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Abstract 
One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of 
‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) 
John Michael Meyer, PhD 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 
Supervisor:  Ami Pedahzur 
Winston Churchill declared Major-General Orde Wingate ‘a man of genius’ for developing 
what he considered low-cost, high-risk, and high-leverage operations in three theaters of the 
Second World War. One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the adoption of 'special forces' tactics 
and strategies (1903-1944) tries to answer two questions: Why did Wingate and his superiors 
adopt 'special forces' strategies and tactics, and why did individuals choose to join his 'special 
forces' units? I use biography and comparative biography to help answer these two questions. I 
provide a narrative of Wingate's life, but I also construct biographical sketches of some of his 
peers, rivals, superiors, and followers during his campaigns in Sudan, Mandatory Palestine, 
Abyssinia, and Burma. I ultimately find that while Wingate's unusual upbringing contributed to 
his propensity for creating new military units, it was ultimately his aggressive competition with 
other British officers for scarce honor and prestige that spurred him to create the units he 
branded 'special forces.' His leaders, on the other hand, adopted Wingate's special forces 
strategies out of desperation, and only when they lacked the resources to win 'traditional' 
campaigns. Wingate's followers did not always volunteer to join his units (compulsion occurred 
in several instances), but many officers joined his ranks with the intention of obtaining a role in 
violent combat; like Wingate, they sought the prestige and role-fulfillment that some soldiers 
seek through war. Despite the inherent risks of special forces tactics, many soldiers 
vii 
paradoxically thought their odds of survival were higher with Wingate than in traditional military 
formations. In many instances, the competition between soldiers required more personal 
investment than any action against the ‘enemy.’ 
 The extensive use of comparative biography encourages the examination of previously 
unused sources, including unpublished memoirs and oral histories. My writing, at times, 
examines stories that do not answer the central questions of the dissertation, but provide a rich 
understanding of the behavior of British soldiers in Palestine, Abyssinia, and elsewhere. As a 
social scientist, I attempt to understand the subject as a salient example of organized violence, 
and not just as a series of unique historical incidents. 
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1. Introduction
Orde Wingate and the adoption of 'special forces' tactics and strategies (1903-1944) 
The actions of Major-General Orde Charles Wingate provide the narrative backbone of 
this dissertation. Wingate was a British army officer from the time of his graduation from the 
Royal Military Academy Woolwich in 1923 to his death in an airplane crash in 1944. He became 
famous for his extravagant risk-taking, his unorthodox methods of organizing and deploying his 
forces, his extensive use of Judeo-Christian imagery to inspire his troops, and (eventually) his 
high casualty rates. His methods had a pervasive influence on future generations of soldiers, 
and shaped how Britain and the United States fought wars in British Malaysia, Vietnam, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan. In 1938, in British Palestine, Wingate founded Jewish-British units called 
Special Night Squads; these units are now considered the forerunners of the modern Israeli 
Defense Forces. Israeli leaders like Moshe Dayan credited Wingate for inspiring modern 
Zionism's turn towards aggressive action against what Wingate considered Arab 'bandits.' In 
1941, Wingate founded a Sudanese-Ethiopian-British unit called 'Gideon Force,' and led it 
against the Italian occupiers of Abyssinia. In 1943 and 1944 Wingate organized and led yet 
another new formation, the 'Chindits;' these troops fought against the Japanese in the colonial 
province of Burma, a region that grips the northeastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. Wingate 
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liked to call his units 'special forces,' and his style, methods, and training set precedents that 
Western militaries continue to follow; this is an interesting development, because many of 
Wingate's more successful British peers (including Bernard Montgomery and William Slim) 
considered Wingate an unsuccessful fraud who threw away the lives of the soldiers that 
followed him into battle.1 Building on previous studies from Christopher Sykes,2 Shelford 
Bidwell,3  and Simon Anglim,4 my dissertation offers a biographical analysis of Orde Wingate 
while focusing on two key questions that help us understand broader trends in modern warfare: 
Why do leaders choose to adopt special forces tactics and strategies? And why do soldiers 
choose to join such units?  
 I have come to believe strongly that answering these two questions requires an 
understanding of human developmental tendencies; to state the problem more broadly, how 
can human psychology and human development inform the study of military operations? 
My interest in human development led me to place more weight on the emotional responses of 
Wingate's acquaintances; I often wanted to know how they felt about his actions, and their 
own. Emotions lead to hunches, speculations, and unconfirmed suspicions, but also signal a 
                                           
1 Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York: Da Capo, 1992); William Joseph Slim Viscount 
Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell, 1956). 
2 Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate, a Biography (Cleveland World Pub. Co, 1959). 
3 Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma, 1944 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1980). 
4 Simon Anglim, Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior from the 1920's to the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Pen & Sword, 2014). 
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keen awareness of the inexplicit costs of military behavior.5 During my study, I made use of 
many unused archival sources (including audio interviews and unpublished manuscripts) that 
affected the broad shape of Wingate's story in unexpected ways.6 Human sexuality, status, and 
intragroup competition, for example, play a surprisingly critical role in shaping the choices of 
individual soldiers—but 'choice' may not be the best word. The individuals choose in the sense 
that their behavior varies among a wide-range of possible activities and attitudes. Some 
soldiers, like Wingate's best lieutenants, Michael Calvert and Anthony Simonds, whole-heartedly 
embraced what they perceived as the opportunity to undertake an exciting and independent 
type of warfare.7 Others, like Peter Acland, responded to Wingate with lasting antipathy and 
resentment; Acland resented Wingate's swift rise through the ranks, and felt that 'special forces' 
simply meant inventing half-baked answers to unsolvable logistical and strategic riddles.8 
Regardless of their reaction to Wingate, the soldiers around him devoted tremendous time and 
energy to arguing, begging, cajoling, defending and attacking each other, rather than the 
5 L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. 
M. Lewis and J. M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guildford Press, 2000); Laith Al-Shawaf and David Lewis, 
"Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions," in Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences, 
ed. V. Zeigler-Hill and T.K. Shackelford (Cham, Switzerland Springer 2017).  
6 Lorna Paterson, Audio Memoir of Lorna Paterson Wingate Smith (Cotswolds, UK: Private Collection of 
Lucy Catling, 1973; 1974). 
7 Anthony Simonds, "Pieces of War," (Imperial War Museum, London, 1985); J. M. interviewed by Conrad 
Wood Calvert, Oral History 9942 with J. M. Calvert (London: Imperial War Museum, 1987). 
8 P. B. E. interviewed by Conrad Wood Acland, Oral History 11584 with Peter Bevil Edward Acland 
(London: Imperial War Museum, 1990). 
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'enemy.' The pattern found here is not quite internecine, but rather one of persistent 
competition, and it is a pattern that holds elsewhere in the study of organized violence. 
Despite facing intense competition from foreign enemies, soldiers spend far more time 
competing with each other than fighting their mutual opponent, even when that opponent is as 
powerful and infamous as the Axis powers during the Second World War. The study of warfare 
reaches back three-thousand years; the finding that soldiers compete with one another is hardly 
novel. Book one of Homer's Iliad begins with Achilles, the best Greek soldier, arguing with his 
commander over the spoils of war.9 Thucydides opens his history of the Peloponnesian war by 
recounting vigorous debates within the city of Sparta.10 Stephen Peter Rosen's recent thesis, 
War and Human Nature, argues that tyrannical war leaders tune-out dissenting peers and rivals 
in their greed for status.11 But soldiers, specialists, and military scholars often gloss over such 
internal conflict in their rush to describe battle.12 The proportion of writing devoted to internal 
competition and decision-making is not commensurate with the amount of time soldiers actually 
spend doing it.13 The dissertation takes a step in correcting that imbalance, and necessarily 
9 Homer, Richmond Lattimore, and Richard P. Martin, The Iliad of Homer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011). 
10 Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive 
Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996). 
11 Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
12 Cathal J. Nolan, The Allure of Battle : A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017).  
13 When researchers do examine an emotion in modern combat, they are likely to focus on the 
manipulation and management of fear, especially at relates to competition against an ‘out-group’. Eyal 
Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit, vol. 10 
(Berghahn Books, 1998); Joanna Bourke, "The Emotions in War: Fear and the British and American 
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examines the emotions, impulses, and behaviors that occur in the throes of war, both in its 
noisy seconds and quiet hours. As a historian, I do not assume that their behavior as soldiers 
strictly adheres to a ‘rational choice’ model, but like a social scientist, I do assume that behavior 
tends to unconsciously conform to 'rational,' predictable patterns: I hold the view that biological 
evolution undergirds human behavior, and shapes and limits its possibilities in remarkable ways. 
Still, for the sake of readability, I slide most of the theorizing into the introduction and 
appendix, and the bulk of the dissertation concentrates on matters of interest to a wider 
audience.  
 I examine the narrative of Wingate's life, but I also provide biographical sketches of 
some of his peers, rivals, superiors, and followers. The extensive use of comparative biography 
led me to examine stories that do not directly answer the central questions of my dissertation, 
but do provide a rich understanding of the behavior of British soldiers in Palestine, Abyssinia, 
and elsewhere. 
1. OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
 The present chapter outlines the scope, purpose, and tendencies of the study. In this 
chapter, I place a particular emphasis on the relationship between two rival approaches to 
studying organized violent behavior—history and science—and argue that history provides a 
way to jump ethical and practical hurdles presented by the scientific study of human violence. 
When using history, I lean heavily on a biographical, cradle-to-grave approach to sketching 
characters and placing them within their particular time period. In social science parlance, my 
                                                                                                                                        
Military, 1914–45," Historical Research 74, no. 185 (2001); Jonathan Gratch and Stacy Marsella, "Fight 
the Way You Train: The Role and Limits of Emotions in Training for Combat," The Brown Journal of world 
affairs 10, no. 1 (2003). 
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'unit of analysis' is human life, and this shapes the particular way in which I understand the 
social phenomena that interest me. It leads me to focus on Orde Wingate, his followers, and his 
peers in a biographical style, but to do so while allowing wider questions about organized 
violence to move my investigation forward.  
 Following the theme of my first chapter, my second examines Orde Wingate's birth, 
family structure, upbringing, and adolescent development. While birth and childhood do not 
fully determine adult behavior, they do provide a time for an individual's socialization, and their 
early reckoning with the world around them. Wingate's early learning experiences bring to mind 
the lessons of evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby14: The physical 
conditions surrounding Wingate (his environment) evoked particular behaviors (especially 
perhaps his stubbornness, depression, and contrariness); meanwhile Wingate's parents, 
teachers, and peers transmitted particular ideas, values, and representations to him. In 
particular, Wingate's parents and his social environment established the criteria by which he 
could measure himself in terms of dominance and prestige—or what is commonly called self-
esteem.15 
                                           
14 Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and 
the Generation of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 
15 J. Barkow, Darwin, Sex, and Status: Biological Approaches to Mind and Culture (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1989).  Considered within the framework of evolutionary psychology, prestige served as a 
mechanism for motivating Wingate to earn respect among peers, and determine whom to challenge and 
to whom to submit. The twin phrases ‘prestige’ and ‘honor’ were qualities that one of Wingate’s 
contemporaries, George Orwell, loved to acknowledge and mock in his peers. George Orwell, Burmese 
Days (New York: Harcourt Inc, 1934), 78-79. The interplay between dominance and prestige is of 
continued interest, as seen in J. T. Cheng et al., "Two Ways to the Top: Evidence That Dominance and 
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 The third chapter traces the early years of Wingate's career, especially through the eyes 
of his best friend, Derek Tulloch.16 After a restless few years as a subaltern, Wingate spent a 
few more restless years studying Arabic and posting to the Sudan Defence Force—a move 
which was partly motivated by his desire to avoid marrying his fiancé, and partly for the 
prestige of holding an independent command in the desert. Rather than simply reiterating the 
arguments of his biographers, I place Wingate in perspective by examining the lives of other 
soldiers and civil servants whose careers followed similar paths in the Sudan.  
 The fourth chapter examines the evidence for Wingate's romantic life in the 1930s, 
including his discarding of his fiancé for a much younger (and wealthier) woman, and the ways 
in which his sexual behavior influenced his military career. In the company of his young wife, 
and after having sold himself to her as a man of action, mystery, and power, he deployed as a 
staff officer for the British military units responsible for securing Mandatory Palestine. As a part 
of my study of this period, I examine his wife's assertion that he used intelligence missions in 
Palestine as cover for extra-marital affairs. Following a more martial tune, Wingate joined a 
number of other British officers in favoring nighttime operations over daytime patrols; he also 
favored integrating British soldiers with Jewish supernumeraries, despite substantial political 
pushback from the Palestinian civil authorities. Interestingly, Wingate, unlike his peers, became 
famous for his military actions in Palestine, and is still well-regarded in Zionist circles as the 
founder of the Special Night Squads. As with the previous chapter, my strategy is to  compare 
and contrast Wingate's story with those who served below, above, and beside him. Echoing the 
arguments recently made by military historian Simon Anglim, I find that Wingate's apparent 
                                                                                                                                        
Prestige Are Distinct yet Viable Avenues to Social Rank and Influence," Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 104, no. 1 (2013). 
16 Derek Tulloch, Wingate in Peace and War (London: Macdonald and Co, 1972). 
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Zionism and tactical approach do not stand out in stark relief when compared with other British 
soldiers.17 His violent behavior appears almost minimal next to that of his peers. But he did 
stand out for the organizational skills he brought to intelligence gathering, his relish for training, 
and his participatory engagement with local cultures, especially the secular kibbutz movement. 
 The fifth chapter again places Wingate in comparative perspective, but this time 
explores the sweep of Wingate's actions during the Second World War, especially what he 
deemed his 'special force' campaigns in Abyssinia and Burma. In Abyssinia, sexuality again 
played a strong and underreported role in Wingate's campaigns. The Sudanese and Ethiopian 
soldiers he commanded commonly took on 'war wives' as companions; the British enlisted 
personnel also took up the practice; sexually transmitted diseases and the costs of reproductive 
effort added to the difficulties of the campaign, but the 'war wives' also provided one of the 
strongest incentives for the soldiers to keep fighting during an isolated campaign against 
numerically superior and better equipped Italian forces. Strife among the British officers again 
proved a dominant theme. At the conclusion of the Abyssinian campaign, Wingate's failure to 
acquire military honors and better pay for his soldiers directly contributed to his suicide attempt 
in Cairo in 1941.  
 Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, one of Wingate's commanders and supporters in both 
Palestine and Abyssinia, summoned him to Burma less than two years later as the Japanese 
tore their way through British colonies on the way to the Indian subcontinent; the Japanese 
reached the absolute limit of their advance in Burma, and Burma was where Wingate would, in 
a two-year blink of time, make his largest mark in the history books. Unlike in his previous 
campaigns, Wingate relied almost exclusively on European soldiers and British Ghurkas to form 
his 'Chindit' columns. These were light infantry units that he expected to penetrate deep into 




the jungle and disrupt Japanese supply lines; here, their reception by the local populace varied 
widely, as the villagers did not trust either the British or the Japanese and had no interest in the 
success of either group. Further, the campaigns consisted of long-range maneuver warfare, 
with little of the local politics that took place in Sudan, Palestine, or Abyssinia. Unlike those 
earlier campaigns, there was no effort to establish legitimate political authority in Burma—the 
overwhelming strategic goal of the British Army was to use minimal resources to poke, prod, 
and defeat the Japanese soldiers that had taken over a British colony. The concern for local 
politics nearly vanished, but the politics of honor within the military itself was as vicious as ever; 
and the stakes were high enough that the game continued to be played well after Wingate's 
death. Some officers who had supported Wingate during his life, such as Field Marshal William 
Slim, began retracting their praise several years after Wingate's death, and came to view the 
Chindit operations as strategic dead-ends that served no real purpose in defeating the 
Japanese. During the years between the First and Second World Wars, promotions were scarce 
in the British Army; the Second World War created many opportunities for officers with stalled 
careers (including Wingate), but some fared better than others, and at least some of the 
resentment towards Wingate stemmed from his quick progression from captain to major-
general, and his post-war fame. A more serious source of resentment, however, were the 
brutally high casualty rates that his men suffered in Burma; it was a minor theatre of 
operations, and the British had few spare bodies to fill the shoes of the missing and the dead. 
Still, most Chindit veterans became intensely proud of their service in a 'Special Force,' and 
many became famous advocates for the exact sort of warfare that had gotten so many of their 
friends killed: train hard, fight cheap, and win honor. But honor is scarce, even in wartime, and 
so the competition for military honor results in bitter struggles for command opportunities, 
military resources, and attention from the press.           
10 
 
2. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS  
 I ultimately find that Wingate’s leaders initially adopted special forces tactics when 
facing a severe deficit of resources—a sense of loss—but that their initial commitment to such 
modes of warfare lacked 'brakes';18 in other words, the noise and status associated with special 
operations created a self-perpetuating, semi-independent army whose resourcing could only be 
stopped with a counterbalancing, massive success on the part of conventional forces.19 
Individual soldiers chose to join special forces units because of two seemingly contradictory 
impulses; first, they personally perceived special operations methods as safer for themselves 
than conventional warfighting (but evidence shows it was in fact much more dangerous); 
second, the soldiers desired the higher status accorded to special forces units.20 Special 
operations leaders often rewarded their soldiers with promises of extra pay and promotion, 
military medals, and even increased access to sexual partners. But leaders also promised a 
                                           
18 Several political science studies show links between a ‘domain of loss’ and an increase in risk-taking. 
See Rose McDermott, "Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission," 
Political Psychology  (1992). "Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First 
Decade," Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (2004). Both of McDermott’s studies makes use of the ‘prospect 
theory’ first proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk," Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society  (1979).  
19 In Abyssinia in 1941, the conventional victories of Platt and Cunningham overwhelmed the ‘buzz’ 
surrounding Wingate’s simultaneous campaign. In Burma, Slim’s more conventional campaign eventually 
retook Burma in 1945.  
20 For examples of clear status-seeking, see Bernard Fergusson, Beyond the Chindwin: Being an Account 
of the Adventure of Number Five Column of the Wingate Expedition into Burma 1943 (London Collins, 
1945; 2009; repr., Pen and Sword). R. King-Clark, Free for a Blast (London: Greenville Publishing 
Company Limited, 1988). 
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more rigorous commitment to training, and a more honorable role in combat operations. 
Soldiers rejected or denigrated special operations if service in conventional forces could assure 
them of the opportunity for advancement, security, and the perception of safety. They also 
rejected special operations methods if, prior to joining the unit, they did not go through an 
indoctrination period that required a costly personal investment of time and energy in quasi-
realistic training exercises.21 Leaders who successfully organized special operations units 
possessed a strong imagination; they imagined and designed (and even fantasized) honorable 
victories, and communicated those concepts to their superiors and subordinates; the honorable 
victory promised to require fewer resources than a more conventional alternative, and it also 
promised to enable individual members of the unit to imagine their own survival and escape.  
 The complex relationship between what special forces are, and what they claim to do, 
can be enlightened with a specific example of the most optimistic assessment of their 
capabilities—to that end, here is an extended quote from Charles J. Rolo, the American 
journalist whose 1944 account of Wingate’s first expedition in Burma placed Wingate’s star—
and special operations—in the firmament of military imagination:  
Wingate’s unorthodox, spectacularly successful conception of warfare is a fantastic 
combination of the primitive and the modern. He himself is a natural-born guerrilla 
leader—fearless, inexhaustible, always alive to the unexpected. [...] Yet this fanatical 
exponent of the rapier-like commando thrust is also the man responsible for introducing 
to guerrilla warfare a Wellsian blend of modern science. He built the Burma expedition 
around daring new uses of the plane and the radio [...] He is an expert in scientific 
nutrition [...] A master of propaganda, he has a genius for winning co-operation form the 
                                           
21 The training enabled ‘dissonance reduction’. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1962). 
Especially clear examples found in Bidwell, 62-63.  
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natives of a country; in Ethiopia and Burma as well as in Palestine his intelligence system 
was infallible.22 
Strong language, and entirely consistent with most descriptions of special operations: 
unorthodox, spectacular, successful, guerrilla, fearless, fanatical, inexhaustible, modern, 
scientific, infallible. It is a swirl of language, and not entirely consistent. Science rarely 
lends itself to fanaticism or infallibility or even fearlessness. Yet that is the combination 
that Rolo propagated, not just for readers of war writing but in one variation or another 
for the readers of The Atlantic Monthly and The Reader’s Digest.23 The selling points 
that Rolo describes are exactly why special operations prove attractive to commanders 
and soldiers, and the contradictions are why they prove unsuccessful.  
 There is a deeper and perhaps more abstract puzzle that I pry from the life of Orde 
Wingate. As the strategist and scholar Lawrence Freedman points out, military strategy 
ultimately involves three components: deception, coalition formation, and the instrumental use 
of violence.24 In the following study, we will see that for the individuals involved in a war, the 
instrumental use of violence is of secondary importance; their primary efforts go towards the 
dynamics of coalition building itself, and heated internal competitions for “goodness”.25 Yet 
                                           
22 Charles James Rolo, Wingate's Raiders: An Account of the Fabulous Adventure That Raised the Curtain 
on the Battle for Burma (New York: The Viking Press, 1944)., pg 21. 
23 Ibid., book jacket description of the Rolo’s writings on Wingate. 
24 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford;New York;: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
25 Coalition building and warfighting are, to borrow a phrase from Rose McDermott, “flip sides of the 
same coin”, as seen in Richard W. Wrangham, The Goodness Paradox : The Strange Relationship 
between Virtue and Violence in Human Evolution (2019). Rose McDermott’s comment came to me 
through a personal correspondence (March, 2020). William James thought of coalition building as “war’s 
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when successful leaders create the narrative of the wars they participated in, they tend to 
prioritize the planning, execution, and results of instrumental violence, and minimize their 
discussion of coalition building, especially the ruthless bureaucratic arguments that consume 
military staffs and infantry squads throughout the world.  
 In terms of safety, status, and biological reproductive effort, participating in violence is 
very risky, and perhaps that is why human beings caught in the Second World War found 
narratives of violence 'stickier' than the more frequent instances of coalition building. 
Interestingly, officers and soldiers in the Second World War dreaded the awful shadows of the 
Great War of 1914-1918, a bloody, grinding conflict of trench warfare that thoroughly shaped 
Twentieth Century thinking,26 creating what literary critic Paul Fussell has described as a 
vicious, sardonic irony that undermined the status historically associated with military life in 
Western culture. For officers like Wingate, caught in the Second World War, the Great War 
loomed as a threat, not just to their lives, but to the historical honors and status associated 
with their professional struggles. Coalition building became an unexpected battleground over 
narrative, and officers competed with one another to cast their rivals in the role of out-of-touch 
'Great War' style officer threatening to waste the lives of their men in meaningless campaigns.27 
                                                                                                                                        
disciplinary function” for which he sought a “moral equivalent”. William James, "The Moral Equivalent of 
War," in William James; the Essential Writings, ed. Bruce W. Wilshire (1906; 1971). 
26 Bourke. 
27 Within the competitive interwar military culture, Archibald Wavell earned the strongest reputation, 
partly through writing wry essays (and even Socratic dialogues) challenging the mistakes of the First 
World War, and arguing which methods would win the next. The best examples of his writing appear in 
A.P.  Wavell, The Good Soldier: A Selection of Essays, Lectures and Articles by Field-Marshal Earl Wavell 
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1948).  B.H. Liddell Hart lionized the ‘indirect method’ of soldiers like T.E. 
Lawrence ‘of Arabia’ and questioned the tactics and strategies of the First World War. B.H. Liddell Hart, 
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To avoid such a charge, Wingate therefore literally rewrote his campaigns. His infantry brigade 
in Burma became a 'special force.' To distance himself from the Great War's waste of entire 
units, he rewrote battalions as 'columns,' and his soldiers as 'Chindits.' In Abyssinia, his soldiers 
fought as members of 'Gideon Force,' ripping their title straight out of the Old Testament, and 
straight out of Wingate's own experiences in Palestine. His rival officers, however, pushed back 
against Wingate's preferred narrative, and with blistering Great War irony labeled Wingate's first 
mission in Burma as "Operation Longcloth," mocking him as a pseudo Tarzan. After his death, 
the officer who received command of Wingate's soldiers dismissively referred to Wingate's 
techniques as "Chindit bullshit," the latter half of the derogatory term a crucial bit of Second 
World War sneering as soldiers of all ranks jostled for "realness".28 It is the combat over men's 
memories of the Great War, not just their bodies present in the Second World War, that best 
explains the development of 'special forces,' as well as the peculiar fact that soldiers spend so 
much time arguing with one another in 'coalition building' rather than fighting the enemy.  
 In any event, the Second World War grows more mythic in popular memory with each 
passing year, but the arguments contained in this study may help to stem the tide of inaccuracy 
and imprecision. In that spirit, the next section will prod the concepts of 'war' and 'organized 
                                                                                                                                        
Reputations, Ten Years After (Boston: Little, Brown, and company, 1928). B.H.L. Hart, "T.E. Lawrence" in 
Arabia and After (Greenwood Press, 1935). The competition came to a head during the Second World 
War, and can be seen with Hart’s 1941 offering (re-titled in 1942): Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The 
Indirect Approach, or the Way to Win Wars (1941; 1942; 1954). A more scathing example comes from 
Peter Anthony Thompson, Lions Led by Donkeys, Showing How Victory in the Great War Was Achieved 
by Those Who Made the Fewest Mistakes (London: T.W. Laurie Ltd., 1927). 
28 For an explanation of the term ‘bullshit’ in the Second World War, see Paul Fussell, The Great War and 
Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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violence,' and determine the challenges of studying some of the most frightening phenomena 
known to our species.    
3. THE STUDY OF AGGRESSION, VIOLENCE, AND ORGANIZED VIOLENCE  
 When thinking about the experience of war and organized violence, it helps to step back 
and take a wider look at the study of violence, and the variety of observable types of violence 
that appear in our world. I do not think we can understand Orde Wingate—or his peers—
without taking this wider look at violence, and thoughtfully, openly adopting our assumptions 
about aggressive behavior.  
 Orde Charles Wingate talked, mated, and fought his way through the sort of military and 
political problems that Westerners have faced over and over again in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries: terrorism, racism, religious conflicts, territorial disputation, nationalism, war, and 
innovation are all prevalent themes. Wingate died during the Second World War, a war that was 
the largest and most costly incident of organized violence the world has ever known. The 
conflict permanently reshaped the world; it shattered empires, vanquished entire nations, and 
killed millions of people.29 The Second World War was an historical aberration and a unique 
event.30 But the day-to-day actions, habits, and patterns of the people who lived, fought, and 
died in that war fit within established behavioral patterns. My research, in a sense, merely 
describes the processes of organized violence—that is, it describes human beings who 
cooperate to aggress against a third party. Ostensibly, cooperating partners organize for 
                                           
29 For an account of the consequences and violence, see Antony Beevor, The Second World War (New 
York: Little, Brown and Co, 2012). 




violence to secure benefits for themselves. Their cooperation results in damages and costs 
intentionally inflicted against a rival. But the simplicity of the goal misleads us, and it is easy to 
miss the complexity of the cooperative relationships.31 Who will be in charge of the group? How 
will they identify an enemy? Why do soldiers trust one another? Why do they sometimes fight 
amongst themselves? How much time do they actually devote to combating the enemy? What 
do they do with the rest of their time? The search, I argue, must begin by recognizing the need 
to describe the cooperative relationships that perpetrate violence. 
 Some writers conflate all violence with war. Thomas Hobbes, for example, described 
individual human beings as existing in perpetual war with one another unless they consign their 
rights to a powerful nation-state—and even then they face perpetual war, but one of nations 
versus nations, which could afford a geographic buffer from immediate peril.32 But by conflating 
the term 'war' with the violence that occurs between two isolated individuals, Hobbes stretches 
the term quite far.  
 Carl von Clausewitz, the first great sociologist of modern violence, suggested there was 
some merit to thinking of war as "nothing but a duel on an extensive scale." Yet Clausewitz's 
sharper definitions include "an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" and 
(most famously) "a continuation of politics by other means".33  
                                           
31 R Harrison Wagner, War and the State: The Theory of International Politics (University of Michigan 
Press, 2010). Tarak Barkawi, "On the Limits of New Foundations: A Commentary on R. Harrison Wagner, 
War and the State," International Theory 2, no. 2 (2010). 
32 Thomas Hobbes and Edwin Curley, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1994). 




 Richard English, building on Clausewitz, draws on more recent strategic and social 
scientific thinking to define modern war "as heterogeneous, organized, mutual enmity and 
violence between armed groups on more than a minor scale, carried out with political 
objectives, possessing socio-political dynamics, and focused on the exerting of power in order 
to compel opponents[.]" Having described what modern war looks like, English then depicts its 
time and tendencies: "[modern war] is located in the post-French Revolutionary era of 
nationalism, during which the interwoven dynamics of national community, struggle, and power 
have determined a particular form of violent conflict".34 Both Clausewitz and English describe a 
phenomenon most easily imagined using maps and figures, stacks of military orders and lists of 
supplies and casualties. But English's inclusion of the word "heterogeneous" at the beginning of 
his definition indicates the difficulty in crafting a definition for sustained, objective 
measurement. The Second World War was a war. But English's definition also makes room for 
terrorist attacks large and small, and almost any behavior that the participants involved think of 
as a war. Wingate's anti-poaching patrols with the Sudan Defence Force do not seem like a 
war—the British participants themselves certainly never classified it as such. But the British 
soldiers who took part in military actions occurring in Palestine from 1936 to 1938 could never 
agree on what to call 'it;' the British dynamited town squares, hung Arab bandits, and sold black 
market weapons to both Jews and Arabs. It was certainly violence. And it was usually organized 
violence, by which I mean that individuals cooperated with one another to inflict harm on other 
human beings; it might have been war.  
                                           





 As many writers have pointed out, animal violence serves a number of adaptive 
functions—that is to say, at points in time, organisms that performed the behavior had a better 
chance of passing on their genes to a subsequent generation.35 A behavior, even an aggressive 
behavior, may be considered beneficial for the individual who performs the behavior if it 
contributes to positive outcomes in one of two categories.36 The first category is 'somatic 
effort,' which includes the sum of an individual's investment in its own development and 
maintenance. For an individual in a bureaucratic modern army like Orde Wingate, somatic effort 
can include events like meals, physical training, financial earnings, and private study. For a 
volunteer soldier fighting for Islamic State in 2015, somatic effort could include seizing 
weapons, wealth, power, and status. The second category is 'reproductive effort,' which 
includes the sum of an individual's investment in mating and parental effort. Again referencing 
Wingate, 'reproductive effort' obviously includes his marriage, but it also may include time spent 
developing a relationship with in-laws. The line between somatic and reproductive effort is quite 
                                           
35 Several writers emphasize the direct connection between war and human evolution. Azar Gat, War in 
Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Pinker. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and 
International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2004). John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, "Groups in Mind : The Coalitional Roots of 
War and Morality," in Human Morality and Sociality, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, ed. H. 
Hogh-Olesen (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). 
For a closer look at the details of the logic that underpins some human violence, see: 
David M. Buss, The Murderer Next Door : Why the Mind Is Designed to Kill (United States2005). 
36 Daniel J. Kruger and Carey J. Fitzgerald, "Evolutionary Perspectives on Male-Male Competetion, 
Violence, and Homicide," in The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide, 
and War, ed. Todd K. Shackelford and Viviana A. Weekes-Shakelford, Oxford Library of Psychology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 162-66. 
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thin and hard to distinguish. Once an individual stumbles down a particular somatic pathway, 
certain types of reproductive effort may be closed off forever. In most modern states, there has 
been a discernible effort to unlink reproductive effort and military aggression, a welcome 
development that may reduce instances of rape, and mitigate passions associated with sacking 
cities or defending one's home. The complexity of the ‘benefits of waging war’ to an individual 
are why it is so important to study violence and organized violence in specific historical 
contexts, rather than on strictly abstract terms. But to some extent, scholars have succeeded in 
drawing in some significant abstract lessons about the precise purpose of aggression and 
violence.       
 The anthropologist Melvin Konner provides a particularly brutal listing of functional 
aggressive behaviors observed in animals (including humans): "competition for mates, food, 
and other scarce resources; play and exercise; forced sexual intercourse; defense against such 
forcing; protecting the young; killing the young, either one's own or those of others; 
competition between groups for territory and other resources; prey killing; and self defense".37 
Many of these behaviors do not necessarily result in damage: kittens, puppies, and children can 
wrestle, bite, and knock each other about without permanent harm. But these same behaviors, 
delivered with a few more pounds of pressure, can result in damage (and even death) to the 
participants.38   
                                           
37 Melvin Konner, The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (Macmillan, 2003), 183-
203. 
38 The echoes of violence found in play bring to mind Robert Graves’ ‘The Next War,’ wherein he asks 
children pretending to be Royal Fusiliers “Happy though these hours you spend, / Have they warned you 
how games end?”  Thomas G. Palaima, "Robert Graves’s War Poems," in Irrepressible Adventures with 
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 Aggressive behavior is functional only in the sense that it often seems tied to particular 
short-term goals, such as food, survival, domination, or access to mates. Of course, not all 
aggression succeeds in its short-term goal, overleaping its practical goals and falling into lethal 
bloodshed. War cemeteries around the world testify that violence often misfires and fails for the 
individuals involved; while nonlethal violence is the most common form of violence among 
animals,39 aggressive behavior still leaves many prospective victors in quiet graves. Students of 
aggression can also differentiate between several categories of violence, each of which is quite 
different in its observable qualities in animals: prey hunting is different than stalking rivals, and 
defensive behavior is different than offensive behavior—though human leaders like Wingate 
often do their best to muddle the line between the two.40 There are 'show' threats meant to 
scare an opponent with false bluster, and there are real threats with deadly seriousness. For the 
purposes of the present study, the most important division is between organized violence and 
individual violence. The goal of organized violence—no matter how well organized—seems 
simple: hurt the 'enemy' and help 'ourselves.'  
 A few generations ago, ethologists felt that humans take aggression to unusual 
extremes, and that other animals exhibit greater restraint. Konrad Lorenz, a one-time Nazi and 
longtime scientist, held the optimistic belief that animal aggression is not intended to kill, but to 
                                                                                                                                        
Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain ed. Wm. Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2013). 
39 Hogan M. Sherrow, "Violence across Animals and within Early Hominins," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide and War, ed. Todd K. and Weekes-Shackelford 
Shackelford, V.A. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
40 Anthony C Lopez, "The Evolutionary Psychology of War: Offense and Defense in the Adapted Mind," 
Evolutionary psychology 15, no. 4 (2017). "Making ‘My’problem ‘Our’problem: Warfare as Collective 
Action, and the Role of Leader Manipulation," The Leadership Quarterly  (2019). 
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protect geographic territory.41 Aggression, according to this view, aims to establish resource 
boundaries between groups. Only when aggression goes awry would the behavior result in the 
deaths of its participants. Lorenz felt that aggression is natural, and that it builds up inside of an 
individual and thereafter needs the opportunity for safe release—the idea of pent-up 
aggression. The early optimism of ethologists like Konrad Lorenz gave way to the recognition 
that killing takes place intentionally in the animal world—and it happens a lot. Animals and 
humans do not release pent-up aggression like a safety valve, but instead use aggression and 
deadly violence for targeted, functional purposes that sometimes prove costly to aggressors. 
Animals kill not just for prey, but often with the intention of permanently enforcing territorial 
claims and dominance hierarchies. Deadly violence may even occur between individuals of the 
same species that face extinction, such as within lion prides or groups of great apes. In the 
words of Edward O. Wilson, aggression may occasionally twist into abnormality under bizarre 
conditions, but it "is the total pattern of responses that is adaptive and has been selected for in 
the course of evolution".42 Aggression and violence exists in humans and animals today 
because it has proved useful to their ancestors.  
 Writers Azar Gat and Lawrence Freedmen, drawing on anthropological research, argue 
that human organized violence, just like individual violence, proves useful to the individuals 
involved; organized violence can prove useful because it provides an opportunity to eliminate 
rivals, prove one's worth within a community, and capture mates or resources.43 When 
                                           
41 Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (Psychology Press, 2002); King Solomon's Ring: New Light on Animal 
Ways (New York: Crowell, 1952). 
42 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1975).p. 255.  
43 Gat. Freedman. 
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examining Wingate and his peers in detail, and listening more to their words than to the 
broader Allied narrative of the Second World War, the pattern becomes clear: the purpose of 
organized violence is often to obtain goods for the individuals involved, and not necessarily for 
the group as a whole. Konrad Lorenz, swept up in the nationalistic sentiments of the 1940s, 
missed the fact that the disputation of boundaries is secondary to the benefits of participating 
in such disputations. Of course, participating in organized violence is risky; the individuals 
involved therefore often devise clever ways of mitigating personal risk, but still actively 
competing amongst each other for the rewards of violence. A soldier who has tremendous 
discipline and a strong penchant for bureaucratic competition can, with careful risk mitigation, 
emerge among the greatest warriors in his or her society without personally ever firing a shot.44  
 The link between the scientific study of violence and the history of violence is easily 
ignored: most histories avoid an ordering of humanity's tendencies as a species, and leave most 
patternmaking to philosophers and scientists. And most of science examines narrow slices of 
behavior, rather than broad historical episodes. The two disciplines probably fit together better 
                                           
44 The English officers of Wellington’s army celebrated the receipt of wounds, but frowned upon taking a 
leading part in violence. This was a total reversal from the English medieval period, when King Henry V 
was celebrated for personally cutting down French knights. Orde Wingate appears to have personally 
never killed anyone; in Abyssinia, he often went unarmed, and in Burma he began carrying a rifle. If he 
ever used it, his soldiers do not seem to have noticed. Until he was found to have given classified 
notebooks to his mistress, David Petraeus was widely considered the most cunning warrior of his 
generation and, being too young for Vietnam, is not known to have fired a shot in combat. John Keegan, 
The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1978). Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble : General David 
Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). 
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than the present literature indicates.45 The art of history provides a durable narrative that helps 
human beings understand how they arrived to the present day, and the ongoing behaviors 
which form an intrinsic part of their existence. But the art of history also fulfills a scientific 
role—it serves as a complex catalog of observed behavior. The more ethically challenging and 
unrepeatable the behavior, the more essential the observation. History helps science locate the 
critical questions that must live with indefinite answers.  
 My research, then, emphasizes the personal development, thought processes, 
interpersonal relationships, and goals of Orde Wingate, his followers, his peers, and his leaders. 
Specialists in the study of organized violence and war will find clues to some of the most 
complex and mystifying events of the Second World War, and answers to technical questions 
about the relationship between coalition building and the use of instrumental violence. Readers 
looking for an adventure story will find one, because my biographical approach (as opposed to 
a more abstract assessment of individual behavior) strives to find the details that can paint a 
humane and empathetic understanding of human action, human achievement, and human 
failure amid one of the most terrible epochs our species has ever known. I hope that both 
casual readers and specialists will be intrigued with my efforts, and that my approach spurs 
increasing use of biography as a method for studying violence.     
  
                                           
45  Academic political science often stands apart from the crucible of policy making, and as a discipline it 
has particularly eschewed biography. This is an odd exclusion since the durability of biography and 
memoir among practitioners and the public suggests that they intuit a usefulness in the form that is 
missing from other types of analysis. An important and carefully argued exception was a political 
scientist’s recent study of American strategy specialist Brent Scowcroft. Bartholomew Sparrow, "Why 
Would a Political Scientist Write a Biography?," Perspectives on politics 14, no. 4 (2016). Bartholomew H. 
Sparrow, The Strategist : Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security (2015).   
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2. “These are the bites of their lair brothers” 
 
Men on average have greater height and weight, more upper-body 
strength, higher metabolic rates, higher juvenile mortality, and later 
sexual maturity than women (for a review, see Miller, 1998).46 Such 
attributes are related to competition for resources, social status, and 
mates ,47 competition that can be hazardous, violent, and sometimes 
fatal.  
     Kruger and Fitzgerald (2012).48 
The preceding epigraph, taken from an essay in the Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary 
Perspectives on Violence, Homicide, and War,49 speaks to part of the reason why young men 
like Wingate were unquestionably channeled towards careers in the British Army as they passed 
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from childhood to adulthood, and it broadly reflects a few of the educational steps of Orde 
Wingate's life as a young British male: his parents sending him from India to England; their 
placing him at a prestigious public school rife with interpersonal violence; Wingate's attendance 
at a state-sanctioned military academy; and the intense competition and bullying that Wingate 
faced each step of the way. The competition did not begin full swing, however, until he reached 
adolescence. The nonconformist Christian sect to which his parents belonged—the Plymouth 
Brethren—were nervous about the temptations of wider English society, but at no time did 
Wingate’s parents try to extract their children from that society. Instead, they sought to find 
their offspring competitive places within it.  
 Orde Wingate's early life provides insight into the sort of childhood that leads to a career 
in the British Army of the early 20th century, an army that was a unique coalition organized for 
violence, and one that enabled its members to obtain personal rewards (security and status and 
sex) while striving for unobtainable higher causes (civilization and justice and Pax Britannica). 
Orde Wingate's early life traces the patterns of reinforcement, modeling, stress, life experience, 
and physical development that helped shape his later behavior. The following chapter traces 
almost the exact same story as Christopher Sykes in Wingate’s official biography. 50 Yet where 
Sykes lifted rocks and found small and crawling strangeness, I lift the same rocks and find that 
it is, for the most part, just the same earth on which the rest of us live. The constant themes in 
Orde Wingate’s family history were not religious fundamentalism and unorthodoxy, but religious 
                                           
50 The papers found in the Imperial War Museum’s Orde Charles Wingate collection were originally 
collated for his benefit. The collection will hereafter be referred to as OCW, IWM. The bulk of my 
narrative comes from Sykes’ interviews and research and therefore I cite him throughout, rather than 
feigning to dig a trench where one had already been dug. 
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change, and an economic and social life inextricably tied to various forms of service in the 
British Empire. 
1. FATHER 
 Born in 1852, George Wingate entered the British army through the purchase system, 
whereby gentlemen were expected to pay for their commission into the officer corps.51 The 
officer could thereafter receive promotion partly through commendation, and partly through 
additional payment—a reflection of the high demand for a limited supply of offices.52 The 
purchase system of promotion also ensured that an officer's social rank stood roughly 
equivalent to his military rank; an officer could later prove his fitness for that rank through the 
discipline of his soldiers and his own composure under fire.53 For the cost of £450, George 
Wingate was commissioned in the Green Howards, an infantry regiment with roots reaching 
back to 1688, and that recruited its enlisted personnel out of Yorkshire. George Wingate’s views 
of the purchase system are unknown, but it was already highly controversial by the time he was 
commissioned and would soon be abolished as “antagonistic and incompatible” to professional 
qualification.54 
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 Though the son of a reverend, the young George Wingate must have found little 
satisfaction in his father's own religious beliefs, for he absconded from the Church of Scotland 
for the puritanical discipline of a Christian sect called the Plymouth Brethren. Sykes holds that 
the deep, multi-hued spirituality of India “impelled” George Wingate to the trials of Protestant 
fundamentalism.55 And yet many young soldiers managed to serve in India without any such 
change. According to Sykes, George Wingate demonstrated his faith in many ways. He once 
joined an Indian mystic in a 'trial by fire' in a wordless attempt to convince the mystic that 
Christians could also endure extreme discomfort. And, while on campaign, he forced his soldiers 
to rest on the Sabbath, thus causing his unit to arrive late for a designated rendezvous with his 
commander. He nevertheless earned a mention in despatches (an important British Army 
method of awarding recognition) showing that his general behavior still accorded with the 
expectations of his profession.56  
 In Orde Wingate's files at the Imperial War Museum, few documents reference his 
father. One of the extant relics is an Elementary Course: Field and Permanent Fortification, and 
of the Attack of Fortresses by Captain G. Phillips, Royal Military College Sandhurst, and 
published in 1866.57 It is a technical manual remarkable for its uninspiring dullness, and 
reflective of the drudgery and mechanical advances of the Crimean War of ten years prior.58 
The archives also include George Wingate's own contribution to the technical literature, a 
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manual entitled "Report on Grass Operations, Western Circle, 1888-89," wherein George 
Wingate received credit for assisting Lt. Colonel R. Patch in discovering the availability and 
needs of forage for the Punjab and Baluchistan regions of the empire in India. In some ways, 
Orde Wingate's greatest inheritance from his father was a military heritage shaped by Victorian 
scientific thinking—an almost religious belief that war was reducible into fundamental 
principles.59  
 George Wingate, though well-suited to his career as a professional soldier, was sexually 
and spiritually adrift. Like many of his peers, he lacked the means and opportunity to marry; 
financial difficulties, the same strain that drove him to India as a soldier, also blocked marriage. 
The religious position of his father suggests that the typical avenues of sexual relief--flings, sex 
trafficking, or romantic love--were unlikely, if not impossible. As Ronald Hyam argues, "Leisure 
[in the Indian Army] was really a choice between lying idly on a barrack bunk, perhaps for 
eighteen hours a day (for going out in the sun or masturbating were both believed to drive one 
mad), drinking oneself silly in the canteen, or going to a prostitute (and risking the clap)".60 The 
puritanical George Wingate had few easy options in the 1870s, but his admittance into the 
Plymouth Brethren solved George Wingate's problems in an unusual way. Shortly after joining 
the sect, he set his sights on a captain's daughter, Ethel Orde-Browne--also of the Plymouth 
Brethren.  
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The fact that Ethel Orde-Browne was only twelve years-old at the time of their meeting does 
not necessarily indicate that George Wingate had a tendency towards the sexualization of 
children. He seems to have placed his marital hopes into the future where they could not so 
immediately meet disappointment. Placing sexual fulfillment in the future also allowed him 
many years of self-justified celibacy. They married in 1899. He was forty-six years old, and a 
colonel; she was thirty-two. Interestingly, Ethel Orde-Browne was missing one eye, and as a 
consequence she posed for photographs, even group portraits, facing to the right so as to hide 
the eyeball's absence from the camera.61 
 Ethel was the eldest daughter of Captain Charles Orde-Browne, and the granddaughter 
of Colonel Browne, a man little remembered except as the owner a mansion in Gloustershire 
called Stout's Hill.62 When Colonel Browne died his eldest son (Ethel's father) fell into his 
inheritance at only sixteen years of age. Through his father, Charles Orde-Browne belonged to 
the Victorian class still known as 'country gentry,' the sort that provided most of Britain's 
military officers since the time of the Napoleonic wars, and only stopped fulfilling that role when 
the casualties and demands of the First World War destroyed their customary monopoly on the 
                                           
61 It seems impossible to find a photograph of Ethel Wingate in which she is looking straight at the 
camera, and this would seem to support the idea that she was missing an eye. But an important 
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Green Rose: The Memoir of Lorna Paterson (Charleston: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 
2013), 44.  
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prestigious commissions.63 Charles Orde-Browne obtained his military commission at sixteen, 
and almost immediately deployed to the Crimean peninsula. The young man soon abandoned 
the Church of England for the stern, evocative spiritualism of the Plymouth Brethren, much to 
the chagrin of his family.64 He resigned his commission at the end of the Crimean War. He 
moved to North Woolwich, a suburb of London that was also home to the Royal Military 
Academy, Woolwich. It was in this suburb of London that Charles Orde-Browne would meet 
George Wingate, who would marry Charles' daughter, Ethel, some years later.65 He brought her 
back to India, where in 1903, the year that Orde Wingate was born, a Reverend E.J. Hardy 
explained that “‘wife and children are a kind of discipline’ in the tropics”,66 an idea that George 
Wingate, as a nonconformist, echoed in his own behavior as a call to be a strict and even 
violent disciplinarian with his small children.  
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3. GROWING UP A WINGATE 
 The conventional story of Major-General Orde Charles Wingate begins with the trauma 
of his birth in India on 26 February 1903. The delivery occurred at Naini Tal, a town planted in 
the foothills of the Himalayas; it was the traditional summer residence for the officers and 
officials of the United Provinces. The circumstances of his birth immediately made him a 
product of the British empire, so much so that from the age of two hours to the age of twenty 
years his prospects for an education and for a career did not change whatsoever. As the 
temperatures climbed in that summer of 1903, the Wingate's left Naini Tal for six months of 
earned leave. Their destination was England, in the London suburb of Blackheath. There they 
could rely on constant help from the Orde-Browne grandparents. In early 1904, Ethel and 
George returned to India, but they left their children behind at II Paragon, the Regency-era 
home that belonged to the Orde-Brownes.67 Ethel Wingate, after barely surviving Orde’s 
delivery in 1903, went on to give birth to four more children by the year 1911.68 
 Orde Wingate's sister, Sybil Wingate, helps make some headway into understanding the 
family's life upon resettling in England—and she paints it in various pastoral images, evoking an 
English landscape wherein the empire beckons as a duty and a threat.69 Sybil wrote a number 
of defenses of her brother after his death, including one for the Spectator in 1959 in response 
to the recently published biographies of Sykes and Mosley, both of which cast her family in a 
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strange, uncertain light.70 The following excerpts, however, come from a letter found at the 
O.C. Wingate collection at the Imperial War Museum; it was probably written as a contribution 
towards Sykes’ official biography of her brother.71 It represents not just their childhood, but an 
attempt on Sibyl’s part to shape her brother’s legacy. Sibyl was a complicated, interesting, and 
highly educated woman who turned to socialism at a young age, and as a young woman she 
visited the front lines during the Spanish Civil War—in fact seeing modern combat before her 
brother, the professional soldier.72 As an young adult she introduced her brother to the writings 
of Karl Marx and George Bernard Shaw, and then to various Labour leaders who could help 
advance his career.73 Wingate was never a professed Fabian, but when he later talked about 
world government, or the just and unjust impulses of British imperialism, he would use terms 
that Sibyl helped him discover. He developed a taste for language that echoed Shavian 
epigrams, and the prolix pragmatics of Major Barbara. His use of the Old Testament (contrary 
to Shelford Bidwell’s interpretation) tended towards the rhetorical and ironic rather than 
Christian zealotry. On the first Chindit campaign, for example, he radioed a passage from 
Genesis in order to lure a group of his own soldiers into serving as a decoy.74 And on the 
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second campaign in 1944, he discovered that he would have to improvise a plan around 
fortifying improvised airfields, and so he told his soldiers to “Get ye to the stronghold, ye 
prisoners of hope”.75  As for their childhood, Lorna Paterson, Orde Wingate’s widow, admired 
the floods of warmth that she knew her husband experienced, but she also warned her son, 
Jonathan Orde, that his father’s siblings could be vicious. The first night she spent in the house 
of her in-laws, she was still a teenager and only recently attached to  Orde Wingate. Here is 
how she described the event in her extraordinary audio memoir:  
Colonel Wingate said a prayer for me: ‘This little lost lamb,’ he called me, and I was 
rather touched. But it was lucky for me that I was not a lamb. I may have been a 
Mowgli, perhaps, thrown in amongst them. And it amused them, and rather pleased 
them to see the way (rather than shrinking back as some of their guests did) I burrowed 
my way into the heap. But of course, wolf children, if they survive and are found again, 
always carry scars on their arms and legs. These are the bites of their lair brothers. And I 
was not quite unscarred....76  
Paterson describes an exhilarating and sometimes explosive scene of intense sibling rivalry over 
ideas, religion, literature, and action. Yet the remarkable aspect of the Sibyl Wingate’s letters 
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concerning her childhood with Orde is the earnest strain to cast their childhood in the tones 
often associated with Victorian and Edwardian notions of childhood innocence, and a love of 
medieval romance,77 such as when they gathered to listen to an aunt’s fairy stories, which was 
“in itself pure delight to any child.” 
Unlike Grimm’s and Hans Anderson’s tales, which we also devoured at this age, the 
stories invented by Mother and the aunts were based on a fundamentally optimistic 
outlook, and an unspoken faith in the essential goodness of the universe, which were 
excellent for children ….78  
Sibyl wanted to bring attention to the fact that her brother experienced more than a ‘wrath of 
an angry God’ childhood, even though many of his peers had assumed that his ties to Zionism 
and struggles with depression were rooted in fears of a jealous, all-powerful deity. In fact, they 
were more likely rooted to his sister’s opening of his mind to Marxist thinking, something that 
one of his commanders would later complain about in the Sudan, and which, in fact, Wingate 
himself complained about, occasionally writing intensely felt letters about how hunting opened 
his soul to noble privilege in the face of the coming proletariat revolution.79 Even today many 
casual observers presume his beliefs as a Christian fundamentalist, usually because they weigh 
the views of Wingate’s male rivals or siblings more than the women who knew him best.  Sybil 
seems to have played the strongest role in crafting the narrative of her younger brother’s early 
life, and she pushed Sykes to emphasize the family’s hiking trips to ruined castles and the sites 
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of medieval battles. The trips, she wrote, led them to invent Brontë-like worlds of kings, 
queens, and great battles to be played out over weeks, months, and years. 
 Fire and brimstone, love and fidelity, revolution or conservatism, sentimental antiquarian 
or technological innovator,  parental resentments and parental attachments, prayerfulness and 
agnosticism. Mosley looked for (and therefore found) a fanatic.80 Sykes wrote about everything 
but saw only half it, and declared Wingate puzzling (rather than interesting) and strange (rather 
than eccentric). Royle wrote about everything, and in the balance of the facts declared Wingate 
a moderate. Wingate was neither a fanatic nor a moderate: he was simply another malleable 
young mind, and tethered to the rigors of a childhood bent towards adulthood using tasks 
almost solely aimed at encouraging competition and rivalry within one’s immediate peer 
group.81 The leading public intellectuals of the day searched for  “a vision for a rapidly changing 
world”  though it was a world that was in fact far more stable than the rest of Europe or, 
indeed, the world.82  Wingate would later position himself as what American journalists would 
describe as a ‘freedom fighter’, by which he usually meant an advocacy for a nationalist project 
associated with his campaigns. The slightly elder Sibyl seems to have pushed Wingate in such a 
way as to ensure that he took politics more seriously than their parents, whom she viewed as 
apolitical with conservative instincts.   
At this age we were much preoccupied with the idea of justice and injustice. We used to 
read avidly an English version which Mother possessed of some of the Socratic 
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Dialogues, entitled “The Trial and Death of Socrates,” and Ordey and I once had a long, 
though inconclusive argument on the theme “Is holiness holy because the Gods love it, 
or do the Gods love it because it is holy?” Ordey at this time was, I should say, nine and 
I ten years old. I am surprised to remember now that Ordey plumped for God’s 
righteousness, if there had to be a choice, and I for his omnipotence.  That is, I said that 
if there was a law above God to which He must conform, then God was not God. 
Whereas Ordey maintained that , if good and evil were so only by a sort of Divine whim, 
then God was not inherently righteous but a sort of Almighty Devil. I don’t, of course, 
mean that we used those words at that age, but we knew what we were talking of, all 
the same. It was this attitude, I suppose, which led him at a later date to tell me that 
(like the greater prophets of the Old Testament) he thought that the need for justice was 
the strongest argument for personal immortality. As he put it then, “There must be a 
future life, or there would not be justice for Rink.” (Rink being a fellow Carthusian whom 
Ordey believed to be the victim of great injustice).83 
Sybil ‘plumped’ for God's omnipotence during her childhood, but here she is also making a case 
for her brother's rationality, and using a story from their mutual childhood to defend his 
reputation and memory from accusations of Christian zealotry while in uniform. In her 
understanding of Orde Wingate's early views, the imperfections of earthly justice required the 
existence of a heaven and hell for the meting out of a true justice that transcends the world's 
imperfections. This is, in Sybil's view, tamer than believing that God metes out justice in the 
active world among us. Sybil does not see her brother as a self-proclaimed Christian soldier, but 
someone who is capable of imagining the basic goodness of the universe.  
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 Sybil’s letter emphasizes moments of happiness and the driving curiosity in Orde 
Wingate's early life. But Sybil also remembered the children felt a deep-seated fear of their 
father, with whom there was an “impenetrable wall of reserve and estrangement”.84 Lorna 
Paterson remembers her father-in-law as elderly, but still strong “mentally and physically.” 
George Wingate “was quite polite and kind to me. But he was obviously not very interested in 
Orde, and he was remote”.85 He used to beat little Ordey so severely at the dinner table that 
his sister Monica would excuse herself from the table in order to cry.86 All the children learned 
to memorize large tracts of the Bible, and they would receive an inscribed copy of the book 
from their stern father upon reaching whatever standard he had imagined for them.87 One of 
Wingate’s later biographers, Trevor Royle, argued that the severity of the father and the blunt 
task-mastery required of the children did not differ so much from many of the school programs 
of pre-war England.88 He is right that the commonalities are stronger than the differences. 
 The severity of George Wingate did not prevent the intellectual independence of his 
children. Orde Wingate's struggles with his father’s religion began early in life. His religious 
upbringing would soon chaff against his (comparatively) liberal education at Charterhouse and 
the Royal Military Academy. Sibyl Wingate suggests that most of her siblings eventually 
abandoned the faith of their parents, but that they retained a sense of mission. In John 
Krivine’s fictionalized account of Orde Wingate’s life, he imagines Orde’s three surviving sisters 
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as women who would have “thrown themselves under a passenger train in pursuit of a given 
purpose”.89 There is no evidence that they ever took their passions quite that far. Sybil 
Wingate, in any event, did become a left-wing activist and ardent supporter of socialism; she 
was close enough to British Labour to introduce Orde to the eventual Labour leader Michael 
Foot when her brother returned from Palestine in 1939.90 More intensely, Sybil Wingate went to 
Barcelona to support the Republican government in 1937.91 She first volunteered as a secretary 
for John McNair and the Independent Labour Party in Barcelona.92 A few weeks later, she 
informed McNair that she would be leaving his office to serve as a nurse along the frontlines. 
The Spanish then instituted a policy to uphold traditional gender roles, and John McNair was 
forced to go to the front to persuade Sybil to withdraw to Barcelona.93 She later became one of 
the founding members of the Labour Spain Committee, and vociferously excoriated the Labour 
party for its lack of engagement with the Spanish Republican movement.94 Sibyl’s first 
experience of war and politics therefore predated that of her brother despite the latter’s career 
as a professional soldier.  
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 As Orde Wingate aged into adolescence, his parents took steps to ensure their 
offspring's place in a wider society. To this end they uprooted the family and moved to a large 
house in Godalming, a small market-town with roots in the wool industry, and within easy reach 
of London by rail.95 This location placed them down the road from Charterhouse, an English 
public school oriented towards education of its pupils—and the assuagement of parental fears 
of social decline.96 The Wingate parents, however, feared that the Anglican atmosphere of 
Charterhouse might spoil Orde's fundamentalist religious habits, and so they sent him to the 
school as a 'day boy' rather than as a resident student. In any event, Orde was not perfectly-
equipped for such a conformist environment as Charterhouse but it had less to do with the 
religion he soon shrugged off than his relatively cheap clothes, and his wearing of dress boots 
rather than shoes.97 It was also true that he disliked Charterhouse’s organized sports and ball 
games (an almost unpatriotic attitude at the time), perhaps because they clashed with his 
siblings’ amusements of role-playing, fantasy, and an actual education.98 Sykes’ 1956 official 
biography of Wingate can hardly contain the writer’s fury at his long-deceased subject. The 
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dead man “won no prize and distinguished himself in no branch of study or athletics”, and that 
he preferred hiding in the chapel to “wholesome” activities like cricket or football,99 which 
meant that Wingate was an “irritating little boy” who was “wretchedly unhappy” but Sykes 
knew that it was just “irrational misery” even though no one “can at all remember [Wingate] as 
he then was”.100 Sykes entirely ignored the fact that the “inexplicably unhappy” day boy would 
have remained within reach of his abusive father each night and every morning. 
 The purpose of Wingate’s attendance had less to do with any particular curriculum, and 
more about competition, class identity and solidarity, and access to a military commission.101 
There is no record of the Wingate parents or their many children raising a concern about the 
ongoing First World War. It may have even been viewed as a cost-saving benefit, as students 
who passed through Charterhouse from 1914 to 1918 could graduate and immediately enter 
the ranks of the British officer corps . The idea was that officers had to be gentlemen, and that 
gentlemen came from a short list of recognized public or grammar schools.102 The consuming 
casualty rates of the Great War enabled a rushed admittance process into the profession of 
arms, and Orde Wingate’s parents had aimed their son at this from a very young age; 
regardless of whether or not his parents rationalized it, it was a fact that Orde Wingate was the 
eldest son of three boys and four sisters. He grew up anticipating the Great War, but by the 
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time he finished at Charterhouse the war was over, and immediate acceptance as an officer 
was not possible. Instead, George Wingate applied to the government for tuition remittance for 
Orde’s attendance at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich on account of his advanced age and 
many children; he received it. Most of the Wingate biographers inexplicably ignore the way that 
the daily grind of Charterhouse was in and of itself a preparation for the competitive, 
hierarchical life within the military; they only see Orde Wingate, the eccentric radical who wore 
boots and cheap clothes to school, and did not know how to play cricket.  
 
5. ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY AT WOOLWICH 
 Orde Wingate, like his father, was 'destined' to become an officer. No other career 
seems to have been considered. Wingate's father was an officer, as was his grandfather on his 
mother's side. So strict, meaningful, and enduring are the divisions between enlisted men and 
officers that it is possible that no Wingate since the years of the Norman conquest had ever 
served in the enlisted ranks as a private soldier.103  
 And so, on a day with an anvil overcast in January, 1921, Orde Wingate entered through 
the East Gate of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich to become an army officer.104 The 
academy, popularly referred to as the Shop, was located on grounds southeast of London. 
There are still a few military installations in the vicinity, but the Shop itself shuttered its gates at 
the beginning of the Second World War. It stood vacant for many years. Its brick facing and 
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curious past eventually encouraged a new interpretation, and now the old academy consists of 
chic apartments and condominium units. The structures are made of red and tawny bricks, with 
concrete window frames. Wind gauges sit atop the metal onion tops of the main building. Local 
cricket players gather on the Shop's front lawn to engage in one of the 'ball games' that 
Wingate never enjoyed. The academy had produced officers trained in engineering and artillery, 
while its still standing cousin, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, formerly supplied the 
needs of the more posh infantry and cavalry regiments. Wingate's father aimed his son at 
Woolwich, partly due to its proximity to the family, but mainly due to its relative affordability 
compared with Sandhurst.105  
 Derek Tulloch, who entered Woolwich with Wingate on the same day, recorded his 
impressions of the academy in the book he published in 1972 to memorialize his lost friend. The 
bleak buildings of Woolwich presented little liveliness to the incoming 'Gentlemen Cadets.' The 
cadets lived three or four to a room. The academy furnished each room with stiff chairs, truckle 
beds, wash basins, and lockers. The rooms lacked carpeting and curtains. Each day was 
arranged in a tight schedule. The instructors attempted to make the academic aspects of the 
program directly applicable to military training, so that the coursework interpreted physics, 
chemistry, and history through the prism of military thought and action. Chemistry classes 
examined the consistency of explosives and smokeless powder. Geography described imperial 
holdings in Africa, India, and Australia. Math and physics included calculus, dynamics, and 
mechanisms.   
 For whatever reason, French was an exception to the rule of earnest application to 
military science, and French, Tulloch remembered, "was not taken very seriously." In a clear 
instance of conformity, Wingate also despised French; his instructor, one Mr. H.G. Chambers, 
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labeled Wingate's work "very bad indeed." Wingate retaliated in his French notebook with a 
series of horse sketches. Horse sketches, in fact, trample through all of Wingate's notebooks, 
and occasionally a horse kicks the skull of a cartoon obese man--possibly the French 
instructor.106  
 Every military academy, borrowing from the rituals of the English public schools, has its 
own peculiar rituals of initiation, and it seems that the less relevant an individual’s status is 
outside of the academy, the crueler an individual might be in holding onto its own chits of 
privilege, while insisting that it is ensuring progress among its youngest cadets.107 If a 
Woolwich cadet slid through the program without any trouble he might graduate after a two-
year period chopped into four 'terms.' The school received a new term of cadets every six 
months. The senior term of cadets attempted to maintain discipline among the student body. 
Derek Tulloch perceived no bullying at the Shop, but he did admit that “there were two customs 
or traditions that had been handed down the years, one of which was pretty uncivilised while 
the other could be classed as perilously near brutality”.108  
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 The cadets called the first ritual “The Snooker Dance”.109 Each Friday, the snookers (or 
first-term cadets) gathered outside the Shop's gymnasium. As a uniform, they wore their white 
flannel cricket outfit and a gym vest (a skimpy sleeveless shirt). The snookers then paraded into 
the gym as if at a formal dance, while the other cadets and the shop officers awaited them in 
their best uniforms--no women were allowed to attend. The evening then alternated between 
formal dance and coerced antics. During the intervals of dance, the Royal Artillery Band struck 
up a dance number while every snooker scrambled to find a partner. Should a snooker fail to 
find a partner, he had to latch onto another pair so that all three cadets then had to dance 
together. In between the dance intervals the senior term cadets herded the snookers together 
and forced them to perform idiotic stunts.  
 In Tulloch's account, he cannot bring himself to actually describe what sort of antics the 
snookers engaged in, but he does state that the activities were severe and stupid enough to 
lead to broken wrists and broken ankles. After an evening of dance and antics, the senior term 
waited outside the gym with cans of water “and other unpleasant items”.110 The snookers then 
rushed into the dark night and met what fate they might at the hands of the senior term. For 
resourceful snookers, there was an odd way out of this final disaster: “The passport to 
immunity from this treatment” Tulloch reports, “was to produce a bowler hat, or a portion of a 
bowler hat.” Why a bowler hat served as protection  is not known. For a snooker, passing from 
the first to second term was the most durable amulet of all, and provided immediate exemption 
from this weekly humiliation.  
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 The Snooker Dance enabled the senior term to harass the snookers. In a cloistered 
environment without women, war, or money, the Snooker Dance presented an opportunity for 
status, and a caricatured form of manhood. Woolwich was not alone in its rituals.111  Most 
academies of the period featured similar stunts, though each had its own peculiar character. 
What is special about Woolwich is the particular figures who ostensibly paraded in white 
flannel—Herbert Kitchener112, Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd113, Arthur Lee114, and many 
more. Did Farouk of Egypt or Napoleon IV  receive the same treatment? 115  In a society in 
which the richest rewards came very late in life, the cheap reward of no longer having to dance 
as a snooker seems to have proved valuable as a marker of status and a ritual of bonding. 
 There is no record of what Wingate thought of the Snooker Dance. But his reaction to 
'running'—a brutal disciplinary ritual—is well remembered because during Wingate's two and a 
half years at the Shop, he was the only cadet punished with a 'run.' Running, unlike the 
Snooker Dance, was directly connected with the attempts of the Senior Term to enforce 
discipline. It was requested and administered by cadets, with only a nod of approval from the 
actual officers that staffed the Shop. 
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 Wingate largely ignored his studies, avoided organized religion, and disliked sports. He 
was 'run' due to his one enjoyment: horse riding. The hobby offered a few moments of escape 
from the rest of Woolwich. Due to a sick-drop, Wingate fell six months behind his peers at the 
Shop; thus, when those cadets he entered the Shop with reached their fourth and final term, 
Wingate had only reached his third. He nevertheless won 'spurs' for riding proficiency, which 
accorded him the privilege of voluntary riding periods.116 But the Shop rules indicated that the 
cadets who wanted to ride horses should, in their few free hours, first form a parade prior to 
bicycling to the stables as a group. Wingate made a habit of ignoring this rule. Instead he 
skipped the formation and headed directly to the stables.117 There he could choose a horse, 
mount, and ride off before the other cadets could reach the stables. The other cadets--the ones 
who followed the rule--complained about this to the cadet known as the 'Senior Under.' The 
professional staff at the academy held the Senior Under responsible for enforcing discipline 
among his fellow cadets. For this particular term, Tulloch records the Senior Under's name as 
Whitman. Like Tulloch, Whitman entered the academy at the same time as Wingate, but now 
outranked him by a term. Whitman threatened Wingate that he would be harshly disciplined (be 
'run') if he violated the rule again. Wingate promptly broke the rule.118  
 Whitman, furious and frustrated and already unpopular with his peers, determined to 
run Wingate as a show of force. Whitman first obtained the assent of the Shop adjutant, as per 
custom. Whitman failed, however, to obtain the agreement of Wingate's own term. This would 
eventually prove to be a tactical error, as it violated one of the norms of the academy. 
According to Tulloch, the ceremony of running traditionally existed as a way of "indicating that 
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the cadet's own term considered him guilty of disgraceful conduct .... But in this case Wingate's 
own term were not aware of the decision to run him until after the event was over, and 
obviously neither Whitman nor Wingate took any steps to let them know".119 After bypassing 
this step, Whitman next ordered Wingate to present himself on the rugger ground at 8pm, after 
mess dinner. Whitman then summoned the senior term to that same field, all armed with 
swagger canes, and forming two lines that made a channel towards a water tank. Whitman 
ordered Wingate to strip naked. Wingate obeyed. The next expectation was that Wingate would 
run through the gauntlet of the senior term while receiving blows from the swagger canes, and 
then get tossed into a water tank. But instead of running, Wingate took a slow march down the 
line, staring the senior term in the face and "daring them to beat him." Startled and uncertain 
and not quite comprehending the reason Wingate was receiving punishment, the senior term 
stood motionless but for a few isolated strokes. Finally, at the end of the line, Wingate calmly 
stepped into the water tank on his own accord.120 
 Tulloch and the rest of the senior term quietly fell away, embarrassed and uncertain. 
Word of the 'running' soon spread throughout the academy. When the cadets of Wingate's own 
term received the news, they were furious. Frederick Wintle, a future Colonel, recalled for 
Tulloch that the junior term (himself included) took personal offense, and then ran riot against 
the anonymous (and probably innocent) member of the senior term that they all assumed was 
responsible for Wingate's troubles. The junior term filled the older cadet's bed with coal and 
soaked it with water. The signal soon came for 'Lights Out.' Tempers had calmed down by 
following morning.121  
                                           
119 Ibid., 25-26. 
120 Ibid., 25.  
121 Ibid., 26. 
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 The Commandant of the academy, General Sir Webb Gillman, spoke with Wingate 
shortly after the running. He found Wingate courageous, but immature. He remonstrated 
against Wingate's habits, and launched Wingate on a trajectory of self-improvement, 
encouraging him to make up for his blown opportunities at education.122 Yet the institutions of 
the academy did not solely encourage the sort of education openly proscribed by the 
commandant. The system of demerits, the openly posted class rankings, the quasi military 
promotions, and the student-enforced discipline all encouraged extreme levels of competition 
among peers. They reflected skills necessary for succeeding within an aggressive bureaucratic 
system. Orde Wingate's experiences with peer conflict and competition were intentional 
outcomes of his education, rather than aberrational sideshows, and they helped to socialize 
Wingate and his fellow cadets into the British Army and the British Empire.   
 Wingate entered the senior term quietly, and received a commission in the Royal 
Artillery. He began reading seriously again. Wingate's peers described him in his Woolwich 
years as unhappy, odd, anti-social, mixed-up, bloody minded, untidy, a poor example, 
rebellious, and irreligious. Tulloch, the man who became Wingate's best friend, suggests that 
Wingate “left, after two and a half years, a happy, well-balanced young man, eager to tackle 
the next stage of his career”.123 The academy, at any rate, had sharpened and ‘balanced’ 
Wingate for the narrow competition expected among British officers. 
6. BROADER ACADEMY CULTURE 
 Wingate's life at Woolwich can be better understood by examining military academy life 
more broadly--and even by crossing the Atlantic and examining the educational priorities at the 
                                           
122 Tulloch.pp. 26-27.  
123 Ibid, p. 27. 
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United States Military Academy at West Point. In a study of West Point, Joseph Ellis and Robert 
Moore described the purpose of a military academy as to socialize a cadet such that they focus 
only on fixable, attainable problems that can be broken down into component parts and solved 
with diligence and careful task management.124 An academy also tries to socialize a soldier to 
behave as if always on top of their work, even if they are not. "But the difficulty for a military 
man is that, having mastered the ability of appearing to be on top of the problem, he is very 
reluctant to set his legerdemain skills aside and admit he doesn't understand the problem," thus 
defeating the obvious usefulness of breaking a problem into smaller, more manageable pieces 
in the first place.125 Wingate’s training prepared him and his peers to compete with one another 
in presenting ‘the mask of command,’ a phrase which often translates into an officer offering 
the illusionary presentation of perfectly understanding the situation in front of them. The 
competition then, becomes for perfect understanding of the military problem in front of them; 
failing that (and they must always fail such a high standard), they must compete at the 
presentational aspect. Additional cultural norms at the academy help enable a shallow emphasis 
on war; Ellis and Moore, for example, also found one U.S. Army officer who described his 
service thusly: “We in the military are simply the bullet in the gun, and the gun is the whole 
American society and the trigger is pulled by the President and Congress. So they fire us. They 
decide what we are to hit. We don't worry about the target and we don't pretend we’re heroes 
.... A high degree of professionalism means you don't question your target and you send the 
heroes to the rear”.126 Wingate would eventually become famous for doing exactly the 
                                           
124 Joseph J. Ellis and R. Laurence Moore, School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
125 Ibid., 152. 
126 Ibid., 162-163. 
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opposite: questioning the target and deciding what to hit in Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma. 
After the socializing rigors of Woolwich, Wingate's creeping political idealism could only alter his 
own shot at certain moments, but when it did occur, it would sometimes strike with tremendous 
timing and spectacular aim. In the desperate hours of the Second World War, Wingate’s 
political instincts, which only disrupted his career during more peaceful moments, aided him in 
the competition among his brother officers for prestigious opportunities, as he argued that he 
could leverage minimal resources for maximal strategic gain—a hubris that required a precise 
political logic in order to persuade the senior leadership. But long before he ever demonstrated 
a tendency for unusual political engagement, he passed through a time in his career in which 
his behavior was fairly uniform to the other young officers around him. More often than not, 
Wingate blended in. He was not an uncanny madman, but a young officer competing alongside 
other young men for scarce promotions, and scarce opportunities for honor.  
 The next chapter will examine Orde Wingate’s unusual marriage to Lorna Paterson, and 
draw on a newly recovered source to tell Wingate’s story form her perspective.  
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3. “I only ask that my evidence be taken into account”  
Lorna Wingate, Orde Wingate, and status and sex among soldiers and survivors of 
the Second World War 
 
 “Who is going to believe the widow?” So asks Lorna Moncrieff (née Paterson) Wingate 
Smith in her audio memoir.127 It is the outstanding (and completely overlooked) source on the 
life of her late husband, Major-General Orde Charles Wingate. Orde Wingate was one of the 
most of controversial British soldiers of the 20th century. His short life and long military career, 
1903 to 1944, led writers of all sorts to create a rich and contentious library about Wingate and 
the irregular military units he created and commanded in Palestine, Ethiopia, and Burma.128 
Lorna’s intimate and vivid audio memoirs address several subjects of interest that pertain to the 
Second World War, Orde Wingate, and the sunset period of the British Empire. The following 
                                           
127 Lorna Paterson, 1974, Digital file 5, 37:00. Lorna Paterson’s daughter, Lucy Catling, née Smith, 
possesses the digital files containing Lorna Paterson’s audio memoir. Paterson. She gave the author 
permission to copy the files, and make use of them for the purpose of academic writing. Mrs. Catling has 
indicated a desire to transfer the files to the Imperial War Museum in London. In the meantime, public 
access to some of the materials on the tapes is through a self-published (and fictionalized) volume by 
Krivine.  
128 There are many vigorously contemptuous accounts of Wingate, including: 
Bidwell. Hugh Boustead, Wind of the Morning: The Autobiography of Hugh Boustead (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1972), 138, 41-44, 49-53. S. Woodburn Kirby, The Decisive Battles vol. 3, The War against 
Japan (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961). And Slim.  
For examples of heated counter-assessments, see Peter Mead, Orde Wingate and the Historians (Devon: 
Merlin Books Ltd., 1987). And David Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the Balance (London: 
Arms and Armour, 1994). Bidwell and Mead also sustained an argument through the Journal of 
Contemporary History. Peter Mead and Shelford Bidwell, "Orde Wingate - Two Views," Journal of 
Contemporary History 15, no. 3 (1980). 
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chapter introduces a provocative new source on Wingate, and is likely to fundamentally alter 
the narrative of his character and private life. More broadly, it challenges conventional military 
history’s myopic focus on war-fighters rather than war-families with a look at the interplay 
between the dynamics of status and sex.  
  Wingate’s widow, Lorna,129 created her account in 1973 and 1974 as a direct response 
to the many contrary assessments of her late husband.130 She places a particular emphasis on 
the relationship she shared with him, and his behavior throughout their marriage. Her account 
consists of almost seventeen hours of audio recordings placed on analog tape over a two year 
period, and now preserved on twenty-three digital files; there is some evidence that she 
recorded even more material, but that it either has been lost or destroyed. The tapes explicitly 
state that she created the recordings in direct response to the publication of Derek Tulloch’s 
Wingate in Peace and War.131 In the recordings, she persistently addresses herself to her son 
Orde Jonathan Wingate.132 And she doggedly attacks the writing of Derek Tulloch, as well as 
that of Christopher Sykes (Wingate’s official biographer), and a host of other commentators. 
Lorna claims that she places her son Jonathan’s interests and feelings foremost as she creates 
the tapes; this might have led to romanticism, but instead comes across as a harsh rebuttal to 
Wingate’s large cadre of biographers, friends, enemies, and former lovers, many of whom (in 
her view) polished an unnecessary shine onto his story, or else traduced him. Doing so required 
                                           
129 The following paper refers to the creator of the audio memoir as Lorna to avoid the confusing her 
with her marital partners: she was born ‘Paterson,’ married ‘Wingate,’ and then married ‘Smith.’ Sykes 
and Royle refer to her as ‘Lorna,’ and the present paper follows those imperfect models.  
130 On Paterson., Digital file 19, 43:06, Lorna tracks the time: “This is track one, side one, of tape seven, 
dearest. [...]  I want to pay a tribute to this machine. It’s been going on now for a year and a half, 
perhaps rather more, and it’s done splendid service. [...] It’s January the 3rd, 1974.” 
131 Tulloch. 
132 Jonathan Orde Wingate (1944—2000), born shortly after his father’s transport plane crashed into a 
remote hillside in the jungles of Burma.  
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Lorna to expose previously unknown aspects of their relationship, and reveal new information 
that has been left out of the substantial historiography on Wingate.  
Postmodern Wingate  
 The chief characteristic of accounts about Wingate is their contested nature.133 The 
basic facts can be agreed upon, chief among them that Orde Wingate was born in 1903, was 
raised in a radical Christian sect called the Plymouth Brethren, unhappily attended Charterhouse 
as a ‘day boy,’ joined the British Army after a difficult schooling at the Royal Military Academy at 
Woolwich, served as an artillery officer on Salisbury Plain in the aftermath of the First World 
War, joined the Sudan Defence Force in 1928, broke off an engagement to a woman named 
Peggy Jelley, married a teenager named Lorna Paterson, failed to secure a position in the Staff 
College, obtained a staff posting to Palestine, discovered within himself Zionist sympathies, 
created and led mixed Jewish-British forces against Arab bandits, received his first DSO,134 
nearly derailed his career with pro-Zionist political lobbying in London, deployed to Cairo, 
obtained command of a unit designed to restore the Emperor of Abyssinia to his throne, 
received a bar to his DSO, attempted suicide, returned to London, deployed to Burma, 
penetrated behind Japanese lines with a few thousand British soldiers, returned to British lines 
with a substantially degraded force, received a second bar to his DSO, returned to London, 
accompanied Winston Churchill to the Quebec Conference, argued for and received a larger 
                                           
133 The Orde Wingate papers in the Imperial War Museum (London) provide the basic sequence of 
Wingate’s life, and include, besides his military reports and school papers, the recollections of his family 
and friends. Most of the material regarding Wingate’s time in Palestine was shipped to Steve Forbes’ 
Churchill collection in New York, but it is also available on microfilm at the British Library. Sykes’ papers 
are in the Georgetown University Booth Center for Special Collections, but it is thin on material relating to 
Orde Wingate.  
134 Distinguished Service Order. 
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command, deployed several thousand more British soldiers behind Japanese lines, and then 
died in a plane crash.  
 It is an extraordinary story. The personal narrative is dramatic, even stripped of the 
military narrative; and the military narrative is dramatic, stripped of the personal narrative. The 
interest in both narratives has led storytellers—mainly military historians, journalists, and ex-
soldiers—to grasp at the scraps of facts as a starting point for a multitude of stories and 
arguments which contradict one another, and prevent a clear picture of Wingate as a human 
being.  
 Wingate engaged and inspired the imaginative faculties of others, and many of the 
people he came in contact with lacked either the interest or the discipline to rein in their 
imaginations. Exaggeration accompanies many of his adventures. Biographer Leonard Mosley 
invented a plan in which Wingate wanted to blow up British facilities in Haifa in support of the 
Jewish cause.135 The official biographer, Christopher Sykes, turned hot and cool towards his 
subject, and as a consequence his book, despite its thoroughness, alternates between passages 
of fanciful romance and heedless gossip.136 
 The Second World War was better recorded than any other major conflict up to that 
time, and yet the conflicting accounts mean that Wingate’s actions can, at best, only be 
ascertained with assiduous and painstaking research. The best of this research comes from 
Simon Anglim, a military historian, who provides a careful analysis of Wingate’s campaigns, and 
Wingate’s use of the British military’s small-wars ‘doctrine’ in planning and executing his 
                                           
135 Mosely. According to Wingate enthusiast John Krivine, Mosely’s imagination was probably encouraged 
(and sent astray) by Wingate’s friend, fellow Zionist, fellow intelligence officer (and subordinate in 
Abyssinia), Anthony Simonds. All of the Jewish Haganah members present at the meeting where this plan 
was supposedly discussed have refuted Mosely’s book; Sykes and Anglim both concluded that the 




missions.137 Still, the behavior and attitudes of those involved remain muddy. Confusion is a 
natural extension of guerrilla and unorthodox warfare and the haphazard organization of the 
units involved; most participants in the conflict could not be entirely sure about where they 
were in the battle-scape, what their immediate task was, or what was happening next. Side 
conversations and scuttlebutt abound. They are repeated as often as the official reports, and 
are sometimes more accurate. The limitations of technology, such as incomplete maps and the 
absence of satellite positioning systems, compound the problem. Contradictory arguments exist, 
and they are not going to be settled: Wingate was an indispensible genius, he was worthless 
and derivative, he was strong and courageous, he was a slight man and a moral coward, he 
was incorruptible, he was a freedom fighter, he was an extension of colonialism.138 All of these 
perspectives have merit to them. His early death robbed history of a backwards-looking 
autobiography that could have clarified his intentions and filled in the gaps, or at least allowed 
him to participate in a running argument with his contemporaries who survived the war and told 
his story for him.  
 Of the rival perspectives, the most illuminating is that of his widow, Lorna Paterson, 
though she too could not resist leaving a variety of competing narratives about her husband. 
When he was alive, as might be expected from someone fulfilling the role of a soldier’s wife, 
she participated in the press’s idealization of her husband, and romanticized their first meeting. 
Later she put a harsher edge on the encounter; she developed an increasing awareness of the 
peculiarities of their courtship, and its implications for his polarized reputation. Her 
                                           
137 Anglim.  
138 Wilfred Burchett, a Marxist journalist, created the clearest image of Wingate as a freedom fighter. 
Anglim finds that any reading of Burchett’s journalism “must be done with care” due to his defection to 
(and propaganda for) North Korea, North Vietnam, and perhaps even the KGB. Ibid., 6-7. Wilfred G. 
Burchett, Wingate's Phantom Army (Bombay: Thacker, 1944).  
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disappointment with the Sykes biography, combined with her marriage to John Smith in 1954, 
led her to avoid further direct interactions with journalists and historians, such that by 1999 
(nine years after he death) Bierman and Smith were comfortable stating that in the latter years 
of her life she tended to drive people off “with a shotgun” and “had a problem with bottles”.139 
She was, by the time of her death, dismissive and dismissed, but her audio memoir reveals a 
more complicated picture of status, relationships, physical danger, and a sense of fair play.  
 
SEX AND MATES 
In the biographies of Mosley, Sykes, Royle, Tulloch, and Alice Ivy Hays, the sexual morality of 
Orde Wingate comes across as a vein of Victorian bourgeois prudery, with little interest in 
women beyond fidelity to his mother and his surviving sisters. In his early years as an army 
officer, he stumbles into an almost accidental (and innocent) five or six-year engagement to 
Enid Margaret “Peggy” Jelley. As the narrative continues, Peggy Jelley breaks off the 
engagement due to pangs of the heart after Wingate suddenly falls in love with the young 
Lorna Paterson aboard a steamship crossing the Mediterranean.140 Mosely, the least reliable of 
the writers, goes so far as to argue that “[Wingate’s] inhibitions where women were concerned 
were fundamental [...] He was afraid of women, for what, as his mother warned, they might do 
                                           
139 Bierman and Smith, 390-91. Lorna states on the tapes that the threat of a shotgun was a bluff—she 
didn’t believe she had one on the premises.  
140 Sykes, 87-88. Lorna makes a point throughout the audio memoir to denigrate Sykes’ tendency to 
throw in odd and unsubstantiated stories. Lorna felt that Sykes made her husband less human, and more 
of a cartoon. Lorna viewed her deceased husband as a consistent and ruthless egoist; Sykes viewed him 





to him”.141 In telling such a story, the writers attempt to make Wingate apiece with famous 
British military celibates like T.E. Lawrence and Charles Gordon.142  
 Lorna Paterson’s testimony on the tapes drastically alters the story of Wingate’s 
sexuality, and destroys the romanticized veil thrown around their courtship. Lorna Paterson 
carried a copy of Wuthering Heights, rather than a prayer book, up to the altar on their 
wedding day, and it is in that Brontë vein that the Wingates can best be viewed as a couple: 
self-absorbed and passionate, they were both leaders who used the Bible more as an 
instrument of imaginative power rather than as a rulebook that might restrict their own actions.  
First Engagement 
 Orde Wingate met Peggy Jelley, his soon-to-be fiancé of five years (or six years—the 
start of the engagement was informal), in 1927 while stationed at Fareham.143 He was a 
subaltern and only recently commissioned. The Jelley family lived in a nearby home in what 
Wingate’s future wife denigrated as “rather straitened circumstances”.144  Lorna Paterson, 
relaying the story that Wingate told her immediately after breaking off the engagement, argues 
that Wingate had originally intended to “make a pass” at Peggy’s sister, Mary Jelley, who had 
“the most beautiful legs” but was discovered (again according to Paterson) to be “a lesbian” 
                                           
141 Mosley, 33.  
142 ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ and ‘General Gordon of Khartoum.’ 
143 Tulloch, 35.  
144 Lorna Paterson, audio tape memoir, digital file 2. There is a streak of what might be dismissed as 
gossip throughout Lorna’s narrative. But so-called gossip, though not always verifiable, is intrinsic to 
human behavior, and to the extent that it casts a light on the broader patterns of decision-making it is 
interesting and pertinent.  
Sarah R Wert and Peter Salovey, "A Social Comparison Account of Gossip," Review of General Psychology 
8, no. 2 (2004). 
67 
 
and in a relationship with the wife of a naval officer.145 And so Wingate shifted his focus to 
Peggy. At a dance, they kissed each other passionately. The kiss promoted Peggy to naively 
announce that they were engaged, and Wingate, not knowing what else to do, naively went 
along with it. Tulloch, with a great deal more circumspection than Lorna, simply states that “In 
due course they became unofficially engaged”,146 and Peggy Jelley’s sister, Mary, later wrote in 
tortuous terms that between Orde and Peggy, there was “intimacy that should not have been 
unless marriage was to follow”.147 In the exchange, Wingate and Peggy obtained access to 
premarital sex, and they could live vicariously through one another while the former explored 
Europe, the Near East, and the Sudan, and the latter remained rooted in pastoral England.  
 Wingate’s career provided a barrier to marriage in two ways. First, his subsequent 
assignment in the Sudan lasted five years, and though, due to the climate, British officers in the 
Sudan Defence Force were permitted to go on leave during the summer, the distance provided 
a physical and emotional obstacle to closer union with Peggy. Second, the British Army would 
not provide any accommodations for an officer to have a spouse until turning thirty years-old. 
In the accounts of Sykes, Tulloch, and Royle, these are the main obstacles to Wingate’s 
marriage to Peggy, though Sykes also describes Wingate’s concern that Peggy was too gentle, 
reminded him of his mother, and therefore would fail to push him into the challenges he 
imagined might come his way.148 In cruder terms, Wingate saw the marriage as domestic and 
tame, and perhaps boring and not especially high status.  
                                           
145 Lorna shares this detail to demonstrate to her son that “she hadn’t forgotten anything” about the 
story. It shows Orde and Lorna’s delicious instinct for story-telling, regardless of whether or not it is true. 
Royle states that “To begin with it was Peggy’s older sister Mary who was most attracted by him and his 
sudden enthusiasms: ‘I thought him such a strange young man, half humorous, half morose.’ Royle, 43. 
146 Tulloch, 35. 
147 Royle, 81.Letter from Mary Jelley to Derek Tulloch. 
148 Sykes, 86-88. 
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Lorna Paterson Meets Wingate 
 Nevertheless, Sykes states that “By 1934 it was agreed that the marriage [to Peggy 
Jelley] should not be postponed longer”.149 Most versions of the story remark that it was an 
unfortunate coincidence that Wingate met Lorna Paterson just before he was to be married to 
Peggy Jelley. Only Lorna Paterson’s version explains the timing. According to Lorna’s recorded 
tapes, Peggy Jelley had, at some point prior to his final trip to the Sudan, promised the 
unhappily engaged Wingate that if he fell in love with someone else, then she would release 
him from their engagement.150 Wingate, in other words, was looking for a way out of getting 
married to Jelley, and the only way out was by meeting another woman—or even a lonely 
adolescent. Just before his desert explorations, Wingate duly booked himself a return voyage 
on the Strathnaver,151 the largest ocean liner on the P&O fleet “because there was more room 
for girls onboard”.152 Wingate obviously had hopes of falling in love on his way back to England. 
Before executing the return journey, he celebrated the end of his time in the Sudan with an 
unsuccessful search for the Oasis of Zerzura. It was his first serious attempt at winning fame. 
He did not find the oasis, but when he got out of the desert he did find that the P&O could not 
put him on the Strathnaver, and he instead was to board the Cathay, a much smaller ship. He 
later told Lorna that he took the smaller ship as a sign from God that he would have to marry 
                                           
149 Ibid. 
150 Lorna Paterson, audio memoir, digital file 2, 36:15. 
151 Royle (pg 79) states that the ship was the Viceroy of India. Lorna Paterson states that it was the 
Strathnaver. In either case, the ship was larger than the Cathay.  
152 Lorna Paterson, audio memoir, digital file 2, 38:35. 
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Peggy.153 But before the vessel could complete its crossing of the Mediterranean and dock in 
Marseille, Wingate stumbled into the affections of a sixteen year-old girl, Lorna Paterson.   
 The tone of their first encounter varies widely, usually due to the varied interpretations 
given by Lorna herself. In an account that Lorna told to the American journalist Charles J. Rolo 
in 1943, she described their meeting as “a kind of joint commando agreement,” thereby 
drawing a direct line between the style of warfare for which Wingate became famous and the 
tactics the new couple used to ditch his fiancé and overpower her parents.154 After the 
publication of the Sykes biography, Lorna wrote a short, unpublished memoir that is usually 
referred to as the Edinburgh Manuscript.155 On the basis of the manuscript, Royle asserts that 
“Later in life, Lorna would always maintain that it was love at first sight: ‘I marched up to him 
and said, you’re the man I’m going to marry, we both felt the same way about it’”.156  
 Lorna’s most detailed account, however, is recorded on the tapes.157 It also rings the 
truest. It is notable for its frankness, and for the aching adolescence that created the moment. 
She was returning with her parents from Australia. It had not been a happy journey. The family 
of three had sailed south in a failed attempt to reach Lorna’s ailing maternal grandmother, Alice 
Elizabeth Wigmore, before she died in August of 1933.158 A frantic and fractious hunt for the 
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will ensued, with Lorna’s mother, Alice Ivy (a trained musician and a philanthropist) castigating 
the widower Herbert John Wigmore for reasons the young Lorna could not understand.159 In 
addition to these intergenerational troubles, the relationship between Lorna’s own parents was 
itself fast-fraying, with her mother having only recently (and unwillingly) exited a years-long 
extramarital affair.160 Lorna’s parents continued to cooperate and cohabitate, but Lorna relates 
that her mother told her that she would deny Walter ‘conjugal rights’ for most of their marriage. 
Alice Ivy, Lorna states, was “straight out of Strindberg: she loved attention, and hated sex”.161 
The coolness of her parents’ relationship later shaped the unorthodox character of Lorna and 
Orde’s marriage.  
 The young Lorna was left to her own devices throughout the journey across the 
Mediterranean aboard the P&O HMS Cathay. Her mother played bridge. Her father “solaced 
himself in the bar”.162 Lorna was lonely, bored, and had just turned sixteen. She first saw Orde 
Wingate as he “prowled” up the ship’s gangplank in Alexandria. Wingate instantly struck her 
imagination, and she determined that she was in love with him “at first sight.” Ironically, she 
failed to see him again for some days because she had poor eyesight and, like many young 
people, refused to wear eyeglasses. Eventually, with the help of a friendly retired general, she 
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discovered Wingate in the ship’s library, where he was reading Wordsworth’s Intimations of 
Immortality.  
 Lorna sat down beside him, desperately nervous, and pretended to read for several 
awful minutes. Finally, with her stomach in knots, she managed to turn to him and ask, “Do you 
come from Egypt or Arabia?” Wingate turned to her, put down his book and replied, “I come 
from the Sudan.” Lorna, having already conditioned herself to fall in love with a stranger, did 
not find it difficult to fall in love with Orde Wingate on account of his china blue eyes, his exotic 
soldiering, his reading habits, his soulful conversation, and even his unusual name. Lorna does 
not recall what they talked about—but she does remember Orde making a point of meeting her 
parents. Alice Ivy later reports discussing the prospect of marriage between the two, and she 
said that Lorna was much too young, but that she had been told by a fortune teller that she 
would marry a soldier, and that—who knows—it might turn out to be him.163  
 All this was enough to plan another meeting with Lorna’s family in London at the 
Brown’s Hotel on Dover Street.164 But first, in Paris, he jumped off the train and sent a telegram 
to Peggy Jelley. He told his fiancé not to meet him at the station, where she and Lorna (or 
Lorna’s parents) might meet. After disembarking in London, Wingate vanished from Lorna’s 
sight for a few days, and then reunited, as promised, at the Paterson’s hotel. He took Lorna 
aside and, according to her audio memoir, he told the sixteen year-old everything that had 
transpired between him and Peggy: how a friend had lent them a London flat for their reunion 
just a few nights prior, how Wingate demanded that Peggy keep her word and release him from 
the engagement, how Peggy persuaded him to come out to Farhem and tell her family that he 
was breaking off the engagement, how the family implored him not to break it off so close to 
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the wedding, how the relationship had gone on for years, and been intimate, but that Wingate 
had never quite loved Peggy as much as she loved him, and, finally, how Peggy, as they parted 
forever, determined to keep his revolver, his cufflinks, and their car. Lorna ends the story of the 
breakup by contrasting her response to hearing the story with his attitude in telling it.  
I may say that I was—I was—frozen with horror at all this. I felt guilty you see. I was 
really almost beside myself with misery. I don’t think he noticed this because he was still 
rather shocked himself by what he had to go through. It takes great courage to jilt a 
woman at the altar steps when you’ve known her for six years.165 
Lorna’s shock was that of a young woman having stumbled into a complicated affair bound to 
change the complexion of their hitherto brief relationship. His attitude was a little more 
indulgent.  
The manner in which he told me this tale was an extraordinary mixture. Not at all the 
sort of thing that would seem to tally with Peggy’s account. [...] But he was torn, when 
he was talking to me, he was torn between pity and compassion, very genuine 
compassion, horror, over what he had been through, and his ‘narrow escape,’ as he said, 
and a kind of brutal laughter[...]166 
 This is not the account described in any of the biographies of Wingate. Christopher 
Sykes’ 1959 official biography went furthest in prettying-up the end of Wingate’s engagement 
with Peggy Jelley,167 a result likely accounted for by Sykes’ dependence upon Jelley for access 
to Wingate’s letters, as well as Lorna Paterson’s tendency—prior to the publication of the Sykes 
biography—to protect her husband’s reputation. The Sykes account of the breakup has Jelley 
and Wingate arrange to meet, not in a private room, but outside the Army and Navy club in Pall 
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Mall.168 Peggy controls the conversation with her fiancé, and elicits a confession from him that 
he has fallen in love. Peggy states plainly and immediately that they must break off the 
engagement. Peggy still meets with Wingate several more times over the following months, and 
finally Wingate agrees to put an end to the engagement—and only then at the prompting of his 
mother. Sykes’ account underlines Wingate’s hesitancy and perplexity, thereby meshing with 
Mosely’s portrait of Wingate as being uncomfortable and uncertain with women due to his 
Christian faith. Derek Tulloch and Trevor Royle both fail to either reaffirm Sykes’ story or to cut 
a new path, though Tulloch does step closer to the truth by noting the Jelley family’s 
resentment of Wingate after the breaking off of the engagement. The Lorna Paterson audio 
memoir provides a clarity and precision absent in the other accounts.  
 Lorna recorded her darker version of the story in direct response to Derek Tulloch’s 
publishing of his book, Wingate in Peace and War, in 1972. In order to capture the more 
intimate aspects of Wingate’s character, Tulloch had included within his book a long letter from 
Peggy Jelley in which she described her relationship with Wingate. After she explained her 
anger at Tulloch, Lorna recorded in her audio memoir: 
Now, I have every sympathy with Peggy. I think she had a dreadful experience. It ruined 
her life. And she’s waited a long time for her comeback. Nearly forty years. Derek has 
waited a quarter of a century to get his knife in.169  
As the excerpt above suggests, Lorna was not pleased with Tulloch’s depiction of her marriage 
with Wingate. Though Tulloch had applauded Lorna’s intelligence, eccentric taste in pets, and 
warmth to his own family, Lorna noticed denigrating details that would escape the casual 
reader. Tulloch described Lorna’s conversations with Wingate as “constant arguments,” rather 
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than discussions. He invented animals (loaded with symbolism) that neither she nor Wingate 
ever owned.170 Most importantly, Tulloch had invited Peggy, and not Lorna, to provide “a card 
of entry into [Wingate’s] character. It might be quite interesting to use me as another card of 
entry into his character”.171 The tapes make clear, repeatedly, that Lorna took umbrage at 
Tulloch’s exclusion of her view, and at the aspersion that her absence from the book throws on 
her relationship with her late husband. It limits her public appearance to that of a sporadic 
helpmate, at best, or at worst, a sharpening stone for Wingate’s belligerence. Lorna’s intention 
to defend herself is clear. But Lorna goes on into a more particular vein, one that gets to the 
heart of Orde Wingate’s character, behavior, and consequent reputation. 
And they’ve managed, between [Peggy and Derek], to evolve a theory—a sort of myth—
which I foresee is going to be discussed. The myth is that your father was not the man 
he’s been described as by both friends and enemies—that is to say, a man of force and 
fire and ruthlessness—occasional ruthlessness—and tremendous argumentative ability, 
and various qualities which some people like more than others like, for instance, 
aggressiveness, and uncompromising-ness. The story now is going to be that he was 
very different [in his youth], [and] that he had this shape thrust upon him by the wife 
that was a major influence in his life.172  
Though Lorna remained committed to Wingate’s memory as a brilliant military officer and 
Zionist, she also (in the tapes) seemed to loathe attempts to sanitize his character. It was clear, 
some thirty years after her husband’s death, that her version of the ‘Wingate myth’ had found 
no purchase, and so instead of attempting once more to delicately polish Wingate’s image she 
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would (literally) toss every self-aggrandizing bit of memorabilia into a bonfire,173 and offer as 
much of a confession as she could bear to Wingate’s only son.174 She also did not want their 
only son, Jonathan Orde Wingate, to view her as a malicious and negative force in their lives.  
I don’t want you, darling boy, to think that you are the offspring of a long, fierce 
argument.175 [...] What I’m saddened by is that [Derek] wants to present me as the 
abrasive creature who roughened your father’s surface so that he became unacceptable 
to so many people.176 
Jonathan Orde Wingate was not the offspring of a violent argument, but he did represent an 
exceptional change of course for the marriage between Orde Wingate and Lorna Paterson.  
REPRODUCTIVE EFFORT 
Prior to the Second World War, the Wingates had decided not to have children. The choice was 
Lorna’s, though Wingate, she recorded, assented as a way for his young wife to retain her 
independence.177 Birth control methods were rudimentary. Lorna’s wealth afforded her access 
to an abortionist.  
I had two abortions. One about six months after I married, and one about three years 
after. I make no excuse for this and I bitterly regret it. I did not want any children—until 
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the war broke out, or just before it, when I came to my senses, realized that he might be 
killed, and tried thereafter to have a baby.178 
The first abortion would have occurred while Wingate was assigned to Camp Bulford, Salisbury 
Plain. The second coincided with Wingate’s assignment to Palestine. Lorna had followed her 
husband to Palestine and set up a home for them in a small apartment in Jerusalem in 1936.179 
Early in 1938 she returned to the United Kingdom to terminate her pregnancy. Her sudden 
leaving of Palestine is attributed, in the extant historiography, to wanting to “avoid the hot 
weather”.180 
 Lorna’s desire not to have children was rooted in her vision of herself as an extension of 
Wingate—as an “armour-bearer.” Her disdain for what she called a “woman’s life” enabled her, 
in her view, to remain untroubled by what others saw as Wingate’s more unusual habits and 
characteristics. Lorna described her state of mind capably:  
But you know [...] I can think of two ways in which [Wingate] was lucky to have me as a 
wife. And one was that I was a very masculine little girl. Not masculine in having a deep 
voice and large muscles—in that sense I was very feminine. But I took a much more 
young man’s view of life than a young woman’s. It took me years, until I was about 
twenty-five actually, to accept the fact that I was a woman and must live a woman’s life. 
Well, it might have been rather a hardship for me sometimes to be in this sort of 
hermaphroditic state of mind, but it was no trouble to your father. What it did allow for 
was all sorts of quirks and oddities in him which I didn’t even notice. If I’d been more of 
a wife and less of an armour-bearer, I might have noticed them and even objected to 
them. But it was no hardship to me to overlook some of his stranger happenstances. 
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What a lovely American word. I don’t know what it means exactly. Perhaps it’s a 
happening and a circumstance all mixed up.181 Well, I didn’t have to consciously be 
generous or too forgiving or any of these things because I didn’t really think these 
happenstances mattered. In that I think he was lucky. But it did have one bad effect. A 
very bad one. Hold on one minute. I am going to shut the door.... Here I am again. 
Owing to my state of mind I didn’t want any children. This is going to be one of the 
things they say about me in the future.182 
There is no record of Wingate being upset over Lorna’s terminating of her pregnancies. She 
described Wingate as supportive of the terminations because of her age, and his liberality of 
mind. Their relationship enabled a tremendous amount of sharing with each other, such that 
Lorna accompanied Wingate on many of his travels throughout Palestine prior to the 
establishment of the Special Night Squads.  
MARITAL INFIDELITY 
Wingate and Lorna were not, however, totally in lockstep. When Lorna returned with Wingate 
to Palestine after his leave in early 1939, she suffered “one or two severe personal shocks.” 
Lorna traces the cause of her distress without filling in a complete picture.  
So Palestine was for your father and for myself a time of growth, really. He was under 
great stress, and sometimes he—he did curious things. He—I think they were part of his 
character: quite in keeping. They were not very easy to live with, but I found them quite 
acceptable. One of his—one of the things he used to quote was Napoleon’s utterance, 
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‘Women: the occupation of the idle man, the relaxation of the warrior’.183 Not a bad idea 
really. I think when men are under stress—particularly in time of war when things tend 
to be so materialistic that the whole of the gentler, personal side of life is swept aside, 
obliterated—there should be some redress from time to time. And I’m entirely in favor of 
bringing the mistresses up with the marmalade.184 
Elsewhere, she tells her son that she would like to know what it was about her that caused both 
of her husbands to be unfaithful to her.  
I don’t know, sweetheart, what it is about me that has failed to hold the fidelity of the 
only two men I’ve married. Because neither of them were faithful to me. And I, for all my 
free fancies, would have wished to be faithful.185 
The melancholic tone of this comment does not suit with most of the material on the tapes, 
which gushes forth in bursts of dark comedy, mirth, and even ecstasy. She used the tapes to 
argue for her and Wingate’s complexity, intensity, and suitability for one another. But the 
comment above does capture the angst and dissatisfaction she found in marriage. 
 Sykes left the subject of Wingate’s infidelity completely alone—his book is absolutely 
silent on the subject, and he may not have known about it. Sykes, in any event, depicted Lorna 
as a pretty and eccentric poppet, and never bothered to sketch her character. As for Wingate, 
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Mosley goes as far as to describe him as “an adoring husband, faithfully constant to his wife 
until the moment of his death”.186 It is a myth of fidelity that plays into the image of Wingate as 
a puritan married to a diffident, traditional wife. But besides being inaccurate, it simplifies 
Wingate, narrows the range of his interests, and misses out on the frequent connections 
between soldiering and sex, which is to say that soldiering provided Wingate with a clear 
hierarchy that reduced intragroup conflict, provided status and resources—status and resources 
that Wingate could share with his mate.187   
 Wingate’s infidelity to Lorna—and it seems unlikely that she would have lied about this 
to their son so many years after the war—most likely occurred during his explorations of 
Palestine. Anthony Simonds states in his unpublished memoirs (archived at the Imperial War 
Museum) that many British soldiers (including Simonds himself) had Jewish girlfriends, though 
he does not specifically say this about Wingate, his good friend and officemate.188 Wingate had 
more opportunity than most of the British for sexual infidelity because he was an intelligence 
staff officer responsible for northern Palestine, and given the liberty to travel to various 
kibbutzim to learn Hebrew and study Jewish militias. The kibbutz movement often took a 
libertine attitude towards sex. In the more radical encampments, marriage was discouraged, 
and children were raised in communal groups rather than in families. Wingate was especially 
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comfortable at Ein Harod, which was then the largest kvutza.189  John Krivine, a writer who in 
2013 audaciously fictionalized Lorna Paterson’s tapes in his self-published book, A Green Rose, 
joined Wingate’s affair to the name of a real-life Jewish-British immigrant to Palestine, Doreen 
Silver, and plainly imagines that Silver poached Lorna’s mate.190 Krivine further argued that 
Lorna didn’t mind Wingate’s sexual infidelity, but resented the intellectual partnership formed 
between her husband and his Jewish lovers. In response to the intellectual infidelity,191 Krivine 
has Lorna seize hold of Wingate’s copies of HG Wells, toss the volumes into the kitchen sink of 
their Jerusalem flat, light them on fire, and burn them to ashes; Krivine even adds the detail 
that she afterwards thought it was a foolish thing to do because it took days to clean up the 
mess. Through personal correspondence, Krivine admits to having invented the episode,192 
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though it was true enough that Lorna despaired of Wingate’s attachment to socialist reformers 
like George Bernard Shaw and HG Wells.193  
 The Jewish supernumeraries who served with Wingate on the Special Night Squads do 
not mention any sexual activity on the part of Wingate, but when they were interviewed about 
his behavior it was almost always with the view to celebrating the life of a martial Zionist 
champion.194 They limited his quirks to the usual stories of inspiring speeches, frequent nudity, 
etcetera. The British soldiers followed a similar vein in their writings and oral histories.195 It is 
impossible to know for sure what happened. Lorna tries to blame herself for his promiscuity, 
citing what she describes as her aloofness.196  “I was terrified of my own passion for him. I felt 
that it was going to—that it was going to obsess me. [...] I responded to [his] passion quite 
readily—but the love? the tenderness? This alarmed me. I had a vision of a life engulfed in 
something of which I knew too little. I was—I think I was not so much cold as—I withdrew. I 
wasn’t there. I used to walk away”.197 Lorna’s description of her relationship reverses the 
popular image, reproduced thousands of times in the media, of the cold soldier walking away 
from his emotional and needful wife. “He took some time to grasp this, I think. By the time we 
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got to Palestine, where of course the tension built up immediately, he had come to accept 
it”.198  
 Wingate’s peers either failed to notice the tension, or declined to mention it. His friend 
(Tony Simonds), his commander (General Wavell), his Jewish allies (especially Chaim 
Weizmann) and his subordinates in military intelligence mention his “beautiful,” “pretty,” 
“attractive,” and “intelligent” wife, but little else about their relationship, besides their 
enthusiastic mutual attachment to Zionism.199 In his unpublished memoir, Tony Simonds even 
claimed to have lived with the Wingates for a brief period in their flat in Jerusalem, but he 
eventually fled due to the learned, all-hours discussions and irregular mealtimes, and not 
because of any marital conflict between Lorna and Wingate.200 Perhaps, as Lorna suggests, 
Wingate simply looked in a different direction, without argument. “I am quite sure he didn’t 
brood about it, and sit about biting his nails, asking himself if his wife loved him or anything of 
that sort. He was far too busy and far too interested in other things. He just, I imagine, 
shrugged his shoulders, and treated it like the weather. One day it’s snowing and blowing, so 
you do something else. The next day the sun comes out and you enjoy that”.201 She still viewed 
their relationship as important, and well-matched. “I was not alien [to Wingate], but alienated. 
It means that I might have been the same sort of beast, but I was put apart from him by my 
own folly”.202 
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 In the audio memoirs, Lorna creates a painful (if beautiful) literary image for her 
perceived failures at tenderness, rather than just passion:  
I think people who live a happy family life, with loving parents, brothers and sisters, 
uncles and aunts and so on, are initiated into this business of receiving affection, so that 
when they come to the great open seas of love, I mean, they can swim. They start 
pattering, you know, and then they are promoted to the deep end, and finally they 
breast the billows. You do it by degrees: Your loving parents, your delightful family, your 
warm-hearted friends, and so on. I’d had none of this.203  
Lorna’s “alienated” feelings about sex and relationships continued throughout her life, though 
she felt that she learned more about affection as she aged. Still, she frankly states that she 
came to view sex as a short-term pleasure to be shared among friends, and not the fulfillment 
of a commitment.204 
BREAKING A STEREOTYPE 
 For her own part, Lorna professed to have been “the most chaste of wives” during her 
time in Palestine. She resented the insinuation when one of Wingate’s fellow staff officers called 
her “a man-eater”.205 She was distraught at the misogynistic taunts she endured from Winston 
Churchill and General Dill while travelling with Wingate aboard the Queen Mary en route to the 
Quebec Conference in 1943,206 and humiliated by the sexual advances she endured during the 
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dismal journey back to England.207 (Sykes follows Churchill in depicting the Queen Mary journey 
as an unalloyed thrill).208 Lorna is even more annoyed when, after Wingate’s death and their 
son’s subsequent birth six weeks later, people would count the months in front of her to see 
how the arithmetic worked out.209 Lorna offers a forceful account of the sexism and sexual 
harassment she endured, but she ascribes her mild reaction to these attacks as due to her 
youth—she was only twenty-six with Wingate died in 1944, and felt she was not as savvy as 
she would be later in life.  
 Lorna resented the insinuations of promiscuity, but she did not argue that she 
maintained strict abstinence. There were opportunities for infidelity before her first husband’s 
death. She worked, for a time, as a clerk in Special Operations Executive in London,210 and the 
most challenging point in her relationship came when he disappeared into Abyssinia while she 
maintained their flat on Hill Street. Her frankest discussions of promiscuity—which she makes 
absolutely clear on digital file 17—occurred after Orde Wingate’s death, in the period when she 
started raising money for Zionist causes as a young widow. 
 Lorna’s unique way of conveying her attitude towards sex destroys the paper-doll 
sketches of Sykes, Royle, and others. Throughout the recordings, Lorna never stops the 
pretence of offering the stories for the benefit of her son, Jonathan Orde. The memoir turns to 
celebration, as well as score-keeping and rule-making in an environment of sexual freedom: 
                                                                                                                                        
the table, shocked Simonds when she called out “You know, General, your administrative arrangements 
are disgraceful.” Simonds, "Pieces of War," 2. 
207 Digital file 19. 
208 Sykes, 448. 
209 The facial resemblance between Orde Charles and his son Jonathan Orde later proved striking. 
210 From digital file 9, 13:15: “I finally got a war job. It was a cloak and dagger job. I was neither the 
cloak nor the dagger. I was the cipher clerk, the SO2 for SOE—and you know all about that.”  
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I’ve been immensely fortunate in my relations with your sex, my dearest boy. I’ve known 
a great many men in my life. Some as friends, and some as something a little closer. And 
I suppose due to this great gift bestowed upon me by my mother (which I’ve mentioned 
before), the inability to like nasty men—I can only like nice ones—I’ve had a succession 
of most delightful friends. [...] I think this speaks very well for mankind. It’s true that I 
was an undemanding companion, that my intentions were always made plain from the 
start, that I took a great deal of trouble not to break any hearts, either of my men 
friends or their families—should they have any—and so my relationships with them were 
always conducted in an atmosphere of good humor, and good manners. But there was 
something more to it than that. The men themselves were always so kind. So gentle. So 
honorable. Some of them were much more amusing than others. But they all shared this 
quality of goodness and sweetness. Lucky, lucky me.211  
Then Lorna turns to rule-making in an environment of sexual freedom: 
I never wanted to be very close to a young man, because young men are generous and 
they fall in love (poor dears), and there are certain rules by which one should abide. One 
of which, as I said, is ‘break no hearts.’ I’ve also tried, and succeeded, in not making love 
to the husbands of my friends. And I’ve also tried not to make love to the friends of my 
husbands. This is important too.212  
Lorna even keeps score, and philosophizes on her preference for men: 
They came in several different races, and ages. [...] I can’t say with Leporello, when he 
was talking of his master Don Juan, ‘a thousand and three in Spain alone.’ But I think 
I’ve known enough about a variety of men to be able to say that when it comes to 
friendship, there’s nothing to choose between a good man and a good woman. The only 
                                           
211 Digital file 17, 4:45.  
212 Digital file 17, 6:00 to 7:57. 
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thing that your sex has over mine, in my opinion, is a greater width of interests. I think 
this is the last track on this tape.  
As she negotiates gender and class differences, mechanical recording problems will not get in 
the way: 
I’ll say that again in case it was too faint. I think this is the last track on this tape. I was 
saying, when the thing came to an end, that  there’s only one marked difference 
between a good man friend and a good woman friend. The man usually has wider 
interests than the woman, and this makes him a better companion. And then of course, 
there is ‘la différence’  which every sensible person is conscious of. I’ve always been 
happier with the foreign service, rather than the armed services—well who wouldn’t be? 
Because the diplomats are trained to be amiable, and if they’re not amiable they’re not 
doing their job properly. I’ve never followed my dear Aunt Kitty, who rather liked to roll 
in the gutter at times.213  
Finally, she avers that Jonathan Orde had better hear about all this from her, rather than from 
someone else: 
My attitude on these things had better be known to you, my darling, because presently, 
when I am dead, various things will be said about me. I’ve been called so many strange 
names in my life. Joan of Arc. Bloody Bitch—well perhaps they called Joan of Arc a 
bloody bitch in her day (they certainly called her a bloody witch). Hard as nails. Would 
give her last crust to a beggar. Loyal and devoted. Completely faithless. Icily remote. A 
nymphomaniac. I don’t know what I am. I think I am a keyhole with a door around it.214 
Her reveling in sexuality offered relief from the stifling loneliness that the war inflicted on her 
early married life—and from the verbal brutality of being married to someone who could switch 
                                           
213 Digital file 17, 5:30, 8:00 to 10:15. 
214 Digital file 17, 10:15. 
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between warm tenderness and ruthless bullying. Though Lorna admires Orde Wingate, she 
does not want to sanitize him. Nor does she wish to sanitize herself. In cooperating with 
biographers such as Rolo and Sykes she had tried to develop a more collegial reputation for her 
late husband, one in which she and he were co-equal adventurers, but she hardly appeared at 
all in Rolo’s book, and Sykes only included items that she found peculiarly denigrating and 
absurd.215 Lorna’s preferred version of the myth “did not come off,” and so there is to be no 
myth at all. She conveys both the best and worst of times in stark terms.  
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUTHLESSNESS 
 In the worst of times, though Lorna insisted that she “had no real criticisms of your 
father”,216 Wingate behaved as “a verbal, conversational bully. He was a mental bully”.217 It 
surprised Lorna that Peggy, Derek and other advocates for Wingate would mistake his 
character, and assess him as not a browbeater.218 She attributed his bullying tendency to his 
upbringing among a fierce family of conversationalists who were also trained as Christian 
                                           
215 Digital file 2, 11:00.   Sykes ‘cuts’ Lorna in three ways in his biography of her husband. First, he 
draws persistent attention to the fact that she remarried by listing her in the footnotes and the index as 
‘Lorna Smith’ rather than Lorna Wingate, perhaps undermining her commitment to her husband’s 
memory—and insinuating to other veterans that Jonathan Orde might not be  Wingate’s offspring. 
Second, although it is a biography rather than a military history, he barely mentions her in 42 pages out 
of 553 pages of prose, and he includes a photograph of Wingate’s first fiancé, but none of Lorna or her 
son Jonathan. Lorna, in her audio memoir, does not mention the first two snubs, but she mentions the 
third: Sykes cites her as a source, not on issues of character or substance, but only on bits of gossip that 
make her look frivolous. She admits in the tapes that she cannot bring herself to read the book all the 
way through, even fifteen years after the book’s publication. Digital file 22, 38:55. 
 
216 Digital file 17, 19:00 
217 Digital file 17, 19:20. 
218 Digital file 17, 19:30.  
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fundamentalists, a family that could be warm, gracious and entertaining, but also ruthless and 
dismissive. She compares the Wingate children to “wolf cubs,” and notes with irony that when 
she first met Colonel Wingate (Orde’s father) he prayed that God might protect “this lost little 
lamb”.219 “But it was lucky for me that I was not a lamb. I may have been a Mowgli, perhaps, 
thrown in amongst them”.220  
And I was not quite unscarred—not so much by the other Wingates—but your father had 
sharp teeth, and when he was bullying me—sometimes for instance he would subject me 
to a dissertation or an exhortation which would last an hour, and if I tried to make a 
point he would raise his voice. [...]Well now, this is the kind of thing that tends to make 
one aggressive. Not uncompromising, because I think I always had been 
uncompromising. But I was not aggressive when I met your father.221   
Besides bullying, there was a second attribute which Lorna considered critical to understanding 
her late husband.  
He was ruthless. I should do him no service if I subscribe to a cult image and pretend 
that he was not ruthless. Many people saw his ruthlessness in action.222  
Ruthlessness is probably the quality most consistently associated with Wingate. Veteran of the 
Abyssinian campaign Wilfred Thesiger wrote in his autobiography that “Wingate was ruthlessly 
ambitious, yet his aims transcended personal ambition. [...] He should have lived in the time of 
                                           
219 Digital file 25:30. 
220 Digital file 17, 25:45.  
221 Digital file 17, 26:30. Elsewhere, Lorna describes organizing a clique of girls to complete her math 
homework for her while at school, and inspiring her best friend to try and stab her with a knife, and so 
Lorna may not have been completely free of aggressiveness prior to meeting Wingate. In 1943, she 
browbeat Derek Tulloch into serving on Wingate’s staff for the second Chindit campaign, an event which 
she describes on Digital File 1, and which Tulloch neither records in his own book (Tulloch, 126) nor told 
Sykes (Sykes, 466).  
222 Digital file 17, 28:55.  
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the Crusades. I can picture him in that brutal age, fighting with a mad gleam in his eye to 
liberate the Holy City, but equally determined, when it fell, to be crowned King of Jerusalem”.223  
It is an acute image, even if Wingate showed too little kingly ambition for it to fit like a glove. 
(He never showed as much interest in colonial administration as he did in colonial wars.) 
General Archibald Wavell, who consented to Wingate’s campaigns in Abyssinia and Burma, did 
not use the word ‘ruthless’ but still considered him a “stern task-master”.224 William Slim, the 
general eventually responsible for retaking Burma, thought of it as a “ruthless energy”.225 The 
historian Jon Latimer offers the most enticing quote from Chindit officer Bernard Fergusson, and 
it seems to perfectly sum up Wingate’s character in line with Lorna’s description: “Wingate 
would do any evil that good might come. He saw his object very clearly in front of him, and to 
achieve it he would spare no friend or enemy; he would lie; he would intrigue; he would bully, 
cajole, and deceive. He was a hell of a great man and few people liked him”.226  
 In the Oxford English Dictionary, the first definition of ruthless is: 
1. Feeling or showing no pity or compassion; pitiless, unsparing, merciless, remorseless. 
That definition does not consistently align with Wingate’s behavior. He was capable of showing 
tremendous pity and compassion. He took an interest in helping disabled First World War 
veterans, he comforted the wounded or mentally distressed, he pitied the dead, he showed 
remorse on numerous occasions. Still, the definition does match with his verbal style, which 
                                           
223 W. Thesiger, The Life of My Choice (W. W. Norton, Incorporated, 1988), 350-51. 
224 Fergusson, 13. 
225 Barbara Wertheim Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1971; 1972), 442. 
Slim, 234. 
226 Jon Latimer, Burma: The Forgotten War (London: John Murray, 2004), 156. In his own use of the 
quote, Latimer’s note states that he cites Fergusson’s Beyond the Chidwin on page 20. Unfortunately, this 
seems to be inaccurate.  
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tended towards the caustic and cutting. He directed unsparing language at his peers (whom he 
often tried to dominate) and he directed it at his young wife, his in-laws, his friends, etcetera.  
The second definition matches Wingate much more consistently: 
 2. Of an action, method, etc.: without regard for the sacrifice involved; uncompromising, 
determined.227 
That well describes the Orde Wingate who demanded that others show absolute faith in his 
abilities, his theories, and his political vision—damn the consequences. He understood the 
power of idealism, and with a mix of rising prestige and constant intimidation he demanded that 
others believe that he was, in fact, the ideal. Interestingly, Wingate’s ruthlessness enabled him 
to drop interest in holding anyone (even himself) to religious standards of behavior. He rather 
justified his ever-evolving ideas with a pragmatic (and not wholly incorrect) ad hoc set of 
arguments centered on observed human behavior.228 As a consequence, there was no 
contradiction when Lorna found that her late husband hunted for useful people, and judged 
people’s strengths and weaknesses “in a far gayer and liberal frame of mind” than his rivals 
supposed, and without regard to their virtues or vices.229 He could be dogmatic, but without 
any true dogma.  
                                           
227 Oxford English Dictionary, "Ruthless, Adj." (Oxford University Press). 
228 Anglim describes Wingate’s most consistent and original strand of military thinking as “dialectical, 
human-centred, and designed to direct British strength in command, training and ‘national character’ 
against enemy weaknesses in these same areas, turning superiority in training, aggression and initiative 
into tactical advantages.” Anglim, 71. 
229 Lorna Paterson, Digital File 5, 43:00, and Digital File 6. 
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 Lorna, joining with the majority, fights against the tamer renditions of her husband 
offered by his best friend, Derek Tulloch, or her mother, Alice Ivy.230 
[O]ne only discredits the truth if one medicines it with minor falsehoods. [...]  The health 
and happiness of people, who may have been dear to him, weighed nothing with him. I 
am speaking now for myself. But one no more thought about complaining about this 
than his ADC complained about being run off his feet. One was glad to serve. But it’s 
something you have to reckon with if you’ve lived your life with a man like your father. 
And it breeds some of the softness out of you yourself. [...] I think a very strong man—
and your father was strong, very strong—can afford to be not only gentle, but also 
considerate.231  
Unfortunately, Lorna limited her discussion of Wingate’s flaws to broad characteristics rather 
than specific examples. There were, however, stories which others offered up in specific detail, 
and which she seemed to believe. Here Lorna relates her feelings regarding Wingate’s character 
in Abyssinia. 
Of course, like all of us, he had times when he was worse than others. When his bullying 
and ruthlessness came uppermost for a while—apparently Derek was shocked from—by 
some of the reports he heard from some of [Wingate’s] officers of the Ethiopian 
campaign, when apparently he was at his most unlikable. And they didn’t like him. But I 
am not at all surprised.232  
The most explicit instances of his bullying in Abyssinia are reported by Wilfred Thesiger. They 
are worth recounting here because they have not been widely disseminated beyond Thesiger’s 
                                           
230Hay. Alice Ivy, overlooking most of the “tempestuous” times before and after his marriage to her 
daughter, offers a generously cleaned-up and magnanimous Wingate. Indeed, she and her late husband, 
as well as all associated with Wingate, are cast in a warm virtuous glow quite at odds with her daughter’s 
account. Lorna addresses its shortcomings on Digital File 22, 39:00.   
231 Digital file 17, 29:20. 
232 Digital file 17, 32:00 
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autobiography, and in that volume Thesiger expressed disappointment that Sykes chose not to 
publish his observations. In the first instance, Wingate lashed his translator across the face with 
his stick for a minor infraction. The next day, when Wingate was away, the translator and a few 
others broke off to smoke cigarettes. Unfortunately, petrol had leaked all around them, and 
when someone lit or tossed a match, the petrol ignited and burned all four men alive. Thesiger 
was “appalled to see four flaming figures like living torches staggering about the yard, 
frantically beating at their bodies with their hands”. They died in awful agony, the translator 
calling out for the absent Wingate. Even Wingate, when he heard this incident, affirmed that he 
felt like a brute.233 In the second instance, Wingate was out of uniform when he decided to 
procure a pistol from captured armaments, and offer the pistol as a gift to a friend. When the 
leader of the guard, an Abyssinian nobleman, attempted to stop him from entering the armory, 
Wingate savagely struck him with his revolver.234 Thesiger offered these two instances as 
examples of Wingate’s “ungovernable temper”.235 Lorna did not quite consider Wingate 
ungovernable, but she did find his behavior disturbing. 
I was much luckier, having the mental makeup that I did, than an ordinary wife would 
have been. But even I felt the strain from time to time. And my affection for him 
changed its quality.  I came to feel more than ever, that whereas in the early days of 
knowing each other, before we married, what I feared was the intensity of my obsession 
with him, now I felt that I had to fortify myself against a positive dislike which sometimes 
came to me, and passed away again. It was only a shadow on the surface of something 
very solid.                                                          
                                           
233 Thesiger, 326.  
234 Thesiger, 350. 
235 Thesiger, 350.  
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 Lorna believed, on the whole, that Wingate rejected violence, which is, of course, an 
interesting claim to make about a soldier. She herself was certainly not a pacifist, and when 
considering the youth culture of the 1960s and 1970s, she remarked, “Make love not war? Make 
love and war, I would say”.236 She perhaps sought to make a Nietzschean distinction between 
Wingate’s violence, which she thought was rare, and his cruelty, which she thought was 
frequent. As evidence of her argument she describes his lack of interest in violent sports, and 
his aversion to violent books and story-telling.237 In comparison to other soldiers of his 
generation, he did not revel in violence. T.E. Lawrence had a passion for front-line bloodshed 
during the Arab Revolt of the First World War.238 In pre-war Sudan, Reginald Scoones (a future 
major-general) gladly encouraged the beating of alleged witches, a development he considered 
of equal interest to training a new motorized machinegun unit.239 In Palestine, the boyish thrill-
seeker Robert “Rex” King-Clark kept track of “kills” with notches on the buttstock of his 
weapon.240 “Bala” Bredin had his S.N.S. soldiers execute Arab prisoners—according to Lorna, to 
make sure he could get back to base in time for breakfast.241  
 Lorna includes, however, two instances in which Wingate engaged in violence in front of 
her. In the first instance, Wingate, a well-regarded horseman, struck “a stupid, hysteric little 
horse” at Bulford shortly after their marriage when it skittishly rejected his commands. “I noted 
                                           
236 Digital file 7, 39:20. 
237 Digital file 3, 10:00.  
238 John E. Mack, A Prince of Our Disorder : The Life of T.E. Lawrence (United States1998), 154-55, 64.  
Lawrence’s famous account of the Arab Revolt, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, famously relishes in direct 
combat, which provides an immediacy and clarity that counterbalances his political contortions.   
239 Reginald Laurence Scoones, Oral History 4297 with Reginald Laurence Scoones (London: Imperial 
War Museum, 1979). 
240 King-Clark, 176. In the Rex King-Clark papers in the Imperial War Museum, the soldier’s transcribed 
journal reveals a specific envy of other soldiers who killed—not captured—Arab guerrillas.  
241 Digital file 8, 17:15.  
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with interest this, and I’d never seen him do anything like that before, and I never saw him do 
it again”.242 The second instance Lorna chose to recall occurred in Palestine. “I was a very 
difficult young thing, at times, ungovernable, you know. Fearful moods. And he was very 
patient, usually, but on this occasion I was standing in the middle of the drawing room, as the 
servants say, ‘creating.’ Growling. Snarling. He produced a revolver, put a shell into one of the 
chambers, twiddled it to the right place, pointed it at me, and said, ‘If you don’t behave 
yourself, I shall shoot you.’ I believed him. I was terrified, instantly came to my senses and 
passed into a mood of sunny cooperation. I was very pleased with him. I thought it was exactly 
the right thing to do”.243  
 If striking a horse and pointing a gun at his wife counts as violence, then Wingate’s well-
known use of corporal punishment in Burma, the beating of Jewish soldiers in Palestine, and the 
striking of Abyssinians with Gideon Force would count as violence as well. Lorna easily 
understates Wingate’s capacity for violence, even if his share of violence from that time was 
less than many of his peers.  
TENSIONS AND CONNECTIONS WITHIN MARRIAGE 
 Wingate’s career fascinated and tormented Lorna. At times, Wingate’s career gave cause 
for tremendous celebration, as when he received his first D.S.O in Palestine, or when, after his 
suicide attempt in Abyssinia, she enjoyed surviving wartime London with him during his 
convalescence,244 or when he became famous immediately after the first Chindit campaign. But 
when his ruthless drive to become leader of a Jewish army did not come off, and she 
                                           
242 Digital file 3, 10:35. 
243 Digital file 3, 11:30.  
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discovered it outside the British Museum, it was she, not he, that clung to the gate and cried. 
And, as every special forces soldier knows, there is some sense of control in being the person 
choosing when and where to go into combat, as opposed to waiting to get hit.245 The 
frustrations of wartime relationships led Lorna to offer one of her more subversive thoughts on 
marriage. It is an image that offers a blunt assessment of the challenges of being married to a 
soldier: 
I don’t think that one husband is enough for some women. If I were Queen of Sheba, I 
would have more than one husband. You see, men are busy. My husbands would be 
running the army, and going on missions, and when one or two of them were away, I 
would be able to enjoy the...society of the ones who were left at home. None of them 
would ever feel that they’ve got to amuse me, or run my errands for me. They could 
consult with each other if I was being difficult, give each other advice on how to.... I um, 
scrubbed out, some tape here. Rather silly. Facetious sort of stuff. Better done away 
with, I suppose, so hold on till the next sound comes up.246  
                                           
245 “In special operations...you know how you're going in and how you're coming out. It is your initiative, 
based on your plan. That moment of paranoia crossing the border--and the alert serenity that follows--is 
almost a luxury compared to the feeling on the eve of war. In [conventional] war, all you know is how to 
go in. You never know how you will come out.” From Muki Betser and Robert Rosenberg, Secret Soldier: 
True Life Story of Israel's Greatest Commando (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011).   
“He was the kind to convince his men by saying, ‘We’re going to do this or that, and we’re going to win,’ 
[...] One of the things awfully upsetting in war is not knowing what is going to happen. When I left 
[Wingate], I was beginning to assimilate some of the flame of this guy...”. Colonel Cochran quoted in  
Lowell Thomas, Back to Mandalay (London: Frederick Mueller Ltd, 1951).  
and Sykes, 467. 
246 Digital file 9, 3:15 to 4:30.  
96 
 
One useful aspect to Lorna’s recordings is that she does not try to ‘scrub out’ the tape on the 
sly. She is not a detached narrator but as active a participant as possible. “I sound pretty 
horrible, don’t I?” she asks on the tapes. “Rather like Queen Elizabeth—the First, I mean”.247  
 The broader scope of her reflections occurs, she suggests, because of the difficulty in 
understanding Wingate’s complexity, which in turn affected her complexity. Softening his image 
would also soften her image.  
They are trying to sweeten his image, which has been smeared. They want to clean it 
up. [...] I don’t think their attempt to turn him into something decently dressed, well 
behaved, cheerful and kind, is going to come off, because too many people knew him as 
something else. And if it did come off, it would reduce him. It wouldn’t enlarge him.248 
Instead, Lorna desired to present Wingate “as the great noble creature that he was”.249 She 
intended to find his nobility, not ennoble him, and so she searched for the comedy, even in the 
darkness. When her memoir addresses what the Wingate siblings referred to as ‘the curse’—a 
sort of manic depression that Wingate was prone to several times in his life—Lorna suggests to 
her son that it was “rather like the Brontës,” in that it only occurred when things risked being 
dull.250 On the whole, and contrary, to Sykes, Lorna believed Wingate’s life to have been a 
happy one—he thrived, and wanted others to thrive as well.251 As time went by, she found that 
she “never missed him. [...] Such people come and they go. One must never hold onto them”. 
She wondered if this represented a lack on her part—a thread of her “appalling aloofness.” But 
ultimately she averred that “If you don’t cling, you don’t get torn apart”.252  
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 The historical evidence generated in Wingate’s passage, and his wake, draws the 
accumulated historiography into the confluence of two rivers of theory, each clearly distinct in 
color and motion before they join and yet irreversibly miscible in the downstream of experience. 
One is postmodern, and carries the competing narratives, the diverse perspectives, the mutable 
retelling of familiar stories, and the inability to ascertain facts to a degree that might elevate 
military history to military science. The second river of theory is instrumentalism, whereby the 
inarguable fact of the existence of competing narratives (and the way they are told) encourages 
an interest in human beings as competitive social animals, bound to a nature that makes their 
behavior broadly predictable—and therefore of interest to military science. There is a 
postmodern Wingate: irrational and unknowable and inimitable. And there is an instrumental 
Wingate: rational, calculating, and—imitable. His instrumental aim was status: opportunity, 
command, victory, honor. The peculiarity of his particular path, and the obvious ambition he 
demonstrated in carving it out, can obscure how similar his objectives were to other human 
beings, especially those caught in the web of British social life.  
 The recordings of Lorna Paterson may not represent definitive history, but what oral 
history specialists Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson describe as the narratives of memory.253 
Lorna was eager for her memories to not slip away. She never felt that time was like “a string 
on a row of beads,” but instead a fluid, and that we have all “lost the ability to swim backwards 
[through time], but it’s all there. The past is so close”.254 Her observations were sharp, and well 
articulated. She observed, as a fundraiser for Zionist causes, the way that money loses its 
                                           
253 R. Perks and A. Thomson, The Oral History Reader (Taylor & Francis, 2015), viii. 
254 Digital file 17, 42:20. 
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absolute value for the rich, and becomes “an element, like water or air”.255 As a “verbalizer” 
with high self-regard, she could still criticize her own use of the language; when describing 
Wingate’s participation in a rapprochement  between the English and German soldiers between 
the wars, she asks, “Rapprochement ? [...] Why does one use so much French? I suppose 
because one doesn’t know one’s English”. 256 Despite her flair for words, by 1974 she had 
sworn off writing: “My idleness is too great”.257 Instead, Lorna created her audio memoir to 
force a reassessment of Orde Wingate, and her relationship with him. She succeeded. Her 
forceful voice illustrates her struggle with the traditional role of a war wife and war widow, and 
her frustrations with the inadequacy of traditional military history for communicating a soldier’s 
story to her family and to the public. In doing so, she examined Orde Wingate's personal 
disposition and character, Lorna and Orde’s first meeting, Wingate’s treatment of his ex-fiancé, 
pre-war sexuality and family planning among the officer class, and her role as an “armour-
bearer” for her husband. The effects of war on the lives of women, the complex roles of women 
in relationship to war, and the narratives women create to shape and interpret their experiences 
have all become the foci of rapidly developing research programs after centuries of male-
centered histories of war—a tradition that stretches back at least as far as Thucydides.258 
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Lorna’s memoir is woven with many of the threads examined in these rising research agendas.  
She depicts a world in which gender roles robbed her of autonomy, her mate, and then the full 
force of her character; she uses narrative to reclaim her past, and then elevate it. 
 Beyond the material covered here, Lorna used the memoirs to draw attention to many 
more subjects from her own life and that of her husband, including life at the Larkhill military 
camp (Salisbury Plain) before the war,259 their work with Chaim Weizmann (the first president 
of Israel),260 their relationships with Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion,261 their 
involvement in mandatory Palestine and the growing Zionist movement, Wingate’s performance 
as a military presenter at the Quebec Conference,262 and life in London during the Second 
World War. But her narrative, as it gathers steam, moves on to discuss episodes that did not 
overlap with her marriage to Wingate, including a diplomatic journey to post-war Abyssinia,263 
her life in colonial British Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the post-war troubles of Chindit and SAS 
commander Mike Calvert, life among Edinburgh ‘society’ before and after the war, her 
experiences in Israel during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, her work as a fundraiser for Zionist 
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causes, and more. For military and social historians of the Second World War, there is more 
work to be done to fully assess the value of her extensive narrative. 
 In the recordings, Lorna Paterson illuminated the complexity of Wingate’s character, and 
cogently interpreted his behavior even as she expressed doubt that she could ever settle the 
debates about her husband or any of his campaigns. “I only ask that my evidence should be 
taken into account. And not swept aside or denigrated, as it has been up to date”.264 Lorna’s 
view of these matters may not be definitive fact, but it is disruptive. 
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4. “To play for his own ends” 
Orde Wingate and the adoption of ‘special forces’ tactics and strategies 
 
 
 Why did Orde Wingate and his superiors adopt 'special forces' strategies and tactics, and 
why did individuals choose to join his 'special forces' units? The following chapters draw brief 
sketches of Wingate, as well as his peers, rivals, superiors, and followers during his campaigns 
in Sudan, Mandatory Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma. The sketches establish a theme showing 
that Wingate's aggressive competition with other British officers for scarce honor and prestige 
spurred him to create the units he branded 'special forces.' His superiors, on the other hand, 
tended to adopt Wingate's special forces strategies in moments of desperation and loss, and 
only when they lacked the resources to win 'traditional' campaigns. Wingate's followers did not 
always volunteer to join his units (compulsion occurred in several instances), but many officers 
and soldiers joined his ranks with the intention of obtaining a role in violent combat; like 
Wingate, they sought the prestige and role-fulfillment that soldiers sometimes seek through 
war.  
 Despite the inherent risks of special forces tactics, many soldiers paradoxically thought 
their odds of survival were higher with Wingate than in traditional military formations.265 
Leaders like Wingate promised (and demanded) precisely planned missions, and a rigorous 
(though sometimes ill-aimed) commitment to training. The planning and training reduced 
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felt they were no long “waiting to get hit” in the Western Desert. Gavin Mortimer, Stirling's Men: The 
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feelings of uncertainty and increased feelings of competence, which, as experienced by the 
soldiers, could be mistaken for a feeling of greater safety. The evidence shows, however, that 
special forces were still in fact much more dangerous. In compensation, special forces leaders 
often rewarded their soldiers with greater autonomy, promises of extra pay and promotion, 
military medals, and even increased access to sexual partners. Soldiers often rejected or 
denigrated Wingate’s methods if service in conventional military units could assure them of the 
opportunity for advancement, security, and the perception of safety. They also tended to resent 
(if not completely reject) Wingate’s methods if, prior to deploying with the unit, they did not go 
through an indoctrination period that required a costly personal investment of time and energy 
in quasi-realistic training exercises. Wingate was not unique in this sense. Throughout the war, 
leaders who successfully organized special forces units possessed a strong imagination; they 
imagined and designed (and even fantasized) honorable victories, and communicated those 
concepts to their superiors and subordinates; the honorable victory promised to require fewer 
resources than a more conventional alternative, and it also promised to enable individual 
members of the unit to imagine their own survival. When soldiers adopted special forces tactics 
and strategies, self-interest tended to predominate over national interest, but that self-interest 
was pursued in an environment of imperfect information, high stress, and confusion. It is a 
fascinating and highly consequential correction to our understanding of special forces soldiering 
in the Second World War.  
WINGATE THE COMPETITOR 
 The following sketch of Orde Wingate’s career establishes the themes and key moments 
in which Wingate’s ambition and creativity overlapped with the needs of those of leaders willing 
to sponsor him, and those soldiers willing to follow him. Wingate’s biographers, such as 
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Christopher Sykes, tend to attribute Wingate’s development of unorthodox military formations 
to what they deem his unique characteristics, such as eating raw onions, or reading Plato while 
behind enemy lines. In a broader survey of British soldiering, however, he does not appear 
especially unusual, and certainly not to such a degree to say confidently that his character was 
both necessary and sufficient for determining the path of his military career. His substantial 
talents—creativity, charisma, self-confidence, physical and mental endurance, ruthlessness, 
tolerance for eccentricity, and coolness under fire—would have also served him well in ‘regular’ 
warfare. Wingate’s weaknesses—his occasional depression, his frequently “pontificating and 
sometimes scabrous” literary style, his tropes about “national characteristics” to justify his 
military plans,266 his “bloody-mindedness”—were shared or endured by many soldiers in regular 
warfare. (Britain’s most famous soldier from the Second World War, Bernard Montgomery, 
comes quickly to mind.) Wingate’s personality therefore cannot strictly account for his 
development of special forces units, though his character certainly shaped their rhetorical 
branding and their internal culture.  
 I have already argued, in previous chapters, that Wingate’s birth order, family status, 
and educational opportunities bent his life towards a career in the hierarchical and highly 
competitive British Army, an institution geared towards organized violence, and sanctioned by 
his society. Wingate would spend his life within that playing field, and if he adopted unorthodox 
methods of warfare later, it was to gain status in the highly orthodox group to which he 
belonged. Whereas the military historian Simon Anglim has recently argued for the ways in 
which Wingate adopted British ‘small wars’ tactics to new technologies and new environments 
in an effort to gain strategic advantage against the enemies of the British Empire, I will instead 
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focus on why Wingate did so, not from the perspective of military strategy, but as part of a 
competitive struggle with peers and rivals within a narrow coalition.  
 Wingate’s career formally began in 1923. As a young officer, Wingate was assigned to a 
medium artillery unit on Salisbury Plain. His best friend and fellow officer, Derek Tulloch, viewed 
Wingate as typical, rather than exceptional, in his interests and attitudes.267 The post-war years 
were a dull time for soldiering, marked by a nostalgic turn towards the customs of the pre-war 
British Army.268 The fading generals of the First World War valued young officers keen on 
horsemanship, camaraderie, and hunting—and Wingate therefore became keen on 
horsemanship, camaraderie, and hunting. After a few years, Wingate studied Arabic in London 
in order to be ‘seconded’  to the Sudan Defence Force.269 It was a commonly sought after 
assignment with a competitive admittance process.270 He received the assignment, and the 
resultant five year term of service, 1928 to 1933, gave Wingate his first experience with the 
British Army’s ‘small wars’ tactics that he would exploit in subsequent campaigns.271 In the 
Sudan, he operated an independent command as a local bimbashi, responsible for a large 
company of Sudanese soldiers, as well as the families who lived with them. His missions along 
the frontier with Ethiopia were concerned with stopping slave traders, poachers, and bandits, 
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and British officials high in the administration of Sudan credited the young officer with showing 
“great dash and judgment”.272 Wingate, confident in his navigation and maneuvers (the riding 
in England had not been entirely frivolous), tried to cut the bandits off from their sanctuary, and 
he used deception, surprise, and the careful use of terrain, “all things Wingate would stress 
later” in Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma.273 The Sudan service proved the longest continuous 
assignment in Wingate’s career.  
 If anything in Wingate’s personal life provided a decisive turn from the ‘orthodox’ to 
‘unorthodox,’ it was the combination of his marriage to an outspoken and fiery teenager, Lorna 
Paterson, in 1935, and his failure to get into staff college in the next year, the latter of which 
could have proven a devastating setback for his military career. The rejection from staff college 
embarrassed Wingate before his spouse, his family, and his peers, and it seemed to shatter his 
prospects of a full career alongside the other officers of the British Army.274 He had felt that he 
had more to offer the military. One of his favorite utterances, “Civilization is based on service” 
depended upon his submission to an understandable social order, and now that social order no 
longer seemed to need him.275 He had, up to 1936, more or less respected the hierarchy of the 
military (often called the ‘chain-of-command’), though he occasionally had leaned on family 
status via his famous Uncle Rex (Reginald Wingate), the former Governor-General of the Sudan 
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and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, in order to obtain certain privileges or opportunities. He had 
served in the Sudan, one the most trying reaches of the empire, for five years—and he had 
leaned on Uncle Rex for that.276 But when he leaned again, this time to obtain a seat in the 
staff college, nothing came of it, despite the decent test scores he earned on his second 
attempt in 1936.277 Perhaps even worse, Wingate had sold himself to his young wife, Lorna 
Paterson, as a man of consequence and a man of action; but serving as a brigade adjutant in 
the Territorial Army he was neither. His wife, in fact, felt destined to marry a famous soldier, 
but her soldier, rather than continuing his adventures throughout the empire, seemed destined 
to finish his career working a few weeknights (and every weekend) in a slow-paced Territorial 
unit, and collapsing into a dull melancholy in Sheffield.278 Now he was on the verge of walking 
out the army as a captain, a mere three grades above the rank with which he had begun. His 
father had carried out a dull military career watching the grass grow in India and assessing its 
usability as forage, but his father had at least achieved the active rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, 
and retired a Colonel.279 Orde Wingate was not even the most renowned among his siblings. 
His older sister, Sibyl Wingate, had already completed her doctorate, conducted research 
throughout Western Europe, and then allied with the Republican partisans in Spain; she had 
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even lobbied to high ranking British Labour members such as Ernest Bevin and Stafford Cripps 
for Britain’s direct intervention in the Spanish Civil War.280  
 Orde Wingate, on the other hand, faced an exit from his military career with no obvious 
professional prospects and no substantial pension.281 Humiliated, recently married, and 
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Victorian England saw a rise in narratives of individuals demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice 
livelihoods and sometimes lives for the sake of knowledge, and Wingate’s journey into the 
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childless—with this frame of mind he undertook what his peers and biographers considered a 
galling breach of protocol and a tremendous risk. Wingate’s gambit was to intrude upon the 
cadre surrounding the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field-Marshal Cyril Deverrel, 
in the middle of a Territorial field exercise, and to then force the CIGS’s interest in Wingate’s 
admittance to the staff college.282 Wingate, ignoring any protests from Deverrel’s staff, inquired 
whether or not Deverrel had known that Wingate had published a personal account of a 
geographic exploration he had undertaken in the Libyan desert. Deverrell confessed he was 
unaware of this. Wingate insisted this was the sort of information a CIGS needed in order to 
determine who should or should not attend staff college. Deverrell did not dismiss Wingate’s 
interruption out of hand, but instead tried to find some kind of staff position for the young 
officer. The risk had paid off in a moment in which Wingate had little leverage, but a keen 
sense of comparative worth alongside his peers. Wingate received a staff position in Palestine, 
one normally reserved for subalterns rather than middle-aged captains, but it at least offered 
him a way forward.283  
Palestine, 1937-1939 
 After posting to northern Palestine with the 5th Infantry Division, Wingate was quickly 
lent to the General Headquarters in Jerusalem. In the turbulent run up into the Second World 
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War, the Palestine command changed rapidly, with its highest position held (in sequence) by 
John Dill, Archibald Wavell, and Robert Haining in just three years' time. Wingate's staff position 
was called 'Special Service Officer;' he was one of six Special Service Officers (SSO) serving on 
the staff, with each officer assigned to a different region of Palestine. Wingate was oriented 
towards northern Palestine and the area of operations of the 5th division, commanded by 
Bernard Montgomery. All of the SSOs fell under the Royal Airforce Intelligence Organisation, 
Jerusalem,284 a curious aftereffect of aircraft having served as the primary means of intelligence 
during the British campaign against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. In his new 
post, Wingate made friends easily with his officemate, a young lieutenant named Anthony 
Simonds, and won the confidence of a young corporal, Ivor Thomas, who served as Wingate’s 
clerk under the humorous nickname ‘Bombardier’.285 Wingate impressed Thomas with his quick 
commitment to creating an intelligence index for all persons appearing in intelligence reports or 
newspapers; the index became a widely appreciated and useful tool.286 Simonds, for his part, 
introduced Wingate to Zionism, and quickly found his commitment to the ideology outpaced by 
the slightly senior officer. One of the more interesting claims found in Simonds’ unpublished 
memoir is that Wingate began stealing and passing on British military intelligence papers to the 
Haganah.287 Simonds demanded that Wingate cease the behavior, and when he refused, 
Simonds skipped several links in the military hierarchy and reported Wingate’s behavior directly 
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to Wavell (possibly because Wavell first met Simonds and Wingate at a private function at 
Chaim Weizmann’s home).288 The event does not seem to have had much of an effect on the 
general. Instead of reprimanding Wingate, or placing him under arrest, he instead sent Wingate 
out of the office to conduct reconnaissance on smuggling routes in northern Palestine, an order 
that gave Wingate tremendous freedom of movement. Jewish sources confirm that Wingate 
passed on intelligence reports, and to Chaim Weizmann he forwarded information about Foreign 
Office correspondence with the Arab monarchies.289 It is not clear what was contained in the 
reports in most instances—it may have simply been information regarding potential attacks on 
Jewish settlements or persons, and Wingate could have appealed to the general on moral 
grounds that it was information that the Jews should have anyway. Wingate could also point 
out that his bias was not blindly towards Zionism, for he had begun to learn Hebrew, not to 
communicate with the Haganah, but because he refused to trust the Jewish clerks hired to 
translate Hebrew newspapers, and instead had bragged to his commanders—General John Dill 
in particular—that he would undertake to learn Hebrew himself.290 In any event, Wingate 
obtained unusual freedom to move about the country, and his (good) Arabic and (poor) Hebrew 
made his travel somewhat easier. He began cultivating ties both to a British commander in the 
Galilee, Brigadier John Evetts, and Zionist leaders in the region. Wingate offered to fill a gap in 
military capability by creating and commanding some kind of direct combat unit, a mixed unit of 
British soldiers and Jewish militia, in order to fulfill British military objectives. In an environment 
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where the British Army was ruthlessly crushing Arab resistance by bulldozing homes, hanging 
‘bandits’, and raiding village after village with the aid of motorized transport, Wingate would 
lead foot patrols on cross-country excursions similar to what he had undertaken in the 
Sudan.291 It was an appropriately familiar set of tactics. It also had a chance of working since 
Arab attacks had shifted from guerrilla warfare to small scale ‘gangster’ terrorism.292 
 The particular problem that Evetts decided he wanted Wingate to solve was the 
protection of an oil pipeline. It ran from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the port of Haifa in 
northwestern Palestine, and in the latter area it was vulnerable to sabotage.293 Arab guerrillas 
could puncture the pipeline with a rifle. The oil would burst forth, disrupting the supply chain.294 
For extra effect, the Arab guerrillas or bandits would light the oil on fire, which would create a 
tower of flame “seventy or eighty feet in the air and could be seen by half of Palestine”.295 For 
the British, the pipeline was a valuable resource. The spectacular attacks on it undermined the 
sense of British control over the security situation. But the pipeline ran through a relatively 
isolated area, away from the high traffic, high population districts the British Army prioritized.296 
The attacks occurred at night, and the British Army’s company-sized formations would, in any 
event, be too clumsy to chase down the handful of offenders. The pipeline’s regular disruption 
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embarrassed the British, and Wingate, as he would find himself doing in Abyssinia and Burma, 
offered a way of easing that embarrassment by creating a unique unit at a relatively low 
investment in terms of men and materiel.  Though the pipeline was remote from British bases, 
it did run very close to armed Jewish settlements.  Wavell had sent Wingate into the field, but it 
was Haining (Wavell’s replacement) who gave Wingate a blessing to work under Evett’s 
supervision, thus further separating Wingate from the direct control of Jerusalem HQ. Evett’s 
gave Wingate permission to raise Jewish units trained and led by British officers, 
noncommissioned officers, and other enlisted personnel.297 Wingate seemed to be “a master of 
doing more with less”,298 and by requiring so few British soldiers  to form his detachments, 
Wingate did not threaten the officers already holding command opportunities in Palestine, and 
he therefore received little pushback from his peers. In May and June of 1938, Wingate began 
leading his first nighttime patrols; at this time, he was the only British member of these patrols, 
and his soldiers were entirely Jewish.299 Operations quickly heated up once Wingate received 
his British cadre. 
 Wingate branded his new units the Special Night Squads, or SNS. As in the Sudan, 
Wingate emphasized surprise, economy of force, and security.300 Wingate met these basic 
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principles with a disciplined set of operating procedures, so that he personally showed his men 
how to conduct such warfare with modern weapons. He loved the details of map-reading, night 
movements, and the employment of machine guns, but he could also step back and offer a 
detailed appreciation of the wider strategic picture, which enabled his men to feel more “in 
control” of their lives, and more purposeful.301 The Special Night Squads reduced the number of 
attacks on the Haifa pipeline, antagonized several Arab villages, and intercepted the 
perpetrators of a massacre of unarmed Jewish men, women and children.302 For his service in 
Palestine, Wingate earned his first DSO award (Distinguished Service Order), an extremely 
unusual achievement for a British soldier in peacetime.303   
 In our century, Wingate and the Special Night Squads hold a mixed reputation. Many 
journalists, historians, and soldiers lionize the units as the forerunners to the Israeli Defense 
Force.304 For the first time, Jewish soldiers adopted aggressive patrolling techniques, and 
sought to dominate the terrain both day and night. Other recent commentators, following the 
Israeli ‘revisionist’ Tom Segev, blame the SNS for establishing a culture of brutality against the 
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Palestinians.305 The SNS certainly participated in retaliatory raids and physical abuse. Lorna 
Wingate, Orde Wingate’s wife, even accused H.E.N. Bredin, Wingate’s second-in-command, of 
the cold murder of captured prisoners, an act which led Wingate to bar Lorna from speaking 
with Bredin because “he had blood on his hands”.306 On the basis of the evidence, some 
historians now refer to Wingate as a war criminal,307 a somewhat anachronistic phrase for 
1938. Perhaps more importantly an imprecise, poorly sourced, and myopic application of the 
term ‘war criminal’ applied to Wingate’s behavior obscures the extreme frequency (and broader 
influence) of British violence at the time, not just in Palestine, but in Northern Ireland, India, 
and throughout the empire.308  
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 During Wingate’s time in Palestine, the British military’s assessments of the value of his 
actions with the SNS shifted over the course of a single year. Fascinatingly, the shift occurred 
not due to anything the SNS actually did in Palestine, but rather what their leader did while on 
leave in London. The historian Simon Anglim shows that in July of 1938, at the height of SNS 
activity, Haining was proud to have Wingate “on my Staff,” and viewed Wingate’s Special Night 
Squads as a unit of “great resource, enterprise and courage.” Haining further argued that “this 
form of activity ... provide[s] a great tribute to the initiative and ingenuity of all concerned”.309 
A year later, Hainging would reverse course, and argued that Wingate tended “to play for his 
own ends and likings instead of playing for the side”. 310 It was a striking reassessment.311  
 What had happened? Wingate had, in short, gone home and jumped the chain of 
command, disrupting the carefully structured hierarchy of the British Army. During the SNS 
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operations in the summer of 1938, one of Wingate’s squad members had negligently fired a 
machinegun, severely wounding Wingate in both legs. This necessitated a convalescence, which 
Wingate and his wife determined to take advantage of by returning to London, though he had 
not actually received permission to do so. There they leveraged Wingate’s recent experiences 
with the SNS to expand his network of influential patrons, quickly adding Lord Rothschild, Leo 
Amery, Liddell Hart, Winston Churchill, and many others.312 Lorna would later remember: 
When [Wingate] came back to England in the early of autumn of 1938—and 
made his first contact with Churchill, and indeed had a most interesting time, 
and then only a couple of months, and those quite unofficial—he absented 
himself without leave in order to try and persuade the politicians that Britain 
should support the Jews and that there should be no partition of Palestine, and 
other matters of state.313 
For a junior officer to try and influence public policy represented a serious (although not wholly 
unusual) breach in protocol. This is why Haining felt that Wingate tended  “to play for his own 
ends.” This stops short of Wingate being a selfless ideological Zionist, sacrificing himself for the 
Zionist cause. Wingate, instead, argued to his British commanders and peers that he was not 
playing for his own ends, but for the good of the British Empire, and the good of the Zionist 
Jews he thought best suited to serve the Empire’s interests in the region.314 Yet Hainging’s 
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critique hits upon a sound problem in military culture—the balance between the necessarily 
relentless pursuit of advancing one’s career in a competitive environment (and Wingate 
certainly thought his advocacy for a Jewish Army could advance his own career), and 
maintaining the perception that one is unselfishly placing one’s ambition at the good of the 
common cause—a vague concept that might be translated into a action in many different ways 
in a rapidly changing world.315 In any event, Haining found Wingate’s removal from Palestine in 
1939 “timely” and helpful in preventing further embarrassments for the British Army.316 When 
Wingate read how his actions had been described in his personnel report, he overestimated 
their negative influence on his career and took advantage of an obscure footnote in British 
military law that allowed him to appeal the report directly to the sovereign. His other well-
placed friends, however, convinced him such a step was unnecessary, and that he 
overestimated the negative influence the report might have on his career in the regular 
service.317 
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 It was with these setbacks in hand that, at the outbreak of world war, Wingate found 
himself as a staff officer on an antiaircraft artillery unit protecting England from German 
bombers.318 Though he resented the position, he still threw his restless mind at the problems of 
air defense, and argued for the army to reorient the guns so that they faced towards the 
prospective targets of the Germans, thereby enabling a concentration of fire at the moment 
when the enemy planes were most vulnerable.319 He wrote another report arguing for the 
reassignment of all staff officers (possibly even himself) not empowered to make independent 
decisions, stating that “A formation which acts merely as a letter-box is simply a block in the 
blood circulation”.320 Wingate, however, spent much of Britain’s phony war and finest hour 
politicking for higher status work. In one effort, he received encouragement from the 
commander-in-chief of the Home Front, ‘Tiny’ Edmund Ironside, to create a counterinsurgency 
unit designed to foil the efforts of possible Nazi sympathizers; it offered the chance for heroics 
in the event of a German invasion, but it came to naught.321 Wingate was also especially 
interested in the possibility of raising a Jewish Legion or army  to help secure the Middle East 
for the British Empire, improve Zionist military capacity, and provide himself with a large and 
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independent opportunity for command. 322 Wingate nearly obtained his goal. The War Office 
hesitated, however, and in Wingate’s view this was due to fears that a Jewish military unit 
might lead to further unrest in the Arab world.323 Instead, to Wingate’s dismay, he found that 
General Archibald Wavell, his former commander in Palestine, had followed the advice of the 
Secretary of State for India, Leopold Amery, and requested the War Office to draw up orders to 
send Wingate to Cairo in order to help in the campaign to liberate Abyssinia from the Italian 
empire. Upon confirmation of the orders, and learning of his Zionist friends’ inability to prevent 
his disappearance into what seemed like a subservient and anonymous role, Wingate’s wife 
broke into tears of frustration and clutched the railing outside the British Museum.324 It 
precipitated one of the low points in Wingate’s relationship with his wife, a relationship which 
was passionate (but often distant), childless by choice, and marked by a significant age 
difference.325 Within the past few months she had already had one or two personal shocks—
probably to include the discovery of Wingate having an affair—and recovered from a medically 
induced abortion.326 Wingate and Lorna hardly heard from each other until he returned from 
the campaign a year later.327 
 The next section will continue to examine Wingate’s story from his narrow perspective.  
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 Once Wingate reached Cairo he received a staff posting, and a promotion to 
major. As a staff officer of middling rank, he would have been expected to support the 
needs of higher ranking officers at the battalion, brigade, division, corps, or theater 
level.328 Staff jobs are useful to an army, and often essential, but they are not glorious 
and rarely make the front pages or the history books.329 Wingate, as was typical of his 
ambition and ego, was not satisfied with the staff position.330 He then adopted a flair for 
maximum attention.331 He strutted out of meetings with generals when they ran too 
long. He began to wear an alarm clock on his wrist to emphasize the value of his time. 
He grew a beard. He wore an old-fashioned sun helmet to evoke the image of a 
previous generation of British explorers. Just as modern special forces soldiers are 
instantly recognizable with their rotating costume of berets, untrimmed beards, baseball 
hats, and conspicuously displayed equipment, so too was Wingate. He topped all his 
showmanship with a close political interest in the deposed Abyssinian leader, Haile 
Selassie, and persistently stated that a campaign in Abyssinia would be about Abyssinian 
                                           
328 James Donald   Hittle, The Military Staff, Its History and Development (Military Service Publishing, 
1944). 
329 Hugh Boustead would later criticize Wingate for having too little experience with battalion or brigade 
sized operations, the kind of which Wingate might have obtained as a staff officer.  Boustead. 
330 Staff positions do, however, enable career advancement, which is why Wingate had sought to attend 
staff college in 1937. Staff jobs are also safer than leading troops in direct combat—a key consideration 
for many people, even career soldiers. Yet “the work is drudgery, attracting neither glamour nor thanks”. 
Bidwell, 55.  
331 Thesiger, 319-21. 
123 
 
liberation, and not about the battle between the imperial powers of Italy and Britain.332 
At a military conference in Khartoum on December 2nd, Wingate gave what Sykes calls 
“one of his finest performances,” as he argued for the political and military potential for 
a campaign of indirect warfare in western Abyssinia.333 Wingate expanded far beyond 
his allotted ten minutes. He suggested that his campaign plan would allow Wavell to 
withdraw the bulk of British forces from Kenya and the Sudan, freeing them to be used 
in North Africa and Greece.334 Wavell did not have quite that much faith in guerrilla 
warfare, but historian Simon Anglim has found that as early as 1939 Wavell’s staff 
stated that “operations should be conducted more on the lines of those undertaken by 
Lawrence of Arabia” and avoid relying too heavily on “regular” warfare.335 In fact, British 
agents were already on the job in western Abyssinia,336 but Wingate sought to relegate 
them to political roles and administrative tasks, and he undermined their influence by 
cultivating a direct relationship with Haile Selassie, the deposed emperor. Wingate 
politicked with Major-General Platt to receive overall command of ‘Mission 101,’ a 
guerrilla unit which had been organized by Colonel Dan Sandford, and focused on 
arming Abyssinian ‘Patriots’ in the western highlands along the Sudanese border. Much 
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to Sandford’s chagrin, Wingate received the command, perhaps in spite of telling Platt 
that all commanders over fifty years of age ought to be shot (Platt pointed out that he 
was fifty-two: but he still backed Wingate and sidelined the older Sandford in the role of 
political advisor to Haile Salassie).337 Wingate, still just in his late thirties, also received 
command of two battalions, one drawn from Ethiopian exiles in Kenya, and the other 
from volunteers in the Sudan Defence Force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hugh Boustead, a veteran of multiple campaigns, including the western front in the First 
World War.  
 Wingate, alongside Haile Selassie, crossed the border from the Sudan into Ethiopia on 
18 January 1941.338 They had relatively few soldiers, and would receive almost no further 
logistical support from an overstretched Middle East Command. The plan was to establish a 
large coalition of ‘irregular’ guerrilla forces around a dependable nucleus of British colonial 
troops.339 A poorly chosen entry route (one that Wingate insisted on) destroyed their motor 
vehicles. Then they reached the highlands, and their desert camels began dying in terrific 
numbers—tens of thousands would perish from exhaustion and starvation.340 Gideon Force 
endured high casualties (fifty-percent in some units) from exhaustion and combat. But they 
harassed more than twenty-thousand beleaguered Italian soldiers and colonial forces into 
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surrender (Wingate would later claim as many as 40,000);341 meanwhile, the British regulars 
assaulted Italian strongholds to the north and south of Gideon Force's operational area and 
ensured the campaign’s overall success. With nearly all the Italian forces defeated, Wingate and 
the Emperor Selassie entered Addis Abba in triumph, thus restoring what Wingate liked to think 
of as the world’s longest surviving independent monarchy. Wingate’s Ethiopian and Sudanese 
soldiers felt vindicated. His British officers and soldiers, however, felt proud but 
underappreciated by Middle East Command. Wingate received orders to return to Cairo in the 
first week of June.342 
 For his efforts, Wingate would receive his second DSO. But upon reaching Cairo he 
found “neglect and ingratitude” for his accomplishments in the midst of severe setbacks for the 
British Empire in Greece, Crete, and the Western Desert.343 Wingate wanted better pay and 
recognition for his soldiers, additional command opportunities, and the implementation of his 
guerrilla tactics on a larger scale—especially in the campaign against Germany. In his official 
report, he denigrated the contributions of the British generals responsible for destroying the 
majority of the Italian army in Ethiopia; he argued that they used wasteful, dated tactics rather 
than exploring new methods based on current technology, sound judgment, and the principles 
of war.344 The generals (and many staff officers throughout the theater) took umbrage to the 
suggestion that Wingate triumphed while they loitered about wasting men and munitions. But 
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the unusual character of Wingate's triumph coupled with the obvious political victory of 
restoring the Emperor to his throne helped preserve Wingate's popularity among the likes of 
Wavell and Amery, which shone all the brighter in the bleak nadir of British strength in the 
region. But there were many rungs on the ladder between Wingate and the high command. He 
received his DSO and a notice in despatches, but with the loss of his command he would soon 
be returned to the rank of major. The demotion from his temporary rank of colonel would result 
in reduced pay and prestige. Further, GHQ bureaucrats threatened to dock his pay due to a 
trivial accounting error. And his British officers and enlisted soldiers had received—up to that 
point—nothing of what Wingate had promised them.345  
 In this already unstable condition, Wingate received a prescription for Atabrine to fight 
off the malaria he had contracted during the Abyssinia campaign. The drug, at high doses, has 
depressive effects, and under the influence of malaria his body raged at a high fever. On July 
4th, Wingate locked himself in his quarters and stabbed his own throat.346 A soldier downstairs 
heard Wingate's body crashing to the floor; the neighbor broke into the room and dragged 
Wingate’s unconscious form to the hospital next door. Miraculously, Wingate survived the 
attempted suicide; less miraculously, his ruthless ambition and callous handling of staff officers 
also survived. A consultant in psychological medicine soon determined that Wingate was no 
longer suicidal, and that he should be sent home for a long convalescence.347  
 This happened at a moment when a recent subordinate, Hugh Boustead, had urged 
Wingate to quickly turn towards other battles in the Middle East, and when Wingate had told 
another subordinate, Donald Nott, that he intended to “worry the authorities into allowing him 
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back into Palestine with the object of raising a Jewish army”. 348 Wingate had instead arrived in 
Cairo and attempted suicide. It proved the end of his actions, if not his ambitions, in the Middle 
East, and it had occurred at a time when Middle East commanders, facing awful losses in every 
direction, were particularly open to the kind of military entrepreneurism that Wingate brought 
to the table.349 It seems Wingate’s suicide attempt came at a moment when there were many 
paths open to the service of  ‘King and country’, or supporting his Jewish allies, or further 
exploring his military theories. The crushing blow of his loss of status in the first weeks of June 
correlated with his attempted suicide, and whatever opportunities may have existed counted 
little to him after the bursting of the bubble, reputation, and the fitness that drained from his 
body under the continued influence of malaria. Wingate recovered, the malaria cooled, and he 
expressed regret at his actions.350 
 Upon arriving home for six month’s leave in November 1941, Orde Wingate and his wife, 
Lorna, found their relationship much improved. He had obtained some measure of his ambition 
by earning the gratitude of the Emperor Haile Selassie during the Abyssinian campaign. He 
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received another bar to his Distinguished Service Order ribbon. Though not quite famous, his 
return to London reminded him that he still had many friends in high places. Lorna remembered 
that Wingate, on the whole, was in a better state of mind than before the campaign: 
When he came back to me in London in the flat, after [the suicide] episode, it was quite 
a long while since it had taken place. He’d had a good recovery and a long sea voyage, 
and he was looking extremely well when he came in through the door. And he was 
looking wonderfully serene. And he continued in that state of serenity. He had a very 
hectic three months in London after this ... we had the most exciting time.351 
Wingate soon secured a physician’s note that ensured he could be listed fit for duty.352 But he 
wanted to avoid a low status assignment, and so instead he based himself out of his London 
flat and travelled England to promote his recent successes in Abyssinia with well-placed 
politicians and military officers.353 Lorna later recalled that together they “had some dramatic 
times, because he was trying to organize a job for himself. It was at this point in his life that he 
gathered his civilian friends again ... and he was determined that he was not going to be 
shunted off to a pool of officers, and then to some minor theater of war”.354  
 If Wingate had not attempted suicide he could have readily enough found work 
immediately after the campaign in Abyssinia. As it was, the required convalescence took him 
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out of action for months. Soon he begrudged the absence of a high status role with appropriate 
rank, and he typed a self-addressed memorandum to underline his frustrations. After noting 
that the staff at the War Office ostensibly responsible for irregular operations failed to recognize 
him (or to even acknowledge the existence of his campaign) he wrote:  
It must be exceptional, even to-day, when an officer who has defeated and destroyed 
nearly forty thousand enemy troops strongly support[ed] by aircraft and artillery with 
[only] two thousand troops [of his own], without either aircraft or artillery, and in 
complete isolation from any other operations, who, as scarcely ever happens in war, has 
not only been [in] sole command of the forces engaged, but has also planned the whole 
campaign, organized[,] trained and equipped the troops, and brought the whole to a 
completely successful conclusions [sic], that such an officer on his arrival home should 
not even be asked to see the men who are responsible for the army’s hitherto not highly 
successful campaigns; that as soon as they hear he is again fit to fight the only response 
should be an order to join the regimental depot at Woolwich.355 
The memorandum’s umbrage shows Wingate’s clear taste for peer competition. He insists on 
the uniqueness of his accomplishment in Abyssinia. He even denigrates the soldiers who served 
beside him, feeling that their stars must seem dim compared with his own. Since Sandford 
organized Mission 101, and Boustead organized the Frontier Battalion, Wingate’s claims fail to 
clear the hurdle of honest self-awareness.  After typing the memorandum, Major Wingate must 
have felt a further sting, because he then wrote in the margin:  
At this moment few, if any, regular officers of my seniority (18 ½ years service) are not 
either Lt Colonels or the staff on unit commanders (Lt Cols) or of higher rank still. I am 
apparently regarded as inferior in ability to the average regular officer.356 
                                           




Wingate, throughout 1939 and 1940 had lobbied for an exceptional opportunity, and he 
achieved it with Gideon Force in 1941, as well as a temporary promotion to colonel. His suicide 
attempt in July of that year led to his return to London, and the reduction in rank to major. In 
the pursuit of further honors, he avoided returning to the officer pool to receive an assignment, 
thereby rejecting the jobs that would have most quickly returned him to higher rank, albeit 
perhaps without the autonomy and power that he craved. In this context, he narrowly dodged 
an assignment with Special Operations Executive, and tried unsuccessfully to dodge a new 
assignment under Wavell (now the Commander-in-Chief in India). Wingate felt he personally 
had little to offer Burma (or that Burma had little to offer him). He tried to lobby for a meeting 
with an Air Marshal.357 He met with MP Randolph Churchill (son of the prime minister) and 
advocated for a ‘Tibesti Plan’ to operate light infantry formations in the areas of northern Chad 
and southern Libya inaccessible to tanks.358 But by then the War Office had already committed 
to sending Wingate to south Asia.  
Wingate in Burma, 1942-1944 
 Wingate flew from London on February 27th, 1942. Almost up until the day he left, he 
argued with his friend and fellow soldier Derek Tulloch that it would be much better for the 
British Empire if he found a way back to the Middle East. Tulloch tried to convince Wingate that 
his fortune might be to “raise and train a vast army of Chinese troops and create havoc 
amongst the Japanese”.359 Havoc was certainly to occur. The Japanese military had attacked 
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the American fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. They had hoped to prevent the 
American navy from interfering in their goal of creating a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere’, a dream “created by idealists” and “exploited by realists” desperate for better access to 
the raw materials of war, especially rubber and oil.360  Japanese strategy included the attack 
and occupation of British Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies and other 
resource rich territories.361 Hong Kong fell in December. Singapore fell in February of 1942. 
Burma fell in May. Within months, much of British Asia had collapsed in a rush of 
disillusionment—and blood. The image of the paternalistic and invincible British Empire was 
replaced with the image of the ‘super Jap’.362 The Japanese conquest fed off of anti-British 
sentiment throughout the region, and even turned 40,000 captured Indian troops into a 
detachment of the Japanese army.363 The Japanese shock troops, rather than liberating British 
colonies, committed numerous atrocities, and enabled or encouraged wave after wave of ethnic 
violence. The British never managed to call the bluff of the overstretched Japanese forces, but 
eastern monsoons accidentally colluded with the Battle of Midway to halt the Japanese 
expansion—or perhaps more accurately, the British collapse, in south Asia.364  Wingate’s 
original destination, Rangoon, had fallen before he could get there. During a long stopover in 
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Cairo, Wingate had desperately tried to secure the honors and financial rewards he had 
promised his soldiers in the Abyssinian campaign.365 Wingate eventually arrived in New Dehli on 
March 19th. 
 Wingate went to Wavell for orders. The commander-in-chief in India instructed him to 
take charge of any remaining ‘commando’ forces during the withdrawal.366 Wingate, sensing 
that the hand had already been played, instead began reconnoitering Burma and formulating a 
novel plan for what came to be known as long-range penetration, wherein units would go far 
beyond the frontline and attack and disrupt the Japanese ‘line-of-communications’, that is, 
disrupt Japanese supply lines and the ability of Japanese commanders to manage their 
operations.367 The Japanese themselves relied on a similar mobility, and Wingate felt that with 
British initiative, increasing air superiority, and sympathetic support from indigenous Burmese 
communities, he might convince his men that they could harass the Japanese in a way similar 
to how Gideon Force had held down Italian troops in the western Abyssinia. Further, contrary to 
what Wingate’s friend Tulloch had suggested, Wingate insisted that the troops under his 
command would be British soldiers or colonial troops, and not bother trying to go north and 
recruit Chinese irregulars. This was a key point for Wingate. He never, unlike his distant cousin, 
T.E. Lawrence, wanted to step outside the competitive hierarchy of the British military. He 
explained his preference, in Abyssinia and in Burma, with practical terms, stating that irregulars 
were expensive and ineffective without a strong example set by professional regulars.368 If 
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Wingate’s new plan succeeded, he felt he could prevent the Japanese from taking effective 
action against other British or Chinese units planning counterattacks into Burma. It would 
prove, in the popular imagination at least, that the Japanese were not invincible. Wingate 
managed to send his plan directly to Wavell, and ignored the usual staff channels. Thanks to 
their personal relationship, Wavell accepted his initiative, but it was much to the chagrin of a 
creaky and proud Indian Army staff that was jealous of access and supplies. With Wavell’s 
backing Wingate bullied, and mocked, and harassed his peers on the staff in order to get the 
resources he had imagined for himself. He had not asked for much—just a few thousand 
soldiers who would otherwise sit idle, but in an environment of scarce materiel and scarce 
honor, it must have seemed like a lot because the attacks on Wingate’s character which 
resulted from this time period would establish one-half of his reputation up to the present 
day.369 Wavell’s Director of Staff Duties, General S. Woodburn Kirby, was particularly hurt and 
angered, and when that officer later secured the authority to write the Official History of History 
of the War Against Japan, he devoted more analysis—almost all of it venomous—to Wingate 
than any other person in the multi-volume set, creating a permanent rift between those who 
served in the Chindits, and those who did not.370 
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 Soon, however, Wingate’s formation shifted from being an auxiliary force to being the 
only game in town. A poorly equipped British counterattack had failed along the coast.371 And 
Chinese leaders showed no interest in using any of the resources that Americans were pumping 
into their military in order to aid the British, even if the campaign did have dim hopes of 
reopening a land route to China.372 Wingate’s new force therefore had no counterattack it could 
support. Still, Wavell and Wingate agreed it should go on ahead, remarkably, despite the risks, 
as a learning exercise. Ostensibly, they could learn whether or not Wingate’s ideas about air 
supply and hard training could prove effective at sustaining a brigade-sized formation behind 
enemy lines.373 With the recent loss of much of his command, Wavell was willing to risk a few 
thousand more. 
 Wingate and Wavell had some confidence that their troops could in fact penetrate the 
Japanese territory without being encircled and annihilated. During the British retreat, the 
Japanese had continuously outflanked the British. They had relied on scavenging captured 
supplies instead of carrying much of their own, which freed them (indeed compelled them) to 
move as quickly as they could, whereas the British, tied to mechanical transport, had limited 
themselves to the poorly constructed roads.374 Wingate observed, quite simply, that the 
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Japanese army’s swift advance left a tremendous amount of thinly held or indefensible territory, 
and that the Japanese may not be inherently more comfortable in the jungle than British 
formations with sufficient training. Wingate’s own units, being lightly equipped and with virtually 
no traditional line-of-communication tying them to critical supplies, could prove less vulnerable 
to Japanese envelopment tactics. He considered Japanese officers  unimaginative, and their 
soldiers to be brave but easily confused. Wingate hoped to paralyze the Japanese military’s 
response to his “strategical” incursion, rendering its fighting power ineffective while he 
delivered “fatal blows”.375 
 Wingate had wanted to call his formation ‘Gideon Force,’ as he had in Abyssinia, but 
instead the staff at India HQ saddled him with operation ‘Longcloth’, a derogatory snub meant 
to compare Wingate to Tarzan.376 He later adopted a moniker named after the highly-stylized, 
lion-like creatures emplaced outside Burmese temples—the chinthe leogryphs, which he and his 
British officers mistook for ‘Chindits’. The name eventually stuck, and would, in two years time, 
become almost synonymous with the war in Burma.377 Language mattered to Wingate. In 1938, 
his British and Jewish cooperative patrols had become the Special Night Squads. In 1941 a 
stalling guerrilla movement, Mission 101, gave way Gideon Force. Gideon Force included an 
auxiliary of ‘operational centers’ to encourage guerrilla resistance to the Italians. And now, as a 
brigade commander in Burma in 1943, he broke his battalions into ‘columns’ and declared them 
to be wholly novel formations necessary for taking advantage of the technological 
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transformations of modern warfare. Lentaigne, one of his brigade commanders in the second 
Chindit campaign, dismissed it all as “Chindit bullshit” but Wingate viewed his ever-expanding 
nomenclature as essential for a reimagining of the war;378 he sought to inspire confidence in his 
soldiers that his innovations—some useful, some not—would enable them to maintain an 
aggressive posture against the Japanese, even with limited resources, and survive. For the 
same reason, Wingate “wrote or drafted all the more important instructions himself,” a 
remarkable use of his very limited time, but one that created within his soldiers a sense of 
technical expertise, and technical expertise and personal competence translated into a sense of 
confidence—even overconfidence—in the overall tactical methods and strategic plans.379   
 At the beginning of February 1943 Wingate and his 3,000 soldiers crossed the Chidwin 
river and infiltrated the jungle on foot.380 Mules gallantly carried the radios and heavy weapons. 
Elephants recruited for a similar task deserted upon the first opportunity. In March, the Chindits 
destroyed Japanese patrols, cut the railway line, and blew up bridges. Despite a few reversals, 
casualties were light. Then Wingate and his columns made the fateful choice to cross the wide, 
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red Irrawaddy river, a move which concentrated their force in an open, hot countryside and 
with no immediate objective within reach. With Japanese troops moving in, it became almost 
impossible to properly schedule and intersect with desperately needed airdrops of food. 
Wingate and his column commanders realized the error, and salvaged the force. The columns 
crossed the river again, this time often under fire. To move quickly, they slit the throats of their 
mule transports and abandoned their heavy weapons. Most of the radios were gone. The 
columns dispersed in order to reduce the costs of any one skirmish with the Japanese forces. 
Those soldiers too worn out to keep going were abandoned, sometimes in villages, but often in 
the wilderness while Japanese patrols closed in. The march back decimated the force. By June, 
it was clear that one out of three soldiers had either died or (rarely) been made prisoner of war. 
Before the campaign, Wingate had warned the men that he thought only half of them would 
make it back.381 He actually overstated the resultant number of casualties. Still, only six 
hundred of the returning Chindits were ever declared fit to return to active soldiering.382 A 
commander who sought to create a new, more efficient method of infantry warfare had 
conducted a campaign with a survival ratio that compared unfavorably to the worst days of the 
Battle of the Somme. Wingate, who had read Plato on the march back, took a philosophical 
approach to the conclusion of his campaign. He imagined writing the obituary for at least one of 
his favorite officers in the expectation that they might not make it back.383 He wrote in his 
subsequent report that “the main value of our operation was plainly demonstrative and 
experimental. I have learned by experience that one never knows enough and that unless one 
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subjects oneself to acid tests one becomes bogus”.384 Still, he suspected it might result in a 
court martial.385 
 Wavell had returned to London, and was soon to be installed as viceroy of India. The 
new commander-in-chief was Claude Auchinleck. Though he agreed with his staff that the 
casualties were appalling and probably wasteful,386 he nevertheless wanted “publicity as soon 
as possible for the only British success to date in the Far East, all the more so as there was a 
recent British reverse to cover at Arakan”.387  Auchinleck therefore encouraged the Allied press 
to visit Imphal (the rallying point for the Chindits) beginning on May 12th, and they were 
allowed to interview the survivors recuperating in hospital beds. On May 21st the story received 
permission to print and immediately the campaign became world famous. All of the columns 
had not yet even returned to India.388 On July 7th the photographs came out, reshaping the 
image of what it meant to be a ‘Special Force’ or an elite warrior during the Second World War: 
beards, coarse uniforms, slouched hats, topees, open neck shirts, and mysterious (yet well 
publicized) operations behind enemy lines. In a war of tanks, fighter aircraft, and other 
technologies, the infantry were suddenly sexy. Sykes, in his biography, tried to emphasize that 
Wingate did not court the press, but after several years of learning to attract attention amongst 
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his peers, it came effortlessly. He coolly suggested his indifference to the attention by declining 
to acknowledge the presence of a well-known American journalist, and instead arguing with a 
fellow officer over a recent commentary on the Brontë sisters.389  
 Wingate’s official report had not cleared all the necessary channels before he started 
distributing it.390 He sent a copy to the Secretary of State for India (and frequent supporter), 
Leopold Amery. Amery shared the report with the prime minister. The timing proved fortuitous, 
for at the conclusion of the Trident Conference in May 1943, Churchill found himself frustrated 
at the lack of success in India, and what he took to be dilatory excuses for avoiding further 
combat. Churchill immediately suggested making Wingate head of all ground forces in Burma, 
and then decided to recall Wingate to London and offer him more support—or rather, for 
Wingate to offer Churchill support in the fast approaching combined chiefs of staff meeting at 
the Quebec Conference in August 1943.391 When Wingate protested that he had not yet seen 
his wife—they had by this point decided to try and have a child—Churchill offered 
magnanimously to bring her along on the H.M.S. Queen Mary. For Wingate, the journey was 
excitement and hard work. For his wife, it was loneliness, and crude looks and comments, the 
latter coming especially coming from Churchill, John Dill, and a few scabrous rakes in 
uniform.392 Wingate’s famous exploits now put him firmly in control of the relationship’s 
direction, regardless of Lorna’s personal wealth or intelligence; his fame would decorate and 
chafe her for the rest of her life. She wanted to be viewed as his armour-bearer, but was more 
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often depicted as a trophy.393 Lorna saw that Wingate’s aching confidence belied an eccentric 
ruthlessness. He was a fierce and successful competitor for scarce resources and scarce honor. 
It paid off. Now his superiors wanted to make use of him at the Quebec Conference, not just 
for his abilities as an officer, but as a first-rate asset in the grinding process of building a 
coalition for war. 
 The American chiefs-of-staff expressed nervousness at the fact that the bulk of the 
Japanese Army was not yet engaged in the war because their soldiers were located in 
Manchuria and mainland China. They therefore wanted the Burma Road opened in order to 
funnel more weapons to the Chinese military, whom Joseph Stilwell insisted “were an important 
military factor” in the defeat of Japan.394 Just when the Americans began pushing for more 
robust action to help China, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brook, 
pushed back with the suggestion that the Americans ought to hear from an officer who had just 
returned from that part of the world—Orde Wingate.395 Wingate, ever since his time in 
Palestine, had shown himself to be able to describe not just his own operations, but what he 
had learned from them. His lifelong interest in history and international politics helped him place 
his operations in a wider context, which in turn helped him guess at strategic goals that might 
be of interest to high ranking leaders. Alan Brooke used Wingate to parry away American 
attempts to ship materiel to Burma at the expense of the ongoing campaigns against Germany. 
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The Americans accepted the parry, and insisted that they would back Wingate to the hilt.396 To 
that end they created two new “provisional” units to support him. The first was Air Commando, 
which intended to provide enough air support to allow Wingate’s men to fly into the jungle 
rather than walk.397 The second, under the codename Galahad, was a brigade of American 
volunteers who would receive training as Chindits. They later became known as Merrill’s 
Marauders. 
 Wingate’s plan for his next campaign anticipated that in 1944 the Allies would launch a 
three pronged attack against the Japanese forces in northern Burma.398 One prong would come 
from China. The second would come from along coast. The third would go eastward (or 
southeastward) from India. Wingate envisaged that the Japanese defense would depend upon 
reinforcements and supplies fanning out from the center. Wingate, however, would place a 
Chindit brigade along each of the supply lines, and he imagined that he would be cutting the 
spokes on a wheel, and that the Japanese army would collapse under the pressure. As the 
historian Shelford Bidwell pointed out, the British chiefs of staff accepted Wingate’s detailed 
plan without yet knowing if the resources were available. Unfortunately, the approaching 
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invasion of Normandy meant that no landing craft would arrive in time for an attack along the 
coasts of Burma. The Chinese leader, Chiang K’ai-shek, sensing an excuse, then tried to cancel 
his own attack, although the American General Joseph Stilwell eventually compelled him to 
proceed by threatening to cut off the military supplies coming from the United States.399 Finally, 
intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese military, partly in response to the chaos induced 
by the first Chindit campaign, was preparing to attack into India, which caused the newly 
appointed commander of Fourteenth Army, William Slim, to settle into a defensive position.400  
 Once again, Wingate’s plan for a strategic victory began to recede into the distance. On 
more than one occasion he threatened to resign.401 At one point, it was because resources 
promised to him were being held in reserve due to the impending Japanese attacks on India. In 
another, it was because the world-wide strategy of the Allies did not intend to exploit the efforts 
of his soldiers in Burma.402 One of his subordinates, Bernard Fergusson, had made a strategic 
follow up a precondition for his continued service, and when he heard that his condition was 
not going to be met, he too threatened to resign. Wingate, fabricating a plan where none 
existed, guaranteed Fergusson that his soldiers would be relieved in place before the 
monsoon.403 Fergusson stepped back in line. Wingate stepped back in line. The Americans, very 
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excited about the adventurous spirit and tactical innovations of the operation, were wholly 
engaged. Wingate did not resign, but he also wanted to avoid a repeat of Longcloth. He needed 
objectives he believed were strategic. He improvised, and once again drew upon Biblical 
imagery, this time for the concept of “Strongholds”.404  
 In the second Chindit campaign, the Chindit formations more than trebled in size, but 
still relied upon a thin line-of-communications, though with the important addition of 
Strongholds (what soldiers in Vietnam or Afghanistan or Iraq would call Forward Operating 
Bases). Each Stronghold was to be defensively impregnable, and contain an airfield for 
resupply, evacuations, and even close air-support aircraft. Artillery would use the Stronghold as 
a firebase in order to better protect patrols that would cross ‘outside the wire’ and attack 
Japanese positions or intercept Japanese movements. If the Japanese attacked, Wingate felt it 
would be so much the better, as his troops, with the benefit of close air support aircraft, could 
hold their position. The Stronghold could also serve as an “administrative centre for loyal 
inhabitants” willing to stand against the Japanese.405 Wingate was, without knowing it, inspiring 
a way of warfare that, with its affordability and promise of security and dependence upon 
technology, would come to dominate American ground strategy in the 21st century. The 
attractions today were the attractions then. It allowed for force preservation while ostensibly 
not surrendering the ‘initiative’ and enabled the sustainment of the unsustainable—an offensive 
without enough troops.  In fact, Wingate suspected that his Strongholds would prove so 
attractive to the imagination that once established, his superiors would refuse to relinquish 
them. Instead, celebrating his success and comparing it to the failures of the British Indian 
Army bunkered down northwest of the Chidwin river, Wingate anticipated the formation of yet 
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more long-range penetration units, and the obsolescence of regular infantry formations. He 
envisioned, in effect, a hop through the jungle from Stronghold to Stronghold, with the 14th 
Army and inspired Burmese partisans mopping up resistance behind him—all the way to 
Indochina.406 Wingate, fighting the Japanese, a conventional army far from friendly territory, 
may have succeeded. If he planted airfields “into the guts of the enemy” surely Slim would 
insist on exploiting the opportunity; or if not Slim then perhaps Mountbatten; or if not 
Mountbatten, then certainly Churchill; or if not Churchill then the Americans; or if not the 
Americans then the news media. Predictably, Wingate did not resign.407 
 Wingate’s new unit was called Special Force. His new operation was termed Thursday. 
He issued his operations orders on February 2nd, 1944. He anticipated a theatre-level victory 
over the Japanese.408 Wingate’s reach for Special Force exceeded the grasp of any explicit 
planning on the part of his superiors. The inexorable turn of training, logistics, planning and 
politics compelled the operation onward. Gliders began crashing into jungle, with Chindits 
crawling out of the wreckage. An entire brigade infiltrated enemy territory moving on foot in 
single file. On March 13th Wingate declared that “There are now twelve thousand all ranks of 
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Special Force imbedded in the enemy’s guts”.409 Before he could establish all of his Strongholds, 
however, his transport plane, a B-25 Mitchell bomber, slammed into a remote mountaintop. The 
crash instantly killed everyone aboard. The date was March 24th, 1944. Wingate was forty 
years old. His only son was born a few months later. Winston Churchill issued an epitaph in 
parliament: Wingate “was a man of genius who might well have become a man of destiny”.410  
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5. Wingate’s Leaders: Trying to escape a “welter of 
inefficiency and lassitude” 
 
 Wingate’s leaders, without exception, adopted his ‘special force’ tactics and strategies 
under feelings of loss and distress, when pressure tilted the machinery of the mind to greater 
risk-taking. The decision to adopt Wingate’s particular theories and policies usually began as a 
spontaneous action among high commanders, rather than filtering up from their staff. Wingate’s 
methods themselves were not entirely novel. In the well-supported view of historian Simon 
Anglim, Wingate adopted British ‘small wars’ tactics to the available technology—wireless 
transmission and air supply—and then, in his truly unique way, created units of astonishing 
pride and ingenuity. Wingate knew how to envisage strategic victories in which his soldiers and 
leaders wanted to believe. 
 A few months before the campaign in Abyssinia, Wingate was still a relatively 
anonymous British Army captain stuck in the middle-parts of fortune. He had received official 
commendation for conducting joint British and Jewish nighttime raids in Palestine with a unit he 
called Special Night Squads, but he had also received a reprimand for advocating for pro-Zionist 
policies in London. In 1940, he pressed for the opportunity to help create a Jewish Legion to 
support operations in the Middle East, but instead received a staff assignment to an anti-aircraft 
unit in Sidcup, England. In that same year, Leopold Amery, the newly appointed Secretary of 
State for India, became the first and most important British politician to intervene in Orde 
Wingate’s career during the Second World War. It was Amery’s intervention that enabled the 
War Office to send Wingate to Abyssinia.  
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 According to Amery, he had met Wingate in Zionist circles through due to their mutual 
friendship with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a founding father of Israel. The meeting occurred 
sometime in the winter of 1939 to 1940. Amery later told Wingate’s biographer that he “had 
made up his mind that Wingate must somehow or other be used to advantage in the war”.411 
Amery, however, though a member of parliament, thereafter remained out of major office until 
Churchill became prime minister in May of 1940. He expected to receive a prominent position in 
Churchill’s war cabinet. The role of Secretary of State for India was, to Amery, a “stunning and 
almost humiliating blow” because in the spring of 1940 India seemed far removed from the war 
in Europe.412 Churchill and Amery, much to each other’s surprise, having finally come into 
office, almost immediately began arguing passionately about policy in India. Amery was 
pragmatic about the rising sentiments surrounding Indian nationalism. Churchill, however, failed 
to grasp the tentativeness of British rule in India. A Churchill biographer, William Manchester, 
noted that Churchill later claimed to have almost no memory of his own speeches as pertained 
to the fall of France and the defense of Britain in 1940, and yet in 1953 Churchill could recall his 
petty arguments with Amery over India in vivid and passionate detail,413 a telling insight that 
suggests the salience of conflict in coalition building. 
 The conventional story of Amery’s patronage of Wingate describes Amery’s intervention 
as a moment of benevolence, or a moment of kindness towards Wingate, or a savvy 
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reallocation of a gifted officer from one field of operations to another—pawn becomes queen.414 
But that perspective views the problem only from Wingate’s perspective, and ignores the exact 
context in which Amery made the decision to elevate Wingate’s name and plumb for Wingate’s 
advancement.  Amery was at the moment under intense pressure from Winston Churchill due 
their differing views on how Amery should handle Indian nationalism. By early July 1940, the 
situation between the two deteriorated to the point that Amery thought it likely that he would 
have to resign, as Churchill began to probe Amery’s every correspondence with the government 
in India—again this is July 1940, the darkest hour. Consider the costs in time and energy on 
Churchill’s part to intervene so directly in Amery’s correspondence. It was in this context that 
Amery, trying to aid the war, yes, but also perhaps trying to restore his own sense of 
usefulness, recalled Wingate’s name at a meeting of the Middle East Committee of the Cabinet. 
Amery put it to the cabinet that “in the war with Italy ‘the ideal man’ to lead insurgent forces 
from within the Italian African possessions was ‘a certain Captain O. C. Wingate.’ The Middle 
East Committee agreed to forward Captain Wingate’s name to General Wavell, commander in 
the Middle East.415   
 High ranking leaders and politicians can, of course, push for a junior’s advancement at 
any time, but given the recent advancements in decision-making psychology,416 it seems 
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relevant that Amery pushed for Wingate’s advancement, and Wingate’s use of special forces, in 
a moment of extreme personal pressure—perhaps even what psychologists refer to as a 
‘domain of losses.’ In the midst of loss, soldiers and statesmen take risks.417  
 As essential as Leopold Amery was to Wingate’s wartime appointments, it was General 
Archibald Wavell who put Wingate into the field in Abyssinia. When he decided to resource 
Wingate, he too was in a moment of professional crisis. Wavell later justified his faith in 
Wingate by professing that he had “always had a liking for unorthodox soldiers and a leaning 
towards the unorthodox in war.” He had family connections to irregular warfare going back over 
a hundred years. He viewed his friendship with T.E. Lawrence as “one of my most valued 
privileges and boasts”.418 Wavell also had a professional interest in the continued importance of 
the Infantry (he tried to insist on the capital “I”), despite their vulnerability to the “siege” of 
trench warfare. To make the battlefield more survivable, he pressed for Infantrymen to be more 
like well-trained and lightly equipped burglars and brawlers, whose expertise resided in 
enduring (and then intelligently dominating) modern battlefields.419 But overriding every other 
interest in 1940 was the fact that Wavell was seriously shorthanded, and receiving “proddings” 
from a politically vulnerable Churchill to take action on every front imaginable.420 Wingate knew 
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of Wavell’s problems, and so when he pitched his guerrilla campaign on December 2nd, 1940, 
he offered action at a low cost and yet providing high honor. Wingate argued for immediately 
providing the Emperor Haile Selassie with a few battalions of “brave” and “devoted” regular 
soldiers. These would move across rough terrain, sliding across the Ethiopian border from the 
Sudan. They would inspire, by leading from the front, a full-scale revolt against Italian 
despotism through their devotion to “the cause of [Haile Selassie’s] liberties”.421 As a 
consequence, Wingate advised them to “withdraw the bulk of British troops from Kenya and the 
Sudan thus enabling the Middle East Command to sweep the Italians from the whole of North 
Africa after which they could and would meet the Germans in Greece and the Balkans”.422 
Liberty, devotion, justice, leverage, and the freeing of resources for other theaters: Wingate 
moved, at that very meeting, the vaguely defined concept of ‘unorthodox forces’ from a tactical 
adjustment to strategic tool.  Though the conference received Wingate’s performance with a 
measure of approval and encouragement, Wavell stopped short of withdrawing forces from 
Kenya and the Sudan.  
 During the actual campaign, Wingate reported at first to Major-General William Platt and 
then later received instructions from Major-General Alan Cunningham in the south, and so 
Wavell, a step above either in the chain-of-command, heard little from Wingate. But with his 
back against the wall due to developing disasters in Greece and Crete, and setbacks in the 
Western Desert, Wavell’s staff tried to summon Wingate through an intervention with 
Cunningham. He requested that Cunningham send Wingate to Cairo on May 10, 1941,423 but 
Cunningham replied on May 16, 1941 that Wingate was still engaged in combat operations near 
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Debra Tabor, and asked that he remain until Wingate could hand over his command during a 
pause in the fighting.424 Wavell immediately replied on May 17, 1941, “Yes retain WINGATE but 
rely on you send him here as soon as you can release him”.425 The short messages do not 
reveal what job Wavell specifically had in mind for Wingate—operations almost anywhere within 
the sphere of the Middle East command seem plausible. It seems unlikely that Wingate knew of 
Wavell’s requests, because as early as May 6, 1941, he was speaking to Cunningham and 
requesting a transfer to the Western Desert as he felt there was no more use for him in 
Abyssinia; Cunningham simply passed the request along to Platt, and Platt stated he would 
discuss Wingate’s future with Maclean (a political officer) at Khartoum.426 The timing of all this 
sounds mundane, but it coincided with the period in which Wingate achieved his most decisive 
military exploits, wherein he outmaneuvered a much larger Italian force and with a ceaseless 
series of harassing attacks, and blustered his way into forcing the surrender of 10,000 Italian 
soldiers.427 Wingate clearly wavered between wanting to stay or go in Abyssinia. The Western 
Desert held more appeal as soon as he heard of the great events going on there, but he bent 
his back further to the wheel in Abyssinia when he suspected a major victory was imminent. In 
any event, with the emperor’s entrance into Addis Ababa, and Wingate mounted upon a white 
horse just ahead of the sovereign, Wingate perhaps achieved the sort of victory march that 
seemed appropriate to him, and he finished his service there giving a toast to the emperor and 
to Gideon Force that enshrined him in the memory of the Abyssinian elite—indeed, Wingate 
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now appears in a mosaic in the city’s cathedral.428 Within weeks, physically worn out, and 
Wavell gone from his post, Wingate would despair and attempt suicide. Platt and Cunningham, 
contrary to the understanding of Wingate’s friends and spouse, wrote about Wingate in glowing 
terms in their official despatches.429  
 In 1942, Wavell again requested Wingate’s efforts (with another nudge from Amery). 
The situation was even worse than in 1940. Wavell had just recently been sent to assume the 
“non-active” role of Commander-in-Chief India because Churchill felt that Wavell was “tired”.430 
Japan suddenly entered the war, and British prestige suffered its most devastating blows and 
“greatest capitulation[s]”—the fall of Singapore and Hong Kong, the loss of the H.M.S. Repulse 
and H.M.S. Prince of Wales to Japanese aircraft, and of course the embarrassing (though not 
inept) retreat from Burma—all within a command that Wavell had taken over just a few months 
before.431 A subordinate from that time, Philip Mason, remembers the normally taciturn Wavell 
pleading with fate: “If I had anything, I’d go for them now. If I had one division fit to fight  I 
would go for them now”.432 It was not just a bellicose impulse, for he felt the Japanese must be 
stretched to the limit. He knew that feeling all too well. While he valued good equipment and 
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tactical skill, he felt that “guts” was more important than anything else, and in that sense he felt 
he had been let down by both his subordinates and his superiors.433  
 A measure of the pressure Wavell felt during the war, and especially in the winter of 
1942 and 1943, can be clearly ascertained from the last despatch he wrote upon being asked to 
retire from active service and assume the viceroyalty.434 Near the end of the document, he 
draws attention to the fact that the despatch “marks the end of my active military career.” He 
reminds the reader that he directed “some fourteen campaigns”, and that though he admires 
the “general strategy of the War Cabinet” he has “always been short of troops” though he still 
felt “up until he arrived in India” that everything possible had still been done to support his 
efforts. Wavell, though “grateful” for the support and encouragement he previously 
experienced, has one important exception to make: “During the operations recorded in this 
despatch I received neither encouragement nor help nor understanding of the difficulties, only 
criticism for the failure of a bold attempt to engage the enemy with inadequate resources, in 
hazardous circumstances”.435  
 With the complete retreat from Burma and the failure of the Arakan landings, Wavell 
took a risk on Wingate’s Chindits, even when their logical strategic purpose—distracting 
Japanese forces from the shore—had collapsed. By the time Wingate came out of the jungle in 
April 1943, Wavell was gone. Wavell perhaps epitomizes the contradictory conclusions that 
leaders would draw from Wingate’s operations. Though he acknowledged that the mission 
resulted in “no strategic value”, he argued that the experience proved “invaluable” because the 
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Japanese “found no effective means to counter the harassment”.436 The first Chindit campaign 
resulted in the loss of “one-third of the force”, and so “showed the necessity for a very high 
standard of training and physical fitness”, not because this alone would result in strategic 
results, but to increase the survivability of the soldiers. Ergo, in order to undertake missions of 
no strategic value (and therefore not worthy of the political effort to employ massive 
overwhelming force) at an acceptable casualty rate, it was necessary to employ the best trained 
troops. The Chindits could survive, barely. With their small size, they could deploy easily, and 
with little political interference. The formula had been found which some fifty years later could 
answer a riddle posed by the American Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, for an 
army more “responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable”.437 It is 
a formula designed to appeal to soldiers, commanders, and politicians operating with few 
resources—and perhaps no serious possibility of strategic relief. In environments where 
strategic success is impossible, leaders clearly prefer tactical success to tactical inaction.438  
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 Wingate became famous after the campaign, and Churchill whisked Wingate away to 
promote British heroism, as well as the British commitment to the war against Japan. Wavell, 
who was soon back in India assuming his new post, commented in his journal:  “P.M. is still in 
Quebec. I hear that Wingate has apparently ‘sold himself’ well there and his ideas are to have 
a  good run. I expect P.M. will now claim him as his discovery and ignore the fact that I have 
twice used Wingate in this war for unorthodox campaigns and that but for me he would 
probably never have been heard of”.439 Wavell, a career soldier, felt sidelined from the action, 
and the note of jealousy in his writing is impossible to miss. He was also once again under 
tremendous stress with Congress leaders in prison, incidents of scattered rebellion and 
sabotage, and a famine in Bengal partially wrought by the panic hording of foodstuffs in India 
and the loss of the Burmese rice paddies.440  
 One of the most illuminating perspectives on Wingate’s reputational rise (and 
subsequent fall) comes from Wingate’s promotion via Churchill and Alan Brooke, the Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). Alan Brooke’s powerful position enabled him to become 
Churchill’s principal strategist, and he also formally served as the professional head of the 
British Army. In March 1942 Alan Brooke despaired of the “unfit” number of British military 
commanders, many of whom lacked “character, imagination, drive, and power of leadership,” a 
problem he blamed on the terrible loss of young officers in the First World War. Searching for 
such traits might have conceivably left Alan Brooke open to advancing an officer like 
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Wingate.441 On July 25th, 1943, Alan Brooke nevertheless, “had trouble” when Churchill 
proposed promoting Wingate from being the head of a brigade to the role of Army Commander 
of Southeast Asia. The prime minister, on the other hand, viewed Wingate as a tremendous 
corrective to what he viewed as the gross incompetence that led to the collapse of Britain’s 
empire in the Far East. After Amery sent Wingate’s report on Longcloth to Churchill, the prime 
minister wrote to his chief military assistant to emphatically state his case for promoting 
Wingate at the expense of other professional soldiers. 
There is no doubt that in the welter of inefficiency and lassitude which has characterised 
our own operations on the Indian front, this man, his force and his achievements stand 
out; and no question of seniority must obstruct the advance of real personalities in their 
proper station in war.442 
 Churchill further shocked Alan Brooke (earning a triple “!!!”) when he brought Wingate along 
as a “museum piece” to the Quebec Conference. Churchill intended to show Wingate to the 
Americans an example of a British hero in the war against Japan.443 Alan Brooke loathed 
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Churchill’s tendency towards “purely opportunistic” strategies (which presumably might include 
gambits such as the Chindits) because Alan Brooke thought of “opportunistic” strategies as 
“chasing hares”, whereas Churchill insisted that long term projects “cripple initiative”. 444 Brooke 
countered that while long term plans may sometimes “hamper initiative” he nevertheless 
thought of strategy (and the consequent in-depth planning)  as a process of simply knowing 
what one was stepping into. Yet Alan Brooke “produced Wingate” on multiple occasions at the 
Quebec Conference and, like Churchill, came to view Wingate as a useful demonstration of the 
British commitment to the war against Japan, especially showing that “we are in no way 
neglecting the operations in Burma”.445 On 13 August 1943, just as the Americans began 
grasping at a China-oriented, resource-intensive strategy against Japan, Alan Brooke suggested, 
as an alternative, that the Americans “might wish to hear from Brigadier Wingate his views on 
the use of long-range penetration groups”  which Alan Brooke advertised as “using the 
Japanese outflanking tactics but whereas the Japanese outflanking movements consisted of 
four or five mile sweeps, Wingate’s used 40 or 50 miles sweeps and used units the size of 
Brigade groups”.446 Whereas Churchill understood Wingate in terms of heroics in the face of 
devastating circumstances and low resources, Alan Brooke understood him as a tool for 
encouraging American confidence in the Anglo-British process of building a war-winning 
coalition. 
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 Brooke’s tone finally shifted back against Wingate when he discovered in March of 1944 
that “Wingate is now wiring direct to the PM....It looks as if the strain of operations had sent 
Wingate off his head”.447 Brooke’s comment ignored the fact that Churchill had expressly given 
Wingate permission to contact him directly. More than once Brooke felt compelled to give 
Churchill “a long lecture on the system of the chain of command in the Army!” in the hopes of 
avoiding disruption.448 As in Palestine, so with Burma: Wingate fell out of favor with his fellow 
soldiers when he disrupted the military’s strict hierarchy, a system intended to mitigate 
intragroup competition. By 1945, perhaps with the recently killed Wingate in mind, Alan Brooke 
warned Slim away from “prima donna generals” and “film star generals”, showing that for all of 
his concerns for imagination and drive in 1942, by the end of the war the professional head of 
the army held little room in his heart for any disruptions to the strict order of status.449  
Why did Wingate’s leaders adopt special forces tactics and strategies?  
 In each instance, Wingate’s leaders were suffering tremendous losses when they 
enabled Wingate’s creation of special forces units. Clausewitz’s term “friction” – the 
“accumulation of difficulties” which “no one who has not seen war accurately conceives of”—
serves to describe the sense of loss and feeble inertia that occurs in wartime conditions. 
Chances slipped away, and a sense of failure suffocated the atmosphere. To counter it, the 
leaders desired a Sturm und Drang—a power, a technique, an idea for a chance at moving 
beyond the friction.450 William McRaven, the former American special operations commander, 
                                           
447 Ibid., 534. 
448 Ibid., 296. 
449 Ibid., 716. 
450 Clausewitz. Book 1, Chapter 7. Translation volunteered by Thomas G. Palaima. 
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theorized in the 1990s that a “special operation” could provide “relative superiority”—a decisive 
advantage obtained when a special forces unit leverages its superior training and preparation 
with an attack on a small fraction of a much larger opposing force, and winning that smaller 
battle in the face of what seems like—to the untrained eye—overwhelming odds.451 In 
Wingate’s campaigns, it was that kind of imagined precision that enabled soldiers to practice 
superior preparation, which in turn enabled their hopes for a ‘decisive advantage’ that normally 
only comes from numerical superiority and overwhelming force.452 The trouble for Wingate’s 
leaders—and ultimately for Wingate and his soldiers—was that the absence of a precise sense 
of purpose at the strategic level. On operation Longcloth and operation Thursday the fact that 
the leaders—and the soldiers—demanded that the action commence without a good sense of 
purpose demonstrates the way that the elite feeling—the status inherent in the training—
becomes its own purpose. It is a feat of arms independent of a strategic reality. Wingate’s 
leaders initially adopted special forces tactics when facing a severe deficit of resources—a sense 
of loss—but their initial commitment to such modes of warfare lacked 'brakes'.453 The noise and 
status associated with special forces created a self-perpetuating, semi-independent army whose 
resourcing could only be stopped with a counterbalancing, massive success on the part of 
                                           
451 William H. McRaven and William H. McRaven, Spec Ops : Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare : 
Theory and Practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 5-10. 
452 The formal description of special forces obtaining a decisive advantage comes from McRaven, 2-3. 
The straightforward argument for overwhelming force in the context of the Burma campaign can be 
found in Slim, Defeat into Victory. 
453 Several political science studies show links between a ‘domain of loss’ and an increase in risk-taking. 
See McDermott, "Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission." 
"Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade." Both of McDermott’s 
studies makes use of the ‘prospect theory’ first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky.  
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conventional forces.454 That success on the part of conventional forces did not occur in Burma 
until 1945, and so the Chindit’s became a ‘private army’ (an insult Wingate resented and 
despised), and the ‘private army’ then became less of an extension of the politics of a nation 
state than the instrument of private ambition and desire.455 That result is not an aberration: it is 
the default position of organized violence. Having explored, in this section, what those private 
desires look like at the level of high command, the next section examines the desires of 
relatively low-ranking officers and soldiers. 
  
                                           
454 In Abyssinia in 1941, the conventional victories of Platt and Cunningham overwhelmed the ‘buzz’ 
surrounding Wingate’s simultaneous campaign. In Burma, Slim’s more conventional campaign eventually 
retook Burma in 1945.  
455 The relative success of the conventional campaign was overshadowed by the use of the atomic bomb 
2,700 miles to the east. As a result, Wingate’s campaigns remained more prominent in the public’s 
imagination than any other effort.  
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6. Wingate’s Soldiers: “We need not...suspect ourselves 
of selfish or interested motives” 
 
Overview 
 Wingate’s officers and soldiers in Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma often joined his ranks 
with the intention of participating in violent combat, thereby fulfilling a role to which they had 
already publically committed through enlistment or commission.456 The role-fulfillment sought in 
Wingate’s units spared his soldiers the embarrassment of having a “quiet war”, or a war without 
an “acid test” to reaffirm their value or to prove their worth.457 Participating in war often meant 
rewards. For the Abyssinian irregulars known as ‘Patriots’ a reward could be access to better 
weapons, a ‘war-wife’, and recognition within a complex feudal system.458 For the Jewish 
                                           
456 The chapter title quotes Sykes, 386. He in turn is quoting Wingate’s ‘order of the day’ prior to 
crossing the Chindwin in Burma. 1943. 
457 Paterson. Digital file 3, 26:00. Lorna describes Wingate’s belief that “acid tests” produce efficiency, 
and that unlike the peacetime navy, the peacetime army had no serious acid tests. Throughout the 
Second World War, experts propagated a preference for action because “to stagnate in mind or body is 
to surrender without terms.” Charles McMoran Wilson Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London: 
Constable, 1945), 42. Bourke,  326-28. 
458 Shirreff’s Bare Feet and Bandoliers, the best English language history of the Patriots, traces the better 
access to weapons and feudal power, but entirely skips the war-brides. W.E.D. Allen’s Guerrilla Warfare in 
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paramilitaries of the Special Night Squads, the main rewards were a distinguishing, risk-taking 
role in coalitional violence within a rapidly changing colonial context. For the soldiers belonging 
to the British Army or its colonial regiments, the rewards included faster promotion, widely 
recognized badges of honor, or even better equipment and pay, all of which could translate into 
a higher status both within the hierarchy of the military and back home. No matter the direness 
of the geostrategic situation, the failure to receive recognition could quickly sap the morale of 
participants, and undermine their trust in Wingate and in the military establishment—such as 
occurred, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the campaign in Abyssinia.  
  A role in violent combat, of course, came with the risk of being maimed or killed, and 
many of Wingate’s soldiers recognized the danger. Despite the inherent risks of irregular 
warfare, many British soldiers preferred Wingate’s methods to conventional operations because 
his tactics required extensive planning and specialized training, both of which encouraged a 
sense of competence. Wingate’s methods thereby seemed to reduce uncertainty, a cognitive 
trick that could lead soldiers to actually feeling better prepared and safer—though the evidence 
suggests that they were in fact in much greater danger than if they had stayed with 
conventional warfare despite its accompanying stressors of dependence and anonymity. 
Wingate’s strategies and tactics also seemed to offer a way to avoid the “unequal competition 
between technology and corporeality” found within the sphere of artillery, tanks, and aircraft 
along the main lines of battle.459 Wingate’s intrepid (and often deadly) walks through the 
                                                                                                                                        
Abyssinia largely ignores the interests of Abyssinian irregulars, though stops short of washing the 
campaign in the same terms as Christine Sandford’s nationalistic liberation narrative.  
Christine Lush Sandford, The Lion of Judah Hath Prevailed: Being the Biography of His Imperial Majesty 
Haile Selassie I (New York MacMillan, 1955). 
459 Bourke,  318. 
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wilderness helped soldiers avoid  the “mechanized terror, extreme mobility, vastly more efficient 
killing machines, omnipresent danger and unpredictability [that] sparked intense panic”.460  
 Though the Second World War is often described in moralistic, patriotic terms, such 
interests received perhaps less mention than expected in contemporaneous diaries and battle 
reports, or subsequent personal writings and oral histories of British soldiers. Sources instead 
reveal a process of soldiers situating themselves amongst their peers through participation in 
coalitional violence, and then, eventually, in the wider society to which they return.461 
Subsequent generations tend to draw attention to an ancestor’s participation in coalitional 
violence, thereby honoring their ancestor and signaling their family’s willingness to participate in 
such ventures.  
Independence and Autonomy 
 The British Army, like any modern military, required an individual’s subordination to a 
vast organization with a strict hierarchy, and it demanded disciplined service within a context of 
violence.462 Many officers and soldiers described joining Wingate’s units for the relative 
autonomy that he could offer within the hierarchy of the British military, an autonomy that 
promised to reduce conflict with peer rivals, shield them from dominant superiors, and enhance 
their sense of personal autonomy. These individuals tended to be young and unmarried, and 
                                           
460 Ibid., 319. 
461 Anglim, Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior from the 1920's to the Twenty-First Century.  
Anglim’s research program revealed just how intensive such positioning could be, and how much 
intelligence and time military leaders invested in the process of solving tactical and strategic problems. 
462 Maury D Feld, The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems, vol. 10 (Sage Publications, 
Inc, 1977).  
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they accepted a trade-off of reduced personal safety for increased autonomy.463 If a soldier 
pleased Wingate, Wingate often tried to reward them with the familiar tokens of honor and 
opportunity that British soldiers tended to expect from wartime service, especially when holding 
a leadership role. 
 In the Palestine of 1938, the British Army units stamping out Arab resistance often 
moved in company-sized formations or larger, meaning that a platoon commander might lead 
twenty to forty men, but he would be under the direct and constant supervision of a higher 
ranking officer at almost all times. When the Arab Revolt fell into a phase of ‘gangster’ terrorism 
rather than large-scale insurgency, the British soldiers faced many of the same frustrations that 
United States and British forces would face in Afghanistan and Iraq sixty to seventy years later, 
as they received orders to conduct brutal house-to-house searches, patrol in broad daylight to 
‘show the flag’ along roads that could be mined or watched by snipers, and man checkpoints 
along high traffic roads while knowing that ‘gangsters’ could slip through the countryside 
unmolested in small groups.464  
 Wingate’s Special Night Squads offered an altogether different experience for its select 
officers and NCOs. In an army of slow promotions and limited opportunities for personal 
initiative, their depictions of their experience show a consistent interest in having more 
autonomy than before. Lieutenant H.E.N. Bredin, a young officer with a long family history of 
military service, “reveled” in being a “detached platoon, and up to a point my own master”.465  
                                           
463 Psychiatric studies throughout the 1940s found that if a soldier felt they could “control the dangers of 
the battlefield by their own behavior” they were granted a “sense of security that is reasonably good.” 
Bourke,  321-22. 
464 Anglim, Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior from the 1920's to the Twenty-First Century, 56-59. 
465 Bredin, Oral History.  
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One of Wingate’s favorite young officers, the playboy millionaire Rex King-Clark, also celebrated 
the independence that the Special Night Squads provided, with Wingate even allowing King-
Clark to travel alone on his motorcycle through the countryside (contrary to a British Army 
policy).466 King-Clark imagined Wingate to be “shifty in his convictions”—King-Clark was not a 
Zionist—but was exhilarated when given the opportunity to join the SNS because he liked that 
he “worked rather independently” of Wingate or any other officer. Wingate himself also had to 
seek autonomy for the unit as a whole, and he relished his independence when he obtained it. 
On June 22nd, 1938, King-Clark noted in his journal that Wingate “returned in great glee” from 
a meeting with Brigadier John Evetts “as his night squads are now officially blessed and he can 
do as he wants”.467  
 In Abyssinia, Wingate’s friend and subordinate Major Anthony “Tony” Simonds wrote 
pages and pages of correspondence to his commander on captured Italian stationery paper, 
and the letters provide an effective series of documents for tracing the emotions and 
motivations for commanding an autonomous ‘operational centre’ within Gideon Force. The 
following excerpt conveys Simonds’ enthusiasm for commanding his own troops in the field, and 
the appreciation he had for Wingate as the instrument of that freedom despite Wingate’s 
notoriously rough handling. Indeed it also conveys how independent field work could please the 
lower-ranking soldiers as well:  
Everyone is very cheerful, working hard & keen as mustard. I am happier than I have 
ever been in the Army & if you could only regard me with some of the affection I actually 
feel for you, you would be a much more human & likable chap. I am very happy Orde & 
am doing a job of work [sic]. I regard myself as a genuine friend of yours, & 
                                           
466 Rex King-Clark, "Journal," (London: Imperial War Museum 1938), 9. 
467 Ibid., 11. 
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consequently write as a candid friend!!! Cheerio old chap & god bless. Yours very 
sincerely Tony.468 
Another letter is even more explicit.  
You have trusted me and given me a magnificent job, & I am not going to let you down. 
It is the chance of my life also for me. I have got what I wanted, an independent 
command & a boss who has trusted me. Nothing is going to deter me. I am no good as 
you know, mucking about in a crowd, but as I hope you know, I am not as ghastly in an 
independent show.469 
Wingate’s operations gave independent-minded soldiers a sense of empowerment, and perhaps 
a sense of greater significance and less anonymity among the thousands of soldiers a staff 
officer might see on a daily basis in a conventional unit.470 The letters of Simonds demonstrate 
a soldier happy not only to have a relatively autonomous role within his coalition, but also the 
liberty to write in an off-handed way to his ‘old chap’ of a commander, free from the acts of 
submission and dominance so common in military environments.471 Another subordinate, with 
similar nonchalance, wrote to Wingate complaining that it was unbelievable that no spare staff 
officers were available, and signs off in pencil: “Excuse pencil [...] ink not obtainable (like 
staff.)”.472  
                                           
468 Letter from ‘Tony’ Simonds to Orde Wingate, “Dear old Orde,” 12 February 1941. OCW, Box 6, 
2/11/3. IWM. 
469 Ibid. 3 March 1941. OCW Box 6, 2/11/3. IWM.  
470 Wingate was particularly skilled at protecting or shielding “his” soldiers from secondary assignments 
or tasks. His clerk at Jerusalem H.Q., Ivor Thomas, describes this in his oral history.  
471 In the American military, the custom is to sign off every letter to a superior officer with the letters V/R 
or “Very respectfully.” 
472 Letter from Lieutenant C.B. Drew to Orde Wingate. OCW Box 6, 2/11/3. IWM. 
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 When that autonomy was threatened, the response could be despairing and vitriolic. 
Here is Tony Simonds in Abyssinia, writing to Wingate after Brigadier Sandford (the political 
adviser to the emperor Haile Selassie) suggested that Simonds might be replaced with another 
officer:  
I’ll PROMISE you to make a success of this, & NOT to let you down, & I will fight my 
fucking way through Begheder until either I get to the rendezvous with my command or 
the whole flaming outfit is dead!!!! Sorry the outburst! But it is my first independent 
command, I am reveling in it, really have got my confidence back, all my men & officers 
are working willingly with me & it would break my heart if [Sandford] deprived me of my 
command. God bless, old Orde, & don’t let me lose this job.473  
As the excerpt shows, officers could and did argue that they would willingly sacrifice their men’s 
lives in order to maintain their “independent command”. In an unpublished memoir written 
years later, Simonds would begin his narrative of his involvement in the Second World War with 
a statement about the First, wherein he mourns the loss of his own father who was  “murdered 
in 1916 with 100,000 other Englishmen on the Somme, because of the incompetence of the 
British Army Generals, who sent the flower of England against barbed wire and machine 
guns”.474 In his own situation in 1941, Simonds viewed his willingness to sacrifice his men as a 
sign of his own devotion, and an ability to suppress fear. It was a sense of active rather than 
passive: heroic autonomy versus powerless ‘automaton’.475  
                                           
473 Letter from ‘Tony’ Simonds to Orde Wingate, “Dear old Orde,” 13 March 1941. OCW Box 6, 2/11/3. 
IWM.  
474 Simonds, "Pieces of War," 191. 
475 Bourke uses the term ‘automaton’ to particularly describe the process whereby the anonymous 
violence and rote duties of trench warfare rob soldiers of their sense of imagination, humanity, and even 
willingness to live. Bourke,  324-25. 
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 That crucial humanistic autonomy could include costs as well as rewards. In an 
environment of scarce materiel, such as in Abyssinia in 1941, Wingate and his soldiers accepted 
that autonomy would be the tradeoff for good logistics—General Wavell’s staff had made it 
clear to them before they crossed the border that they could expect only minimal support once 
they left the Sudan.476 Still, Wingate’s British volunteers, though engaged in guerrilla warfare 
and enthralled with the autonomy it provided, were not irregulars, and did not want to be 
irregulars: they still desired the pay, supply, medical support, and prestige allotted to soldiers in 
a modern army. The absence of close ties to a regular headquarters therefore resulted in what 
some of the soldiers considered to be disturbing shortages. Simonds expressed dismay at the 
poor equipment and the absence of “entitlements” like cigarettes. Many of the supplies they did 
receive came in worthless quantities. They felt compelled to carry, for example, anti-tank rifles, 
and yet had no anti-tank rounds. In a moment disturbingly close to Joseph Heller’s World War 2 
satire Catch-22, they received medical bags stuffed with cotton wool instead of bandages, and 
simple aspirin instead of morphine and quinine. Their 2 inch mortars—a highly portable indirect 
fire weapon—could fire nothing but smoke rounds. They had four Lewis machine guns, but no 
tripods to ensure accurate long-range fire. Simonds' wireless radio set failed to work—though 
Simonds appreciated this because GHQ could not interfere or countermand local orders he 
received from Wingate or actions he took on his own initiative. Simonds’ men received no 
rations, supplies, or mail over a seven month stretch, and this led, in part, to an attempt on 
some of his noncommissioned officers to desert him in the field, a group action that would have 
more easily been deterred within a conventional British unit with conventional access to 
                                           




administrative reward and punishment; Simonds, according to his unpublished memoir, resorted 
to shooting over their heads with a Lewis gun; the soldiers “sheepishly” returned.  
 The shortages of the campaign continued after its conclusion. When Simonds finally 
arrived back in Cairo, he discovered that he and several other soldiers had not received any pay 
or allowances for the past six months.477  
 Wingate, furious, went to General Wavell, who was utterly ashamed; and I was 
given, as Wingate's [second-in-command] £1,000--out of Wavell's C. In C.'s fund 
to [sic] distributed amongst survivors. And this worked out that I, having served 
the longest time up to then in Abyssinia, received £60!! No so much for 7 
[months] of hazardous and primitive service.478  
Simonds’ narrative of his commanders’ reactions to the perceived mistreatment of soldiers 
reveals that Simonds accepted it as a given that service with Gideon Force should include the 
usual degree of remuneration despite the unusual degree of autonomy. Contrary to Marxist 
accounts of the campaign, participating in irregular warfare did not represent a radical break 
from the military establishment, but instead a parallel contribution.479 
 
                                           
477 Simonds, "Pieces of War," 298-300. 
478 Ibid., 300. 
479 Contra Burchett, Wingate’s Phantom Army. 
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A ROLE IN COALITIONAL ORGANIZED VIOLENCE: “ALL THOSE WORTH THEIR SALT” 
 Many of Wingate’s soldiers sought a role in organized violence, and they anticipated that 
role being celebrated both within and without the army for serving as the “tip of the spear”.480 
The soldiers knew that participation in violence often correlated with a higher status within the 
coalition. Joining one of Wingate’s units, which were invariably committed to the field, could 
increase the opportunity to see what soldiers euphemistically called “action”. Later in life, in an 
interesting second act, the soldiers drew attention to their “wartime service”, but often 
minimized their former interest in engaging in violence, and even tried to draw attention to the 
violence of others as being far worse than their own.  
 The contrast becomes especially clear with a comparison between published and 
unpublished sources. In Palestine, Rex King-Clark was openly jealous of the violence of a rival 
squad leader H.E.N Bredin—but only in his diary. Rex King-Clark excised his desire to kill from 
both his published memoir and in the oral history archived at the Imperial War Museum.481 The 
difference shows a change in attitude toward his violence, but also the duality of the status of 
‘killer’. As an infantryman, Rex King-Clark’s status within his role depended in part upon the use 
of violence; Bredin’s success in killing (not capturing) Arab saboteurs and insurgents led to 
Bredin becoming the most highly decorated British member of the SNS (barring Wingate 
himself).  In King-Clark’s transcribed diary the young officer emphatically says 'goddam them' 
with envy every time another unit, such as the West Kents, successfully kills a few Arab 
                                           
480 For examples of individuals from disparate cultures using violence (especially coalitional violence) to 
raise their status, see Kruger and Fitzgerald.  
481 Lieutenant-Colonel R. King-Clark journal assembled 83/10/1 "April 1938 Some experiences in 




‘gangsters’. His swearing is not expressing anger at the use of British violence, but feelings of 
his own inadequacy. He states plainly on Wednesday, July 6th of 1938:  
I feel very  badly today about last night's show. Worse now as Wingate is reported as 
having—with the R.U.R.'s—killed 9 men out of a gang of 100 he met on the pipe line—
and also as he is said to have sent up two red Verey Light's for assistance, and we didn't 
see either of them.482 
King-Clark’s patrol had not been completely uneventful. He had stumbled into a band of 
‘gangsters.’  None of his men were hurt in the ensuing firefight that occurred at nearly point 
blank range. His men held their ground. The other party fled. This seemingly benign outcome 
did not assuage his frustration.  
 Also our private battle--which should have been a chance in a million--failed miserably. I 
feel I am not the chap for this job....Out tomorrow night again I presume. We must get 
someone soon. Tomorrow I will get on with training the Ghaffirs.483 I feel very low 
today.484  
King-Clark had already apprehended at least one known Arab gangster on 18 June 1938. When 
he stated that “he must get someone soon,” he seemed to mean that he must kill someone 
soon. His journal is largely filled with predictable references to Biblical geographic landmarks 
and the weather and the absence of creature comforts. Within that overall sense of normality, 
King-Clark sought the opportunity to directly take credit for taking human life. SNS operations 
succeeded in halting the attacks on a nearby oil pipeline, and as an infantry officer he surely 
knew that even seemingly uneventful patrols would (to use a military euphemism for 
dominance) deny the gangsters freedom of movement. Nevertheless, during most of his time in 
                                           
482 King-Clark journal.  R.U.R. is an acronym for the British military unit ‘Royal Ulster Rifles.’  
483 Ghaffir: slang for a member of the Jewish Settlement Police.  
484 King-Clark,  23. 
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the SNS he viewed his work as a failure, though there is not a shred of evidence that his 
supervising officer, Orde Wingate, disproved of his performance. In fact, Wingate’s wife 
believed that King-Clark was his favorite soldier, as he enjoyed the younger, wealthier man’s 
playboy attitude and the sly use of personal motorcycles, airplanes, and automobiles.485 Yet it 
was not until King-Clark’s final patrol that the young lieutenant felt fulfilled as a leader of 
infantry, for on that day he and his soldiers raided a village, startled the inhabitants, and killed 
any villager who grabbed a weapon.486  King-Clark then notched his kills onto the buttstock of 
his weapon.487 King-Clark excluded his headhunting “must get someone soon” details from both 
his Imperial War Museum oral history and his book Free for a Blast, perhaps sensing that the 
emotional, intragroup competition among infantry officers in their early twenties made less 
sense now that he was a retired, older gentleman.488 His change in attitude is reminiscent of 
the military officers in Jane Austen novels who mysteriously return from violent imperial 
contexts and then, upon returning to England, say nothing violent whatsoever.489 In his oral 
history (which is actually replicated in his book) King-Clark even goes so far to say that he 
thinks Wingate was “shifty” and favored the Jews too much and the Arabs not enough—strange 
sentiments from a soldier who lusted after killing impoverished Arab gangsters. The day after 
                                           
485 Paterson. Digital file 8, 20:00. 
486 His memoir included newspaper clippings highlighting his unit’s accomplishment of “14 GANGSTERS 
DEAD AND 16 RIFLES [captured]”. Reprinted in King-Clark, 199. 
487 Ibid., 176.  
488 Ibid.; Rex King-Clark, Conrad Wood Interviews Rex King-Clark About the Special Night Squads 
(London: Imperial War Museum, 198x). 
489 Joseph Carroll, "The Extremes of Conflict in Literature: Violence, Homicide, and War," in The Oxford 
Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide, and War, ed. Todd K. Shackelford and 
Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford (New York Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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leaving the SNS, King-Clark rejoined his regular unit. As he drifted into a tired march he 
stumbled across an Arab peasant on the road and he thoughtlessly lifted his weapon and, “to 
my everlasting regret”, murdered him. His regret did not include any sort of reprimand, even 
though he had been surrounded by puzzled and even frightened fellow soldiers and officers 
when the murder took place.490 His obituary in 2007 (reprinted online in 2010) explicitly stated 
that his time with the SNS was “The part of his life as a soldier which he enjoyed most”.491  
 Similarly, H.E.N. Bredin, who retired a major-general, insisted that “I've seen too much 
of war to like it,” but his obituary in 2005 listed almost nothing besides his (and his ancestors’) 
well-rewarded wartime exploits, leaving only a few spare sentences to describe his gardening 
habits.492  Enough of a record has grown up around Bredin to argue that he was perhaps the 
most violent of the SNS leaders.493 Lorna Wingate, in her self-recorded audio memoir, related 
how she and her husband, while dining with members of the Jewish Agency in London in late 
1938, received a confidential report from Palestine. Wingate, reading its contents, “turned very 
pale”, for it informed him that Bredin had instructed his British sergeant to gun down his Arab 
prisoners because “everybody was tired”, and they did not want to wait for a transport vehicle. 
Lorna, with an alliterative twist, adds “Bredin wanted his breakfast” after a long night of 
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patrolling.494 Years later, however, Wingate was dead and Bredin was not. When interviewed 
for Brian Horrocks’ television series Men of Action, Bredin stated that it was Wingate who had 
murdered prisoners.495 Wingate’s widow, Lorna, deeply resented Bredin’s testimony against her 
late husband. “But you see wicked people always wish their wickedness onto others. Thieves 
believe that all the world’s a thief. Liars never believe anybody. Bredin was a murderer. And so 
he accused your father of murder.” She dismissed Bredin as probably having “reached some 
comfortable shelf by now upon which he reposes, waiting for death”.496 The point here is not 
whether or not the murders occurred, but rather to underline the ways in which Wingate and 
his soldiers assigned credit and blame for acts of violence committed by their coalition. Former 
soldiers seemed eager to convey their participation in violence while also insisting that they 
were not as violent as others. Years after the Horrocks documentary, Bredin still insisted he was 
proud to associate himself with the SNS, as he felt that “[we were] presided over by this 
extraordinary genius, Wingate, who we could all see was an extraordinary man—a human 
dynamo”.497  
  In Abyssinia, the young explorer and Oxford graduate Wilfred Thesiger volunteered for 
the British Army in hopes of a role in the liberation of Abyssinia, where his father had for years 
held an important diplomatic post. His background ensured he came to the immediate attention 
of the Governor-General of the Sudan, Major-General William Platt. The young man was 
disappointed when Platt ordered him to work alongside conventional forces rather than go 
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immediately into the field. When a Mission 101 staff officer fell sick, however, the short-handed 
Platt felt compelled to send Thesiger to report to Orde Wingate. Wingate, upon meeting 
Thesiger, gave a performance that may have been as important to Wingate’s hopes in Abyssinia 
as that which he gave to Wavell, for he immediately launched on a detailed story of his plan to 
invade the western Abyssinian highlands, and to reach Addis Ababa before the South African 
Army from Kenya. Wingate made Thesiger uncomfortable with his forwardness, as well as his 
off-putting habits in dress and behavior. Thesiger, an eccentric Englishman himself, tended not 
to have patience with other eccentric Englishmen. Yet Thesiger also found Wingate “inspiring,” 
as Wingate’s political views concerning Abyssinia corresponded with his own. Further, Wingate 
seemed to view the Gojjam campaign and the restoration of Haile Selassie as a worthy effort in 
and of itself, and not just another step in the overall war effort.498 “It was obvious as he talked 
that Wingate never doubted he would be given command of the forthcoming campaign in 
Gojjam, even though Colonel Sandford, who was organizing Patriot resistance there, and 
Colonel Boustead [who had recently raised the SDF Frontier Battalion], had both served with 
distinction in the First World War and were a rank senior to him”.499 Wingate may have 
perceived Thesiger’s support as crucial to his own ambitions due the young man’s past 
connections to Abyssinia and his known loyalty to Haile Selassie; in any event, Wingate 
habitually discomfited older officers and kept younger officers “amused and elated”.500  
 Thesiger was not widely considered a violent man—unlike T.E. Lawrence or ‘Mad’ Mike 
Calvert there are not many testimonies to his violence—yet he proudly noted in his 
autobiography that when Wingate gave him the opportunity to cut off an Italian retreat, they 
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both grimly celebrated the number of Italian colonials he ‘got’, an opportunity that Thesiger was 
grateful to receive. The duality of taking credit for violence in combat again appears in 
Thesiger’s later protestation that Wingate relished combat too much—he twice recalled him 
smiling grimly at Italian casualties—and yet Wingate declined to carry a weapon in Abyssinia 
and never even hunted, whereas Thesiger’s autobiography nonchalantly lists its author’s 
contributions to hundreds of dead lions, dead game animals, and dead human beings.  
 The best example of the drive for combat, however, is Hugh Boustead, who desired 
autonomy, but was willing to walk away from it if Wingate, whom he hated, could ensure him 
of the opportunity for violence. Boustead had served out a truly incredible career even before 
the Abyssinian campaign. As a teenaged midshipman with a king’s commission, he deserted his 
assigned ship in 1915 in order to join an infantry unit in South Africa bound for Europe. Then, 
after service in the trenches as a private soldier, he received a second king’s commission to 
become an infantry officer. Though he never intended to complete a career in the Royal Navy, 
his desertion (which could have been a death sentence during wartime) was precipitated by 
four events. First, his commander turned down his proposal for a daring “frogman” style raid on 
German naval vessel. Second, most of the other midshipmen received assignments posting 
them to service in dangerous European waters. Third, with other midshipmen he volunteered 
for a newly formed Royal Navy Air Service, but Boustead was turned down. Fourth, and perhaps 
most significantly, his brother was killed at Gallipoli in July 1915 (a similar loss propelled T.E. 
Lawrence into direct combat two years later). Bereft, “unsettled,” and even embarrassed, he 
fled into the ranks of a South African Scottish regiment as a private soldier in order to see “an 
active front”.501 
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 In Boustead’s memoir, The Wind of the Morning, he never fully reveals what attracted 
him to combat, but quotes Vera Brittain’s depiction of an “enlarged vitality” created through 
“common peril for a common end” which strikes when young people have “just reached the age 
when love and friendship and adventure call more persistently than at any other time”.502 
Brittain wrote with a scathing hatred of the war, as it destroyed those closest to her.503 
Interestingly, Boustead points out that the same could be said for himself—he seemed to vividly 
remember everyone who was killed around him. But he underlines the importance of the 
“enlarged vitality”.504 It framed his experiences such that little else mattered—he never had a 
family or ‘settled down’—and the pursuit of the “enlarged vitality” enticed Hugh Boustead to 
fight on the Western front, in Russia, in Turkey, in the Sudan, and (under Wingate) in 
Abyssinia. In between, he competed in the Olympic Games and attempted Mount Everest. 
Throughout his life, he pursued approximated bonds of kinship replacing the brother that he 
had lost, and participated in competitive coalitions deemed honorable within the social group in 
which he was raised.   
 Boustead also serves as an example of a soldier drawn to ‘unorthodox’ infantry work. 
Like others, he liked the sense of control it gave him, and even the feeling of relative safety. 
Wingate provided some of this, but even in the First World War Boustead volunteered for the 
sniper section, and thought that night patrols “beneath stars and star shells” in search of 
targets were “more exhilarating than the closed walls of the parapet and parados of the fire-
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trench”.505 When, in 1916, his battalion received orders to engage in a frontal assault against a 
German position, he volunteered his sniper platoon to undertake a dangerous (but seemingly 
less so) mission to cover the battalion’s advance. He received a gunshot wound that opened the 
femoral artery, and he nearly died.506 After a convalescence, the army sent him to Western 
Himalayas to join a new unit, but he could not bear to be there “whilst my friends at home were 
falling daily at the front,” and so he obtained permission to rejoin his old unit in 1918.507 After 
the “stupefaction” of the armistice, he realized he had found the war “greatly stimulating” and 
volunteered to join the British intervention in the Russian revolution. The key finding revealed in 
these escapades is that Boustead’s primary motivation was often the thrill of a direct role in 
organized violence and a sense of being elite; he never prioritized political ideology, or even a 
sharpened sense of nationalism.  
 Years later, in 1941, he bristled at being under the tactical direction of the much 
younger Orde Wingate. They had briefly met several times in the past without having formed a 
definite opinion of one another. Boustead viewed ‘Gideon Force’ and Wingate’s active and 
imaginative plan as being his best chance for once again seeing “action.” Wingate was “going 
all out to bring the Frontier Battalion into battle, and this conception dominated all else in my 
mind”.508 In his memoir, Boustead mocks the “unbecoming” appearance of Emperor Haile 
Selassie and the “scruffy” dress  and “lack of experience” of Wingate.509 When Boustead met 
Wingate in Khartoum, the latter instantly annoyed him by “lying in a cold bath reading Pride 
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and Prejudice, a suitable title, I felt afterwards, for the conversation that ensued”.510 He loved 
Wingate’s strategic concept (which placed his unit at the tip of the spear), despised Wingate’s 
logistical plan and tactics, and finally, in his memoir, sums up his characterization by insisting 
that Wingate lacked “common sense,” and goes to great pains to point out that Wavell often 
wrote of that trait’s particular importance for successful military leadership.  
 Boustead, in fact, might have made an obvious choice to lead ‘Gideon Force,’ rather 
than Wingate. But Boustead was committed to his Frontier Battalion, which he had raised from 
scratch, and Wingate had cultivated closer relationships with high ranking British officers. 
Wingate had also, unlike Boustead, won the trust of the Emperor Haile Selassie. By the end of 
campaign in Abyssinia, with victory in hand against the Italians, Boustead suddenly flushed with 
magnanimity towards the younger officer whose strategic plan had seemingly ensured the 
Frontier Battalion’s place of honor in the fighting. Boustead wrote to Wingate a note of 
congratulations on their recent success, but also an exhortation for further action as Greece and 
Crete fell to the Nazis, and Rommel threatened the Western Desert: 
So do not delay in what is now a minor theatre here, or you will be too late and the 
hurricane will already have swept over the real Middle East before you reach it. ... 
[W]ithout any bouquets I know how much your qualities for war, resolution, boldness 
and imagination will be needed in the Mediterranean.511 
His sudden enthusiasm for Wingate vanished in Cairo. After reading Wingate’s unflattering 
campaign report, Boustead came to Wingate’s hospital bed and advised him that the next time 
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he tried to kill himself, he had better use a gun rather than a knife.512 Throughout his memoir, 
Boustead deliberately writes around Wingate, avoiding Wingate’s more spectacular 
accomplishments, and wrestling with him, even in death, over the scraps of honor afforded to 
Gideon Force. 
 After the campaign in Abyssinia, Boustead’s obvious zeal and competence for organized 
violence (and the instincts which had been kept alive in so many campaigns) resulted, in his 
words, in several opportunities for further participation in the war with Germany “in Yugoslavia 
or Jordan or Sicily or the Levant”, but he “turned them down” because he wanted the autonomy 
of an independent command.513 This left him somewhat stranded along violent colonial 
outposts in the Sudan, engaged in a ceaseless struggle against “brigands.” He does not state, 
or try to explain, if he found this kind of operation any more or less satisfying than operating 
against the Italian Fascists. It provided enough of an ‘englarged vitality’ that he seems not to 
have cared.  
 Participation in organized violence was also a key motivating factor in Burma. When the 
young staff officer Bernard Fergusson told General Archibald Wavell that he was considering 
joining the Chindits, Wavell replied that if Fergusson were married, he would tell him to remain 
behind in India, but that if he were a bachelor he would tell him to go with Wingate. Since it 
was the latter, Fergusson went. And indeed, after years of inglorious staff work, Fergusson’s 
involvement elevated his status and sky-rocketed him to fame. When Fergusson decided to 
follow Wingate, the Chindit campaign seemed “the only prospect for action” in 1943, and 
certainly, for Fergusson, the only opportunity for command.514 The elder Wavell felt that in 
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undertaking the exercise, Fergusson had taken the opportunity “to prove himself a fit 
leader”.515 Wavell then evoked tribal imagery to justify Fergusson's service under Wingate: "all 
those worth their salt would rather attempt hard tasks under a great man than serve at ease 
under a lesser".516 One year later, Wavell’s own son, Archie J. Wavell, volunteered for the 
second Chindit campaign for similar reasons, and not without cost—he lost his left hand in 
action against the Japanese.517 The brutal challenge of Wingate's Operation Thursday became 
an end on its own terms, and needed no justification in terms of nationalism once the strategic 
objective evaporated, instead “the experience to be gained would be invaluable and well worth 
the risk”.518 Despite all the technology brought to bear, modern soldiering remains elemental in 
its conduct: Fergusson’s social and professional status translated into a place of honor within a 
hierarchical coalition built for organized violence. An explicit sense of patriotism only begins to 
appear in Fergusson's book on page 59, when a discussion with other Scottish soldiers evokes 
pastoral memories, allowing Fergusson to return "to [his] column with a renewed idea of what I 
was going to war for.” Nationalism, at least for the soldiers joining Special Force, was the 
dessert wine, and not the main course; the wider context of intergroup violence enabled 
varying strategies of intragroup competition, and it was the latter that occupied their passions. 
Fergusson's writing reveals a mix of attractions and interests within the Special Force lifestyle. 
He discovered happiness, not just in the independence of command (autonomy and hierarchical 
status), but in brotherhood and camaraderie (recreated kinship to increase collective action), a 
focused and unique mission that required difficult (and therefore rewarding) training. “I was 
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getting to know people, and becoming a member of a very happy family, pledged to do great 
things”.519 He earned approbation from Wavell, his long time mentor, respect from his peers, 
and obedience from his soldiers. It was a life-changing opportunity for someone who had 
shuffled from one “snob post” (Wavell's term) or staff job for years.520 When Wavell inspected 
Fergusson’s Special Force column immediately prior to Operation Thursday, Fergusson 
described it as “one of the proudest days in my life”.521 Years later, Bidwell reported that 
Fergusson still remembered his “paladin”, Orde Wingate, as “a man who had enhanced his life 
by giving him the opportunity to take part in two searing but splendid adventures”.522 
 Another Fergusson story illustrates the desire of others to join such units, the life and 
death stakes of the decision, and its disconnect from larger war aims. Fergusson, wanting 
another officer on his staff prior to operation Longcloth, stumbled across a man named Duncan 
Menzies. They shared a prior acquaintance from a "cock up" while holding a tenuous defensive 
line in Tobruk (Libya) against the Germans. It had been an instance of "regular warfare", and a 
strategically important job, but little glory and much embarrassment. Menzies' decision to serve 
in Fergusson's unit should not be taken for granted—Fergusson, in his writing, makes it 
apparent that he feared that Menzies would decline to join the march. There were—
objectively—good reasons not to go. On the one hand, they did have a prior association, and 
the kinship bonds of wartime brotherhood are strong, but on the other hand Menzies had that 
same bond (if not stronger) with their "regular" regiment, the Black Watch. In the end, to 
recruit Menzies for the Chindits, all Fergusson had to do was to tell Menzies “very little” of the 
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mission, and then warn him that the “chances of coming back were about even money”.523 
Menzies nevertheless “jumped at it”, and though Fergusson gave him another few hours to 
think about it he remained firmly attached. A fifty-percent chance of getting killed would have 
put the unit among the highest rates of death in the war. In the event, it proved slightly better 
than that, and Fergusson obtained a 65 percent survival rate for his column. But Fergusson’s 
off-the-cuff estimate gives the sense of how soldiers calculated the risks and rewards of 
entering Wingate's Special Force.  
 Prior to Longcloth, Archibald Wavell, the field-marshal who had empowered Wingate, 
informed the Chindits that an offensive along the coast—to which the Chindts were merely the 
supporting effort—had been cancelled and withdrawn. Fergusson recalled the moment: “This 
was calamitous. True our whole object was to precede and aid in an offensive; this was the 
purpose of our existence. But Wingate still had to prove his case [...]”.524 The worthy purpose 
of the Chindits, at this point, had become to prove the worthiness of the Chindits. It was a 
circular argument moving in the fear that Clausewitz’s ‘friction’ would rob them of the 
opportunity for glory. Cut free from strategic necessity, the desire for the continuance of the 
operation nevertheless seemed unanimous. “I can only say,” Fergusson remembered, “that 
every column commander was in agreement; so would have been every officer had they been 
consulted; and not one of us, even in the life of the after events, has ever regretted the 
decision. So it was on”.525  
 Despite Operation Longcloth’s detachment from strategy, the soldiers maintained the 
pretensions of a higher cause throughout the campaign. Wingate encouraged it. It was one of 
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his specialties. When Fergusson, eager for a supply drop, signaled to Wingate Psalm 22 Verse 
17 (“I may tell all my bones: they look and stare upon me”), Wingate signaled back “It is 
expedient that one should die for the people”.526 Fergusson, despite Wingate’s black humor, 
never let go of the idea of the Chindits as a higher cause—and he became, halfway through the 
mission, more determined than ever to impress Wavell. In the midst of the Chindits’ most 
perilous hour, Fergusson found his column facing two wide river crossings within range of 
Japanese patrols. They had hundreds of miles of marching to go, and little hope of additional 
supply drops, and the Japanese forces within the area were maneuvering (unsuccessfully) to 
destroy the Chindits. Still, Fergusson took the time to insist that his clerk take down a list of his 
officers deserving medals (honor and status always a prominent theme), and then insisted to 
two of his junior officers that if he were killed they should force a private audience with Field-
Marshal Wavell in order to list Fergusson’s “irrefutable proof” that long-range penetration 
campaigns, including the one that they were on, were worthwhile, and that he felt that would 
remain the case even if the present operation ended in disaster.527 
 Fergusson in fact survived the campaign, but Duncan Menzies, the man Fergusson 
personally recruited, was among those who died. The Japanese, to Fergusson’s despair, had 
captured Menzies alongside another soldier. Their captors shaved their heads and beards, and 
then “used him [and the other soldier] for bayonet practice” before shooting Menzies in the 
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stomach.528 The Chindits managed to find him, still alive, tied to the tree. Another officer then 
chose to administer a lethal dose of morphia to Menzies (no sooner had the officer administered 
the drug than he was shot by a sniper and instantly killed). Fergusson posthumously honored 
Menzies with a personal dedication in Beyond the Chidwin, and Menzies’ surviving relatives have 
continued to receive recognition for the sacrifice of their uncle as recently as 2014 in an article 
entitled “In the Footsteps of a Hero”.529 Menzies’ story of risk-taking and Fergusson’s insistence 
on honoring his life and death are but one sample of several thousand from the Chindit 
campaigns. Despite the risks involved, other Chindit officers found it similarly easy to attract 
soldiers to their operations. Michael Calvert, for example, fleshed out his command of 77 
Brigade in operation Thursday with a multiethnic band of refugee Home Guard from Hong Kong 
who volunteered after years of  “feeling disconsolate and forgotten”.530 Though Wingate 
insisted that his leaders should be prepared to accept high casualties, the Chindits were not a 
cult of death as they headed into the jungle—I have not found any instance in which someone 
describes anyone else as having a desire to die in Burma.531 Indeed, the British Army, for many 
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years, avoided honoring deceased soldiers with its highest forms of honor.532 Instead, Wingate 
had trained them up to feel as though they would be the one to survive, even if others failed, 
as long as they followed his exacting tactical procedures and high standards for individual skills.  
THE DEMAND FOR REWARDS 
Though Wingate’s soldiers did not bluntly demand awards it was clear that they desired, 
appreciated, and even expected them. Bredin recalled his British SNS soldiers getting paid an 
extra shilling a day–no small amount in a peacetime army that at times demanded soldiers 
police their own brass after firefights.533 Wingate helped ensure that Brigadier Evetts put Bredin 
in to receive a bar to his Military Cross, as well as a mention in despatches.534  Rex King-Clark 
received less recognition from official channels than Bredin, but still earned the Meritorious 
Cross. King-Clark also stated that the SNS received much better food and living conditions than 
in conventional service elsewhere in Palestine. The SNS took up residency in various kibbutzim 
and lived off of the food of Jewish Zionists rather than regular British Army rations. Many years 
later King-Clark received special recognition from the state of Israel for his participation in the 
SNS.535 
 In Abyssinia, the autonomy of Gideon Force led to a shortage of supplies, but certain 
freedoms in other areas as well. Simonds, in his supply requests, felt compelled to ask for 
contraceptives, as four of his sergeants "had contracted some form of V.D., very prevalent 
amongst the village women.” The contraceptive arrived in a "longed-for air-drop." The air crew 
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tossed the supplies out of the plane, along with bundles of cash for local purchases. The 
contraceptives came attached to a long streamer that read "with the compliments of the Royal 
Air Force".536  
 Simonds expected rewards after the campaign as well, as indicated with his careful 
tracking of Wingate’s movements after the conclusion of Gideon Force. Back in Cairo, Wingate 
"was dosing himself heavily, and ill-advisedly, to combat the fever and malaria from which he 
was suffering. He would not report sick.... If an Officer was admitted to hospital for more than 
three weeks, he lost whatever temporary rank he was holding.... He felt that he could get more 
justice for his men, and recognition of their achievements--as a Colonel--not a mere Major".537 
Wingate’s suicide attempt came while he was struggling to obtain the “justice” and 
“recognition” that Simonds clearly desired. Simonds saw Wingate one final time in 1942, on the 
latter’s way to GHQ India. Wingate spent “a few hectic days at GHQ M.E. trying to right the 
wrongs and neglect of the men who had fought under him at Abyssinia.” Wingate then 
resubmitted the paperwork for a Simonds DSO (he received another mention in despatches 
instead) and a reward for Simonds' secretary, Abram Akavia, who eventually received forty 
pounds in 1944.538  
 George Stanley Grey, an officer who served under Orde Wingate, commented on the 
use of 'war-brides' in Abyssinia.539 The Ethiopian leadership expected and encouraged Grey's 
Ethiopian soldiers to bring along women on the campaign. "During the war,” Grey remembered, 
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“there was a law that you could take upon yourself a woman for the duration. And she went 
along with you as your wife if you had to leave yours behind (that sort of thing) and at the end 
of the war [Grey claps his hands] they split up and that was it.” Women were also frequently 
offered to the British. He remembered Brigadier Sandford rejecting one such offer with the 
phrase “no, this is not our way.” Reflecting on the experience (and reflexively racist), Grey 
attributed the Ethiopian treatment of women as “rather lax in morals.” But it was, perhaps,  
their way of paying their ‘Patriot’ soldiers while on campaign, and keeping the troops in line—an 
especially challenging task when many of the Patriots had previously bowed to the Italian 
occupation. In Operation Thursday, Wingate insisted to his new Chindit formations that he had 
secured them the “best equipment and the best of everything”, including a newly invented 
flame thrower and expensive American field rations.540  
IDEALISM 
 Autonomy, status, an instrumental role in violence, and additional rewards—was there 
room for ideals in Wingate’s forces? The answer clearly must be yes, but the ideals did not 
strictly align with the propaganda reels of the British or American public. Wingate not only was 
able to sell his units as a unique soldiering opportunity, but also as the chance to do the most 
good possible (as a British soldier at least) in an environment of colonial complexities. Many of 
his men openly wore their ideals on their sleeves: William Thesiger and Dan Sandford wanted to 
liberate a country they loved from the tyranny of the Italian occupiers, and restore Haile 
Selassie to the throne. But then again, their own personal status and identity were inextricably 
to Haile Selassie’s fortunes; Thesiger’s relationship with the emperor had afforded him 
invitations to high status train journeys across Africa with the future king of England, 




extraordinary hunting opportunities, and eventually adventures that established him as one of 
the preeminent explorers of the mid-Twentieth century. Dan Sandford held property rights 
within the territory held by the Italians, and had lived there for years with his family before the 
occupation, and had even been appointed governor of an Abyssinian province. And Wingate 
himself first insisted he would restore the Emperor of Abyssinia to the throne as a boast to his 
young wife, to whom he had sold himself as an adventurer and great soldier, and yet at the 
time of the boast he was a captain serving as an adjunct to a territorial regiment, unable to 
even qualify for a position at the staff college.541  
 Higher ideals, in war, are likely to get torn apart. Robert C Glanville, a veteran of Gideon 
Force, felt depressed at the end of the campaign in 1941, as it looked to him that the 
Abyssinian's were “going back to the middle ages...we'd freed them from the yoke of the 
Italians and brought them back to the yoke of Ethiopians”.542 It was an unfair charge against 
the Abyssinians. The Italians infamously used poison gas on resistant Ethiopians and ruthlessly 
executed the children and fathers of resistors.543 The Abyssinians, on the other hand, helped 
the British protect the Italian prisoners of war, and avoided retaliatory attacks.544 But Glanville’s 
comment underlines the quick deterioration of ideals under the pressure of a military campaign.  
 Accounts from Chindit spouses are rare, but Lorna’s audio memoir shows that at least 
some women encouraged the participation of men in Special Force. In 1943, Wingate felt he 
would be unable to gather a first-class staff in London before returning to India, as he had only 
                                           
541 Hay. 
542 Robert C. interviewed by Conrad Wood Glanville, Oral History Interview with Colonel Robert C. 





a few precious weeks to gather a cadre of officers to help guide his operation and fight for the 
interests of his new command.545 His wife, Lorna, recommended that he ask Derek Tulloch, his 
friend from his first years of soldiering.  Tulloch had been to staff college, and had been serving 
in various staff positions since the war began. Crucially, Wingate and Lorna agreed that 
“[Derek] was capable of holding the interior fire of a superior mind”.546 Wingate made the 
attempt, but Derek rebuffed him, believing that the job was beyond him. Lorna considered that 
Derek Tulloch “was used to being led by a strong woman” (his wife) and so Lorna cornered him 
alone, and coaxed and bullied him into finally agreeing, much to Wingate’s appreciation. The 
story would end there, and we would not have Lorna’s audio memoir, had Tulloch not cast 
Lorna’s relationship with her late husband in an unflattering light in his memoir Orde Wingate in 
Peace and War. Tulloch subtly hinted at the “alien” and “violent” relationship between Orde and 
Lorna. This naturally angered Lorna, and led her to record that while she admired Tulloch’s 
“marvelous” book for its depiction of Wingate’s martial action, she derided his understanding of 
Wingate’s marital action, and informed her son (who was in the army at this point) that Derek 
had been “guilty of the most appalling crime—there’s no other word for it.” His crime, Lorna 
avers, was “going to pieces” after Wingate’s death, and refusing to take command of the force, 
as per Wingate’s instructions. “[Derek] is quite hollow inside...in fact, he is a moral coward”.547  
                                           
545 In the event, a well-trained division was ‘broken up’ in order to constitute the additional Chindit units, 
and Major-General Symes, the former division commander, kept his staff together and led them in the 
service of the younger Wingate’s command. Symes resigned, however, when after Wingate’s death Slim 
did not ask him to assume command of the Chindits, but instead elevated Brigadier Lentaigne who—like 
Slim—came up as a Ghurka officer. He sat out the rest of the war in England. Bidwell.  




Lorna’s fascinating influence on the Chindit campaign, even if an unusually vivid example, still 
demonstrates that even in the sharply gendered militaries of the Second World War, women 
could and did play a role in shaping the opportunities for high status war jobs, and then 
competing for scarce honor years after the end of the war. In 1944 Lorna recruited Tulloch to 
Wingate’s staff. In 1973 she castigated him for dishonoring her relationship with her deceased 
husband. As political scientist Rose McDermott recently reminded me, coalition building and 
intragroup competition really are flip sides of the same coin.  
SCARCE HONOR: COMPETITION WITHIN A ‘BROTHERHOOD’ 
 If honor is perceived as an unlimited and boundless resource as the air then we should 
expect to see boundless magnanimity, and virtually no discussion of it because it would be as 
free and easy as breathing, and there would be a ready and mild acceptance of both blame and 
credit, and a disinterested acceptance of whatever role one is asked to play in the nationalistic 
struggle for survival. If honor is scarce, then we should expect to see intense rivalries, calumny 
and doubt heaped upon soldiers, much effort spent on adjudicating or deflecting blame, and 
intense competition for command and credit, only mitigated by the use of strict hierarchy and a 
kinship enforced through discipline. The former world is almost unimaginable, and the latter is 
the one in which we live. 
 In a wartime context, the word enemy could often apply to coalitional rivals rather than 
armed opponents. Military veteran and historian Shelford Bidwell, for example, wrote that 
Wingate’s success at the Quadrant Conference in 1943 “was a considerable personal victory 
over his enemies in India”.548 The slide between rival and enemy was often furious and swift. 
When the ‘official mind’ of the War Office was asked to produce a biographical sketch of 
                                           
548 Bidwell, 68. 
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Wingate for the Official History of the War Against Japan, a Miss. R.J.F. Hughes included the 
following description: 
Forcefulness and determination made Wingate many enemies. His consuming fire of 
earnestness was such that, in a theatre where resources were extremely limited, he had 
energy only to grab tools to get on with the job and none to conciliate his professional 
rivals who found themselves the beaten bidders.549 
The stakes of intragroup competition could escalate quickly, and such escalations were so 
crucial and common in coalition building that later writers depicted them with metaphors of 
violence. Here Bidwell describes the interaction between the professional heads of the British 
military and the regional headquarters back in India after the conclusion of the first Chindit 
campaign in 1943: 
When the British chiefs-of-staff informed the commander-in-chief in Delhi [Auchinleck] of 
the decisions taken at Quebec and the man-power requirements to be met to make 
Wingate’s operational rôle possible there was great consternation .... A furious 
bombardment and counter-bombardment took place between the chiefs-of-staff and the 
staff in Delhi, with top-secret signals for missiles. Wingate himself had the satisfaction of 
drafting the answers from the chiefs-of-staff, who had no intention of backing down or 
modifying decisions taken jointly with their American colleagues.550  
Auchinleck, whose press campaign had elevated Wingate to the status of national hero, 
resented that the war cabinet ignored his concerns over expanding the Chindits. He argued that 
the “L.R.P. Groups...are unjustifiably costly against a first class enemy and achieve no strategic 
                                           
549 Found in Royle, 271. ‘Wingate as a Man and a Commander’, memorandum by Miss R. J. F. Hughes, 
undated, CAB 101/202. Kirby, 3, 219-22. 
550 Bidwell, 68-69. 
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object”.551 While the bitterness between Wingate and some of the staff officers in India proved 
exceptional, rivalries between soldiers occurred often enough that Bidwell, a military veteran, 
proffered advice to his readers:  
Inevitably there was friction [while preparing for operation Thursday]; there always is in 
preparing any big operation. To overcome it an emollient approach works better than a 
rough one. To yield a little is good tactics, as scoring off an opponent only tends to 
establish him as an enemy.552  
Even after the commitment of resources, the competition continued to manifest in many ways, 
subtle and strong. Wingate’s death in March 1944, for example, precipitated sudden stabs of 
internecine rivalry to take his place as the commander of Operation Thursday. When one 
officer, Major-General Symes, realized he would not receive the command, Bidwell relates that 
Symes “understandably asked to be relieved of his post of deputy commander” and to return to 
London.553 A fellow general, like Bidwell, finds it easily understandable that an officer could quit 
his post in an undermanned theater of war after helping to send 14,000 men into the jungle 
behind enemy lines whilst in the midst of a historic global conflict in which the empire to which 
they both belonged was falling apart. It is not understandable from the perspective of ethno-
centric nationalism, or Marxism, or international order. It is very understandable through the 
narrow frame of professional competition within an emotionally charged environment of 
hierarchy, prestige, and dominance. 
 Within the Chindit formations themselves, the competition continued as credit and 
blame were assigned in at least five different ways. First, there came the direct feedback in 
                                           
551 Auchinleck, 169. 
552 Bidwell, 55. 
553 Ibid., 159-62. 
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training and on the battlefield: Fergusson called out one "young lad" as "always in trouble and 
always lazy".554 Another becomes "the finest regimental officer I have ever met".555 The 
informal accounts created a local reputation for each soldier within the immediate hierarchy. 
Second, there were formal medals and despatches that kept a cumulative record to honor 
wartime achievement. Third, obituaries and private memorials honored soldiers lives within a 
broader society. Just as Americans now signal the sacrifice their children have made with gold 
star banners, so too did the British units use memorials, sometimes spontaneous and 
sometimes formal, to honor the fallen. Wingate, upon seeing that Fergusson had, contrary to 
report, survived the return journey to India in 1943, reproached his subordinate for wasting 
"the obituary notice which he had been composing all the way back." Fergusson commented "I 
should have liked to have seen it".556  After Wingate’s own death, Lorna Wingate 
commemorated her late husband with a service organized by Chaim Weizmann. Fourth, there 
were (and are) social clubs and "associations" of veterans to promote the group’s achievements 
and sustain their place in the wartime hierarchy, and these were often responsible for the 
statues and awards and decorative errata after the conflict. Fifth, war writing provided a 
reassessment of the written wartime record, encouraged a pursuit of new types of honor 
(Fergusson and Calvert both had their work described as "classics"), and continued the 
intragroup conflict. 
                                           
554 Fergusson, 29. 
555 Ibid., 31. 
556 Ibid., 238. 
199 
 
“So well thy words become thee as thy wounds; They smack of honour both” 
 War writing, the fifth category, accorded the Chindits exceptional fame. Wingate's path 
through life was that of a professional soldier; 557 the institutions of the British Army shaped his 
preferences such that his obsession with soldiering and a soldier’s status dominated his mind, 
and he only learned to work with the media after Operation Longcloth, and then it certainly 
required the initiative of others—notably Wavell and Auchinleck—as much his own. After 
Abyssinia he turned down at least two opportunities to publish “his ideas” or memoir (though 
he preserved the invitations from W.E.D. Allen and the publishers at Jonathan Cape).558 He was 
not a Stilwell, who dragged a dozen strong press corps to battles not yet won, nor a Churchill 
who viewed the pen as his most powerful weapon. For Wingate’s soldiers, the first wave of 
attention came from journalistic accounts funneled through public affairs. The second came 
through books celebrating the Chindit campaigns as a stunning feat of arms, technological 
breakthrough and heroic victory against the Japanese in a part of the world known for British 
"lassitude" and "waste". Fergusson's skill in observation enabled a post-War prolixity that 
secured him a third-place finish among famous Chindit officers behind Wingate and "Mad" Mike 
Calvert. In the public eye, he might have been the best 'liked' for his ability to recognize, 
restate, and parry writers who denigrated Wingate's Chindits. He also shows a magnanimity in 
                                           
557 The heading is a quote from King Duncan in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, and it comes at the conclusion 
of a battle. In the next act, incidentally, the king’s best soldier, Macbeth, murders him, usurps the throne, 
and tries to undermine the prestige of his peers and dominate his rivals. When British postwar intragroup 
competitions in the Second World War are compared with the standard set in Macbeth, a lively rivalry of 
memorial plaques and war writing suddenly looks a lot more ‘civilized.’ It was just “a right shame” that it 
cost 70 to 85 million war dead to reach the postwar part. 
558 OCW papers, Abyssinia Box 2. IWM. 
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naming and characterizing his many friends--but never his rivals. Calvert, in the years before 
alcohol and agony overwhelmed his judgment, quickly published Prisoners of Hope.559 Even 
soldiers who didn't especially like Wingate, like Jack Masters, benefited from the proximity, 
and Jack Masters' account comes closest--of all of Wingate's contemporaries--of depicting the 
war in the ironic, cruel terms most associated with the First World War.560 War writing helps 
preserve memories, of course, but with few exceptions (Robert Graves comes to mind) the 
writing intends to honor the soldiers who suffered and died—to continue the competition for 
scarce honor, both for the writer who puts pen to paper, and for the soldiers included. Calvert, 
aware that his reputation was on the wane after a court martial for homosexual behavior, 
became increasingly sensitive, and lashed out figures who tried to help him—but who had also 
perhaps eclipsed him in professional accomplishment. Calvert despaired of Slim for the latter’s 
disparagement of Wingate and the Chindits, and he twice took offense to Fergusson, which the 
latter, as he was always able, parried with wit and warmth.561 Calvert tried to reinvigorate his 
reputation using the medium of war writing, but was only partially successful.562  
                                           
559 Calvert’s title comes from the Biblical reference that inspired the moniker for Wingate’s “stronghold” 
concept, similar to a 21st century “forward operating base.” Zechariah 9:12, KJV. “Turn you to the 
stronghold, ye prisoners of hope: even today do declare that I will render double unto thee.” 
Michael Calvert, Prisoners of Hope (London: Cooper, 1952; 1996). 
560 John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay: A Personal Narrative (New York Harper, 1961). In terms of 
First World War literature, I have in mind the ineffective heroics of All Quiet on the Western Front, Her 
Privates We, and A Farewell to Arms. 
561 See Fergusson’s apologetic letter to Calvert published in David Rooney, Mad Mike : A Life of Michael 
Calvert (London: Leo Cooper, 1997). 
562 Michael Calvert, Fighting Mad (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1964; 2004). 
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 The discourse of honor surrounding Wingate’s units remained fraught and conflicted for 
decades afterwards. Churchill gave Wingate a guest-star role in his descriptions of Burma: 
indeed his depictions of Wingate are just about the only positive thing to say about Burma or 
India in the entire five volumes.563 Churchill (like Thucydides) managed to write a history that 
includes virtually no references to women whatsoever, and yet Wingate’s wife, Lorna, makes a 
surprising (and romanticized) appearance in Churchill’s account when Wingate is back in 
London after the first Chindit campaign.564 If soldiers from the Indian Army staff resented 
Wingate's glory while he was alive, they went to work about it after his death, as Kirby provided 
Wingate with the longest profile in the official history of The War Against Japan, but dismissed 
his psychology, character, ability, and suggested (with incredible bitterness) that Wingate was 
lucky to die before others found out that he was a fraud.565 Field-Marshall Slim wrote his own 
“classic” and followed Kirby's line in attacking Wingate—Tulloch, Lorna, and Calvert assumed 
that Slim’s attack was disingenuous, and that he was miffed at Churchill’s publically stated 
preference for Wingate.566 In turn, Thompson, Mead, Tulloch, Fergusson and countless others 
fired back at the Official Historians.567 Even Lord Moran, Churchill's doctor, joined in, dismissing 
                                           
563 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (New 
York: Random House, 2005).  
564 Churchill, 5, 63. 
565 Kirby, 3. Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the Balance. Mead. 
566 Slim Defeat into Victory. 
567 Henry Pownall, Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Volume Two 
1940-1944, ed. Brian Bond, vol. 2 (London: Leo Cooper, 1972). Mead and Bidwell. Mead; Shelford 
Bidwell, "Wingate and the Official Historians: An Alternative View," Journal of Contemporary History 15, 
no. 2 (1980). 
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Wingate as half mad, and even went so far to dismiss Wingate’s strategies.568 Given that 
Wingate was Lord Moran’s patient at one time, it made Moran’s behavior as a clinician 
unethical, as a strategist untrained, and as writer faintly ridiculous—but in sum: perfectly 
human. All in all, the battles of the Chindits and Merrill’s Marauder’s produced no strategic 
victories, but did generate half a dozen classics of military adventure; and the drama of the 
story eventually aided Barbara Tuchmann’s receiving of the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction. Long 
after the last bullet was fired, the competition for scarce honor continued.  
 Wingate, holding as much power as he did, and dying so much sooner than his high-
ranking peers, inevitably fell victim to the conflict inherent in military units. Fergusson, in turn, 
attacked Wingate’s critics more than once,  underlining the competition by referring to 
Wingate’s critics as “professional rivals”.569 Michael Calvert (and many others) went further and 
declared the attacks on Wingate a deliberate conspiracy.570  
 Government sponsored projects such as the BBC’s WW2: People’s War and independent 
personal blogs have enabled subsequent generations to draw attention to an ancestor’s 
participation in coalitional violence; they honor their ancestor and also, depending upon the 
narrative they produce, show their family’s history of service to the community or even signal 
their family’s willingness to participate in violence. Sometimes a connection to the Chindits is 
not fully understood by the family member due to a dearth of information. Even then, 
descendents will often do their best to honor what remains, as is the case in the following 
touching tribute to a Chindit grandfather using a modest internet blog:  
                                           
568 Charles Moran, Winston Churchill : The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 Taken from Diaries of Lord 
Moran (London: Sphere Books, 1968), 113-15. 
569 Fergusson, 242. 
570 Paterson.  
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Towards the end of 2015, my dad sent away for Grandad’s army records, and we were 
surprised at what we got back – his movements throughout the war and his notification 
of release. We were proud to read: "Military conduct – Exemplary. A really good type of 
soldier, trustworthy, sober and cheerful, who always worked willingly. Saw active service 
in Burma 1944 and is strongly recommended for any employment entailing mechanical 
work, such as driving and maintaining a motor vehicle”.571 
On the soldier’s way out the door, the army modestly signaled his usefulness to his community. 
Seventy years later, a  young man honored this individual with a public memorial using a 
technology almost certainly unimaginable during Second World War. The expressions shift year 
by year, but they continue to occur.  
 More complex efforts can serve a similar purpose, and are written with the explicit 
intention of redistributing honor. John Igbino, a British citizen of Nigerian descent, recently 
published a volume that demonstrates how certain Nigerian Chindit formations were being 
denigrated and neglected as ‘fringe’ Chindits. In the most shocking page of the book, Igbino 
shows how postwar photo editors published a popular image of white Chindits processing down 
a jungle trail with a wounded comrade—and to simplify the image both graphically and 
ideologically, they had cropped a Nigerian Chindit out of the frame.572 Igbino’s book seeks to 
                                           
571 Paul Newton, "World War 2: My Grandad, the Chindit: Serving with the 1st Battalion King’s (Liverpool) 
Regiment, India and Burma 1944,"  (2016), https://medium.com/pnewton84/my-grandad-the-chindit-
9e66bc066b60. 
572 John Igbino, Spidermen: Nigerian Chindits and Wingate’s Operation Thursday, Burma 1943 – 1944, 
(Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2018)., photo illustrations. 
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give the Nigerian Chindits “the attention they rightly deserve” after decades of being “neglected 
by contemporary Chindit writers”.573 
Conclusion  
 At times, the soldiers honored in the present made poor tactical and strategic choices in 
the past, not strictly because of the fog of war or lack of skill or professionalism, but because 
the coalitions formed for violence created a  highly competitive environment, and many soldiers 
in rapidly changing circumstances inevitably made choices that maximized their individual 
‘utility’ (to borrow a term from economics), with preferences set not always set by their country, 
but often by the competition within the military ‘brotherhood’ to which they belonged. The 
soldiers who joined Wingate’s campaigns provide startling expressions of a human nature,574 
even as the particularities of individual variation, modern war, and empire rule out an attempt 
to reduce the experience of the SNS, or the Patriots, or Gideon Force, or the Chindits to 
                                           
573  Dr. John Igbino expanded on his reasons for writing the book: “People of my generation - I am 71 - 
are often accused of nostalgia, particularly about the Empire. But people never ask us what it is, or was, 
about the Empire we are nostalgic about. For me - and perhaps for countless number of people - some of 
the things I am nostalgic about was the kind of sense of belonging and brotherhood of mankind which 
the Empire engendered in me when I was growing up in the 1950s.” A personal communication via 
LinkedIn. April 2020. 
574 Smith, examining the absence of the evidence of war in prehistory and the appalling record of war in 
human history, helpfully distinguishes between “components of human nature from expressions of human 
nature. The disposition to war is an expression of human nature rather than a component of it.” David 
Livingstone Smith, "War, Evolution, and the Nature of Human Nature," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide, and War, ed. Todd K. Shackelford and Viviana A. 
Weekes-Shackelford (New York Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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anything as ridiculously simple as ethno-sectarian violence, or primordial war, or religious 
differences, or fear of a rival empire, or the pursuit of natural resources. It is hard to find 
examples of Wingate’s soldiers caring about any of those things; the texture of their experience 
centers more on banalities of evil—the ordinariness of behaviors that culminate in something 
awful.575 Even Wingate, who famously stated his preference for fighting on behalf of the 
Zionists, told his wife that if in post-war Palestine a Jewish state offered him the chief-of-staff 
job instead of overall command, he felt that he would decline to fight.576  
 Both during the Second World War and the present day, hierarchy within the military 
decreases intragroup conflict by creating a clear and almost unequivocal structure of rank and 
prestige. Wingate’s ‘special forces’, with their fast promotions, freedom of action, and 
independence from military hierarchy could actually increase intragroup conflict—that is to say, 
special forces increased conflict among soldiers, especially in environments of limited resources. 
At times, the conflict could spoil the solutions to the collective action problem necessary for 
‘victory’ in modern war. But the individual soldiers in high status, high reward positions may not 
have noticed that conventional campaigns, as in Palestine and Abyssinia, accomplished most of 
the actual work of enforcing their side’s political will their enemy.  
 
                                           
575 Borrowing Hannah Arendt’s phrase. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem : A Report on the Banality 
of Evil (1963). 
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7. “Posturing to shoulder a heavier operational, command 
and control role” 
Orde Wingate’s Growing Influence on Modern Warfare  
 
 An inherent irony of Wingate’s units—the Special Night Squads, Gideon Force, and the 
‘Chindit’ Special Force—was that they did not match the elite training that later units would 
mythologize and claim as ‘special forces.’ Instead, the units consisted of rather ordinary 
volunteers with inadequate means who lived through grinding hardships, endured personal risk, 
and showed inarguable flashes of courage. Strategic outcomes—if claimed at all—were often 
overstated. Later writings on Wingate’s operations, especially from the American perspective, 
ignore the fact that more conventional, massive military efforts produced each campaign’s 
definitive results. In Palestine, the British military’s violent ruthlessness combined with the 
political assuagement of the interests of Arab elites to bring an end to the Arab revolt of 1938. 
A pincer movement of two (relatively) modern British armies destroyed the Italian stranglehold 
on Ethiopia in 1941. A carefully marshaled and well-armed Allied force ended the Japanese 
occupation of Burma in 1945. Yet by the late 1990s, the United States Army found itself more 
committed than ever to trying to chase the Wingate myth of “self-contained formations” that 
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could operate “independent of the division headquarters or support structures”.577 Historical 
evidence offers little evidence that such units, if even possible, would benefit America’s strategic 
goals. Why have such units persisted (and increasingly flourished) in the American military?  
 The present chapter looks at Wingate’s paradoxical influence on modern military 
formations in the United States during and after the Second World War. Other writers have 
emphasized Wingate’s influence on the Israeli military, or counter-insurgency, or his 
sustainment of British ‘small wars’ doctrine.578 Even more writers have critiqued (or at least 
tried to understand) the use of special forces at the level of tactics, operations, or strategy.579 A 
                                           
577Joel D. Rayburn, 1, 10. The quote examines the U.S. Army’s struggle, especially under former Army 
Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, to adapt to the ideal of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’ wherein 
mastery of technology and information could win decisive battles with less of a ‘footprint’. Donald 
Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, pushed hard for what he fantasized could be 
a “lighter” and “more lethal” force, while Shinseki pumped the brakes until crashing into the Iraq war in 
2003. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Group, 
2006). More on the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs in Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military 
Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and 
Israel, vol. null, Null (2010). See also the “battle” (i.e. above tactics and below strategy) arguments of 
Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
578 Bruce Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers : The Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947, First edition. ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015). Anglim, Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior from the 1920's to the 
Twenty-First Century. Akavia.  
579 Richard Halloran, "Military Is Quietly Rebuilding Its Special Operations Forces," The New York Times, 
July 18 1982; Richard L. Russell to Best Defense, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/channel/best-defense/; 
Hasan Bilgin and Kerim Goztepe, "Strategic Utility Analysis of Special Operations Forces Applying Game 
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closer look at the moments when leaders adopt special forces tactics and strategies, as well as 
the motivations of individuals joining such units, brings to the fore a persistent pattern of risk-
taking behavior and operational overreach, sometimes in the face of frightening loss and 
desperation, and other times to make progress through a hierarchical coalition organized for 
violence. In this light, special forces appears less as an ‘answer’ or a ‘solution’ to arcane 
strategic puzzles, and instead as a set of practices that provide personal answers to the 
mundane problems of life. Because the private motivations that make special forces so 
attractive to individual soldiers remain underexplored, the following chapter seeks to show the 
peculiar historical influence of Wingate’s campaigns on American military organization and 
                                                                                                                                        
Theory," Journal of Management and Information Science 1, no. 1 (2013). Anthony King, "The Special Air 
Service and the Concentration of Military Power," Armed Forces & Society 35, no. 4 (2009); Tony 
Geraghty, Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the Cia, the Sas, and Mossad (Pegasus Books, 2012). 
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the Utility of Special Operations Forces," Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 3 (2010); Christopher 
Lamb and David Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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strategy; it also emphasizes the psychological motivations and strategic traps of Wingate’s 
methods.     
OVERVIEW 
 Wingate’s approaches filtered into the United States military in at least two direct ways 
as a result of his Chindit campaigns. The first occurred during the Second World War with 
George C. Marshall’s explicit advocacy for the creation of an American ‘long range penetration’ 
brigade popularly known as Merrill’s Marauders; 580 the experience of the new unit and its 
surviving veterans shaped the training and institutionalization of the U.S. Army Rangers, and 
inspired the wider use of special forces tactics and strategies. The second way Wingate’s 
approaches influenced the American military came during the Vietnam war, through the 
influence of Chindit veteran Robert Thompson; Thompson’s influence centered on a strategic 
reimagining of the battlefield to rely more on local cooperation, fewer troops, and a less 
traditional line-of-communication with which to maintain ground forces. In both cases, 
Wingate’s methods attempted maximal benefit for minimal cost, and they were branded with 
concepts such as parsimony, leverage, and professionalism.  
THE CHINDITS AND MARAUDERS, STRONGHOLDS AND FORWARD OPERATING BASES 
 At the Quebec Conference in 1943, General Sir Alan Brooke (CIGS) and Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill had Brigadier-General Orde C. Wingate brief the Americans on the planning 
and execution of his first “long-range penetration” campaign (popularly known as the Chindits), 
as well as a possible follow up effort planned for 1944. They expected Wingate’s briefing to 
                                           
580 Wingate called his units “long-range penetration” columns, whereas Marshall preferred “long range 
penetration.” I use both, depending upon the context.  
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appeal to the Americans due to its heroics, its direct action against the Japanese in Burma, and 
its proximity to China, which was an American strategic obsession at the time due to the 
tremendous number of Japanese army soldiers occupying the eastern mainland.581 General 
George C. Marshall, the American Chief of Staff of the Army, liked the plan enough to commit to 
it. He would also raise an ‘elite’ American brigade to be placed under Wingate’s command and 
trained in his methods.582 Biographers of Wingate tend to lose sight of Marshall, lumping him 
into the anonymity of an American ‘official mind’ that wanted to support any kind of action in 
China.583 Marshall, desperate for a plan that at least offered the possibility of engaging the 
Japanese army on mainland Asia, quickly adopted Wingate’s plan as his own. Just as the British 
General Archibald Wavell had overleapt his staff process in adopting Wingate’s ‘long-range 
penetration’ plan in 1942, so with Marshall in 1943. Marshall was eager to receive credit for 
backing Wingate. Speaking to his biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, Marshall said in 1956:  
 “Wingate was strong for me, because I printed over here his report on what was needed 
[for his next operation] when the British staff suppressed it. I wouldn’t go for that a 
damned bit. They didn’t want him here [in Washington] but I asked for him, 
and I pushed his project.” 
The trip to Washington was an extraordinary step for a British brigadier general, and one not 
recorded in the biographies of Wingate.  
                                           
581 Rana Mitter, China's War with Japan, 1937-1945 : The Struggle for Survival (2013). 
582 Pogue, 257.  For the sake of clarity, I have replaced Pogue’s use of parentheses with the em dash. 
583 Marshall is missing from the indexes of both Anglim and Royle. He only appears in Bidwell in 
relationship to his promotion of Stilwell, and in Sykes he is only listed as among those to receive a press 
briefing upon the launch of Operation Thursday. See also Bidwell, The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and 
the Campaign in Burma, 1944. Royle, Orde Wingate. 
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From Quebec, Wingate journeyed to Washington for talks with Arnold and Marshall. To 
Wingate’s delight the American Air Chief made every effort possible to furnish necessary 
air support for his operations, and General Marshall took a close interest in the 
arrangements. When Wingate explained special morale problems that arose in his 
operations because men feared that they would be left behind if wounded, 
Marshall asked Arnold if he could design an air-rescue project. The Air Forces Chief could 
and did, devising the forerunner of methods later perfected and used with great success 
in Korea and Vietnam.584 
Pogue puts matter too civilly. During his previous operation, Wingate had ordered his officers to 
abandon the lame and wounded hundreds of miles behind Japanese lines. Sometimes they 
were left in Burmese villages, but other times they simply collapsed, deep in the jungle, from 
malnutrition and exhaustion. A third of the force never made it back. The air-rescue project 
morphed into 1st Air Commando, led by Philip Cochran, an officer more influential in the 
development of the United States Air Force than Wingate ever was for the British.585  Marshall 
quickly grew protective of both Wingate and his campaign plans, for he had “a great fondness 
                                           
584 Pogue, 257. 
585 Cochran was a fighter pilot who had just received tremendous honors for his operations in North 
Africa. When interviewed for the job in Burma, he refused it, saying he didn’t want to “go to Asian 
jungles to fly ‘little’ airplanes in a resupply and evacuation role”. He eventually relented when the mission 
was sexed up with gliders and given the name ‘Air Commando’. He was also given a co-commander to 
reduce the administrative burden, and he received “the highest possible priority  for men and materiel”. 
Cochran’s “success” in keeping alive the starving, disease-ridden soldiers in northern Burma led the 
United States Airforce to push for the wider adoption of air resupply in Korea and Vietnam. Mason et al., 
9-10.   
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for Wingate” and “had no doubt: ‘Wingate would have been in the class of Lawrence of Arabia 
but for his death’”.586 
 Finally, Marshall took one further step to cement Wingate’s influence on American 
military thinking. He sent a copy of Wingate’s report on the first Chindit campaign to the United 
States Army Infantry School for further study, and they in turn adapted it into an essay entitled 
Long Range Penetration.587 As of April 2020, the Infantry School’s adaptation is a more widely 
accessible report than Wingate’s original. Its dissemination provided another opportunity for 
Wingate’s ideas to pollinate among bored staff officers trapped in western Georgia.  
  Knowing that South East Asia Command was a severely overstretched theater of war, 
Marshall tried to make the resources he sent to Wingate nearly sacrosanct. Marshall later 
recalled that he “warned everybody that if they took anything from the operations—Stillwell, the 
British, and the Chinese all wanted some of the stuff I had allotted for Wingate—I would take it 
back.” 
 Marshall ultimately could not prevent the plan’s interruption. The second Chindit 
operation depended upon a concurrent three prong offensive that never took place. When the 
two British offensives failed to materialize, Wingate’s entire operation steadily bent towards the 
implacable, dour American commander General Joseph Stilwell, and Stilwell successfully lobbied 
to move the new American brigade under his control.588  
                                           
586 Pogue, 257. 
587 Long Range Penetration Units. 
588 Bidwell, The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma, 1944, 73. 
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 Nevertheless, Wingate’s Chindit veterans, especially Bernard Fergusson, trained the new 
American unit in jungle fighting and long-range penetration.589 Stilwell put his son-in-law, Frank 
Merrill, in command, and the unit became popularly known as “Merrill’s Marauders”.590 Stilwell 
sent the Marauders on an enveloping maneuver of a Japanese division in northern Burma, and 
then tried to persuade two recalcitrant Chinese divisions to engage the Japanese head on. After 
the Chinese dictator, Chiang K’ai-shek, agreed to the campaign, Stilwell bragged to his wife: 
Put down 18 December 1943 as the day, when for the first time in history, a foreigner 
was given command of Chinese troops with full control over all officers and no strings 
attached.591 
Stillwell was sorely mistaken, however, and the lightly equipped Marauders became the main 
effort for the first few weeks while the Chinese divisions dithered and delayed. As a 
consequence, the Marauders suffered greatly on their march through the jungle, then suffered 
Japanese attacks, and then suffered some more as they were ordered onwards to more obscure 
                                           
589 Stilwell, who begrudgingly admired a few of the key Chindit leaders, stated that monocled and 
bearded Fergusson “looks like a dude, but he might be a soldier.” Tuchman; Gary J. Bjorge, Merrill’s 
Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 6-10.  
Historian Simon Anglim, working through the Wingate papers, found that Wingate rejected labeling the 
Marauders as ‘Long Range Penetration’ units because he felt they failed to closely follow his training 
protocols and leadership. Anglim, Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior from the 1920's to the Twenty-
First Century, 176. 
590 Formally called the 5037th Provisional Unit, conducting operation ‘GALAHAD.’ Note the Wingate 
influence on the operational name, which is that of the Christian knight of Arthurian legend that 
successfully quests for the Holy Grail.  
591 Bjorge, 11. Stillwell overestimated the amount of control he would be able to exert.  
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objectives. It made for an ambivalent outcome, but decent heroics, and tremendous legends. 
After a few months of operations, however, the jungle, the Japanese, and Stilwell’s relentless 
orders had reduced the Marauders from 3,000 to 1,400 active soldiers, the majority of the unit 
having been evacuated.592 They had gone from holding blocking positions along the enemy’s 
flank, to static defense, to seizing an obscure and strategically unimportant airstrip outside of 
Myitkyina—and then having to defend that as well.593 Then the monsoon hit. Incredibly, after 
Wingate’s death in a plane crash in March 1944, the Chindits were placed under Stilwell’s 
command as well. He was a soldier as ruthless as Wingate, but without the imagination to even 
pretend to give uplifting orders—only the drive to send soldiers in the direction of his vanity. 
The saving element for both the Marauders and the Chindits was that the Japanese had to 
endure the same jungle, only without resupply.594 The Allies also received greater support from 
the local Kachin, Karen, and Shah ethnic groups who, even if their preference for the Allies was 
uncertain, they could at least sense that the Japanese were no longer ascendant.595 Myitkyina 
held an interesting place in Stilwell’s imagination. Capturing it, he felt, would show him to be a 
commander capable of seizing an important objective. The head of South East Asia Command 
(SEAC), Louis Mountbatten, had been led by his staff to believe that “Myitkyina could not be 
                                           
592 Tuchman, 444. 
593 David W. Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War Ii (Washington D.C.: Center of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1992), 115-19. 
Tuchman, 445-51. 
594 Latimer. McLynn. 
595 Hogan, 119-22. The OSS cooperation with the Kachins, in particular, helped Americans imagine the 
possibilities of cooperating with indigenous peoples, and later shaped the operations of both the Green 
Berets and the Central Intelligence Agency.  
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taken, or if taken it could not be held, or if held was not worth it”.596 Stilwell managed to 
disprove the first two points, but not the last one, and there’s the rub. Tellingly, when on May 
17th the airstrip at Myitkyina fell to a mixed force of Marauders, Kachin guerrillas, and Chinese 
regulars, Stilwell recorded in his diary, “WILL THIS BURN UP THE LIMIES!”.597 Perhaps it did, 
but any bitter aftertaste was quickly washed out with the incredible superlatives often applied 
to special forces campaigns in hindsight: Churchill called it a “brilliant feat of arms,” 
Mountbatten called it, an “outstanding success,” and a “feat which will live in military 
history”.598 The next day, planes landed with hardly any food, water, or reinforcements, but 
Stilwell did manage to bring an entourage of twelve journalists.599 To celebrate the effort, an 
American newsreel later added an appropriately martial tune over images of wrecked aircraft, 
decimated soldiers, and confused staff officers perched atop an isolated plateau that the 
newsreel gamely described as “an important stop on the air supply route to China”.600   
 After the fall of the ‘cities’ of Myitkyina and Mogaung, and a subsequent distribution of 
outsized prestige for unwanted spoils, the remnants of the Marauders were reorganized into a 
new taskforce, and the remnants of the Chindits were disbanded.601 Years later Charles N. 
                                           
596 Tuchman, 448. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid., 448-49.  
Winston Sir Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (London Cassell, 1948), 569.Vol. 5. 
599 Tuchman, 449. 
600 United News Company, Allies Win Myitkyina Airstrip (New York: Office of War Information, 1944). 
601 The few ‘still fit’ members of the original GALAHAD mission became the 475th Infantry Regiment 
(Long Range Penetration, Special). They were thrown together with a modified cavalry regiment to 
become the blandly named MARS Taskforce.  
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Hunter, the second-in-command of the Marauders, wrote a blistering memoir of Stilwell’s 
misuse of the unit, stating that Stilwell led the Marauders into disaster in order to “bolster his 
ego”.602 If this was one of the major starting points of special operations in the American 
military—and official U.S. military historians believe that it was—then it was an ominous 
beginning.603 In American military lore, many soldiers know of the prestige associated with the 
Marauders, but very few knew how little they had accomplished, or at what cost.  
 Several years later, in the Korean War, the Army brass created a much publicized 
‘Ranger School’ in the hopes of penetrating enemy lines out of a “sense of desperation” after 
General MacArthur’s humiliating setbacks.604 In the same time frame, game theorists began 
deriding the military strategy of World War 2 as “too conservative” and advocated for the use of 
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602 Charles N. Hunter, Galahad (San Antonio, TX: The Naylor Co., 1963), 1-2. 
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published by the Central Intelligence Agency. Bob Bergin, "The Development of a British-American 
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604 Charles H. Briscoe, "Largely out of a Sense of Desperation, Macarthur's Decisions Renewed the Army's 
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“mixed strategies” or random moves to paralyze an opponent with uncertainty, especially when 
making “command decisions for small military organizations”.605 To train the new Ranger units, 
the army recruited veterans from Burma, ostensibly so they could pass on the lessons they 
learned in enduring hardships, capturing strategically unimportant objectives, and scraping by 
with as little resources as possible. The local press, undeterred by history, hyped the Rangers 
as the ultimate warriors, capable of sneaking up on an enemy and decapitating him in silence—
and then catching the head before it could hit the ground.606 In theory, the training sought to 
“combine the best of the lessons learned from the various elite forces that had existed in World 
War II”.607 The cadre included “individuals who had served in either allied or former adversary 
commando type organizations”—that is to include former Marauders and even Chindits—and 
then “created a tough, realistic training environment which included extreme physical training, 
live-fire exercises, and advanced field problems executed in all weather and terrain conditions 
day or night”.608 The Ranger cadre to this day refer to Ranger School as a ‘tactics program,’ 
and those tactics are derived from Wingate’s long-range-penetration program of wireless 
                                           
605 OG Haywood Jr, "Military Decision and Game Theory," Journal of the Operations Research Society of 
America 2, no. 4 (1954). RAND famously encouraged the development of game theory; when looking 
backwards for facts that would support their findings, they found the Chindits. A. H. Peterson, E. E. 
Conger, and George C. Reinhardt, Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and 
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606 The history of the Rangers depicted in Mark Moyar, Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America's Special 
Operations Forces (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 105.  





communication and a thinly established supply line. After a brief training period, the Rangers 
were sent to Korea. On the journey, they heard an announcement that the war would be over 
before they could reach their destination. The sailors cheered the end of the war. The Rangers, 
however, robbed of their purpose and sense of elite usefulness, sulked. Then China entered the 
war, ensuring that it would not terminate but become an indeterminate stalemate. Now the 
sailors sulked, but the Rangers cheered, seeming to prefer an open war (or even a stalemate) 
to a decisive victory in which they had no share.609 Once on the battlefield, however, the 
Rangers’ penetration missions did not occur, as patrolling behind enemy lines was considered 
too likely to instead provoke a larger engagement requiring conventional forces to bailout the 
exposed Ranger unit. Instead, the Rangers simply filled in as regular infantry units, a disciplined 
tactical decision on the part of American commanders. 610 The Rangers, however, with an irony 
that escaped them, complained that they were being misused.611 
 Such discipline vanished during Vietnam. Even at the peak of American military power in 
Vietnam—which still only consisted of ten divisions—the combination of challenging terrain, 
anti-colonial resentment, and a corrupt South Vietnamese government combined once again to 
compel civilian and military leaders to grasp at tactics that suggested doing more with less. 
Soldiers tend to want extra recognition for trying (not necessarily succeeding) in doing more 
with less. In this context, President John F. Kennedy personally encouraged the wearing of 
green berets by Special Forces soldiers—as they become formalized, special forces units also 
                                           
609 Moyar, 104-05. 
610 Ibid. Colonel Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Washington 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973; 2004). 
611 Moyar, 105-08. 
221 
 
receive capital letters—whom he intended to deploy in large numbers to Vietnam.612 The Navy 
Seals were formally organized at the same time. As the war ground on and more conventionally 
trained forces entered the country, conventional fighting occurred on many occasions, but much 
of the violence still involved what became known—thanks largely to Chindit veteran Robert 
Thompson—as counter-insurgency.613 Since, theoretically, the South Vietnamese were 
supposed to be increasingly capable allies, beleaguered American leaders allowed their lines-of-
                                           
612 U.S. Army Special Forces, popularly known as the Green Berets, inspired a wave of post-Vietnam 
scholarship that considered the symbolic messaging of the Special Forces as a dogma of white, masculine 
Americanisms, and related it to myth-making component of a broader ideology centered on American 
security. Cinema artists adapted the green beret as a go-to visual signifier of ‘elite’ soldiering. The bland 
patriotism of John Wayne’s The Green Berets and the shattered Kurtz of Apocalypse Now stand foremost 
among them.  
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communication to collapse into the use of forward operating bases that looked a lot like 
Wingate’s Strongholds from the second Chindit campaign.614 Robert Thompson kept Wingate in 
mind during the war in Vietnam, and cited him as a key originator of many of the tactics used 
throughout the war for supplying distant outposts and exploiting the advantages of wireless 
communication.615 He wrote in 1972 that Wingate "was the first to appreciate that wireless and 
air support, particularly air supply, could give ground forces complete freedom of movement in 
jungle terrain where otherwise the lack of communications would restrict their movement to the 
very limited roads, rivers, or railway".616 Thompson, who had earned his reputation for counter-
insurgency in Malaya, found that in Vietnam the Americans naively failed to place all civil and 
military resources under a single authority—an idea that may not have been feasible anyway, 
since the United States lacked the power of a colonial government.617 His doubts about 
American policy, however, did not tarnish his view of his former commander, Wingate, for 
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whom he went out of his way to lionize, and shield from criticism in the viciously see-sawing 
assessments passing back and forth within British military circles.618 
 In the dispiriting collapse of American efforts in Vietnam, the United States Army 
decided to create the 75th Ranger Regiment. When it was established in 1973, it adopted the 
lineage of Merrill’s Marauders, and used the Marauder’s shoulder patch as an inspiration for the 
flash for their berets.619 The most recent editions of the Ranger Handbook—the field manual for 
the United States Army Ranger School—explicitly cite the influence of Orde Wingate’s training 
and techniques, and credit him with the organization and training of the Marauders, and then 
describe the Marauders as “the father” of the modern 75th Ranger Regiment.620 Most members 
of the Ranger Regiment still go through Ranger School but, for the regiment as a whole, the 
Wingate influence on special operations is largely in terms of a historic afterglow that confers 
prestige upon the unit, and provides a narrative that communicates its status in the military 
hierarchy to other soldiers, and to the broader population. 
 The lure of special forces has been felt especially strong since September 11th, 2001, 
when terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center buildings in New York and severely damaged 
the Pentagon with the suicidal use of hijacked commercial aircraft.621 In Afghanistan, United 
                                           
618 See also the forward to Mead. The most widely cited attacks on Wingate come from Slim. And Kirby, 
3. 
619 Semancik. 
620 U.S. Dept. of the Army Headquarters, Ranger Handbook, Tc 3-21.76 (Washington D.C.: Department 
of the Army Headquarters, 2017), xviii. 
621 The most useful history of the September 11 attacks and the United States’ immediate response 




States special forces units combined with deep strike jet aircraft to quickly drive Al-Qaeda 
militants and Taliban forces into hiding, but were unable to either seize or hold or protect the 
villages, towns, or cities that constituted the most important part of the battlefield. Similarly, 
the invasion of Iraq marked perhaps the largest use of special forces tactics and strategies in 
history, with almost half the geographic terrain of Iraq ‘cleared’ using special forces. It was 
again correctly assumed by war planners that special forces soldiers could destroy targets in 
western and northern Iraq with a reliance on superior technology, skillful training, and precisely 
planned operations. War planners failed to consider, however, that Iraqi militants might simply 
melt into towns and cities, exert their will on the populations, and seek a fight only once the 
special forces soldiers had moved on. Further, a civil war broke out among the Kurdish forces 
supposedly allied with one another and with the United States, leaving northern Iraq’s security 
in an even more perilous state. In this manner, special forces completed all of their key 
objectives during the invasion of Iraq, and yet failed to have a strategic impact on the opening 
moments of what became a decades long war.622 This irony is not a design flaw: modern 
special forces units exist, from an anthropological perspective, in order to provide a sense of 
achievement and high status, a sense of self-control and certainty, and to create a close-knit 
bond between soldiers. Coalition building necessarily involves intragroup competition, and 
special forces provides a clear way to manage the costs of conflict in the struggle for 
hierarchical status. Special forces soldiers, like most of us, do not quite use such explicit 
language. Instead it is often coded in “unit cohesion” and “professionalism,” with an 
accompanying emphasis on abstract ideals including freedom, democracy, and liberty, pulling 
language right out of Wingate’s hat of Second World War strategies for intragroup competition: 
                                           
622 Joel D. Rayburn, 1, 103, 18. 
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insist on moral and professional superiority, compete in intense training environments, and 
marshal limited resources for high status results in circumstances of low strategic value.623  
 Beyond the units formally called ‘special forces,’ Wingate’s methods for operating with a 
reduced footprint have continued to exert a broad tactical influence on warfare. The United 
States and Britain, in a key example, have established remote, well-defended compounds that 
communicate with one another via wireless transmission, and which the military supplies 
through air drops or intermittent ground convoys.624 Wingate, drawing on his Biblical 
nomenclature, used the word ‘Strongholds’ to describe such tactics in 1944, but in Iraq and 
Afghanistan the commanders use the perhaps less inspiring term of  ‘Forward Operating 
Base’.625 In any event, military leaders, unknowingly following Wingate, have forgone traditional 
‘lines-of-communication’. The establishment of traditional lines, however, may be a necessary 
condition for forcing their “political will” against their out-group rivals—that is to say, their 
enemies.  
                                           
623 Leonard Wong, "Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 
Army War College, 2003). 
624 The establishment of forward operating bases had become a widely accepted tactic in the ‘War on 
Terror’ as early as 2002. Curtis W. Hubbard, "Base Defense at the Special Forces Forward Operataional 
Base" (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002). 
625 Forward Operating Bases (or F.O.B) have become increasingly complicated, belying their purpose as 
impermanent military structures. A description of these features (and the unexpected psychological costs) 
can be found in Douglas; Wong Lovelace, Leanard, "Cu @ the Fob: How the Forward Operating Base Is 
Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006). 
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SPECIAL FORCES NOW 
 Wingate was a strategist, capable of re-imagining the objectives of organized violence 
under the constraint of limited resources. Famously, after each campaign he wrote blistering 
reports arguing that the broader army’s failure to maintain a line-of-communication with his 
troops (he usually blamed the staff, occasionally blamed his men, and rarely blamed himself) 
reduced the survivability and usefulness of his soldiers, and consequently, his mission. He 
expected, especially during the first Chindit campaign, high casualties. After all, he loudly told 
his soldiers that only half of them could expect to survive the campaign, and he ordered them 
to leave the lame and wounded on the side of the trail.626  But he imagined, if not seriously 
executed, campaigns that would prove of strategic value. Since his British commanders only 
approved the creation of his units after major setbacks, it cannot have been truly shocking to a 
soldier as ruthless as Wingate that the resources necessary to complete his strategic objectives 
never materialized. The personal objectives, however, did materialize: the personal honor, the 
promotions, and the exclusivity of the club.   
 The personal rewards of special forces continue to materialize to this day, with the trade 
magazine Army Times baldly emphasizing, in a recent journalistic report, that special forces 
provides the opportunity to earn “big bucks” and “rapid promotion” in a “team you can trust” 
while deploying to a “real war”.627 The Army Times report presumes that a decision on whether 
or not a soldier attempts to join special forces remains rooted in self-interest.  
                                           
626 Fergusson. 
627 Meghann Myers, "Earn Big Bucks, Move up Faster When You Go Army Special Ops — but Can You Cut 




Perhaps it’s the higher standards or the notoriously high operations tempo, but 
the [Special Operations Recruiting Battalion] is generally not accustomed to 
filling every spot. “Not necessarily that [special forces is] hard and they’re afraid 
of it, but [soldiers feel] ‘I’m good where I’m at, I’m successful where I’m at right 
now. I don’t want to risk that’”.628 
For individual soldiers, the complexities of modern war ensure that the ultimate strategic or 
tactical effects of their choices recede into the distance, overwhelmed by the practicalities of 
balancing status and survival.  
 The selling point to leaders who choose to resource special forces remains the same, as 
shown with a quote from former Special Operations Command (SOCOM) commander Admiral 
William McRaven’s United States Special Operations Command 2020 report:  
Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint 
approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational 
presence, and advisory capabilities.629 
The United States military has always been most straightforward in its recruiting pitch for 
families, regardless of whether or not the military can deliver:  
In the end, our success is ultimately rooted in how well we take care of our most 
precious resource - the SOF warriors and their families.630 
The report then alternates between the modest language of “deterrence”, but inevitably slips 
into the doctrine of hope most essential to special forces budgets and brawn in a section titled 
                                           
628 Ibid. 
629 Public Affairs Office, "United States Special Operations Command 2020," (http://www.socom.mil: 
United States Department of Defense, 2013), 1. 
630 Ibid., 2. 
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“Win the Current Fight.” It begins with a mitigating claim pointing out that special forces units 
are too small in number to accomplish the strategic objective they nevertheless are oriented 
towards: “The imperative to winning the current fight is first and foremost our commitment to 
Afghanistan, a significant international effort”.631 The dependent clause carries a lot of 
information: there are many countries involved in Afghanistan with diverse interests; if the 
United States fails to obtain its objectives, McRaven wants to signal that the fault lies not with 
Special Operations Forces. “This effort is linked back through both the Joint Staff and Defense 
Department objectives to the National Security Strategy (NSS).” The intensive use of military 
slang, nomenclature, and jargon allows confusion to mitigate dissent, and prevents a discussion 
of whether or not “winning the current fight” can be obtained with the resources available—or if 
the purpose of the fight can be accurately described. “We have achieved unity of effort in this 
campaign and gained efficiencies by aligning all U.S. and coalition SOF under a single SOF 
command.” Wingate clawed resources out of conventionally organized armies, but in the United 
States we have provided ‘SOF’ with an independent budget, staff, and command, thereby 
obviating a competition over resources with other types of war power—or soft power, such as 
international aid organizations, or economic development programs. “As conventional forces 
continue to drawdown in Afghanistan, SOF is posturing to shoulder a heavier operational, 
command and control role with interagency and partner nations.” Here, ‘SOF’, shouldering a 
heavier load, takes on the imagery of weightlifting, or Atlas, though the multiple items suggests 
that circus juggling might be more appropriate. As Special Operations Forces prepare to 
‘shoulder’ or juggle those tasks, the report is quick point out to leadership that “we still 
represent less than 4% of the DoD total budget. While maintaining cost effectiveness, we will 
                                           
631 The preceding and following quotes from ibid., 2-4.  
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remain within our programmed manpower growth”.632 That is important, because the 
Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force orders special forces community to “Be 
affordable in every way possible”.633 
 The quotations listed above come just from the introduction to McRaven’s report. The 
SOCOM 2020 report contains every aspect of ‘special forces’ that make this set of strategies and 
tactics so attractive to soldiers and to leaders in the day-to-day competition for status and 
survival.  
 Language plays a role in sustaining Wingate’s concepts and methods, both in special 
forces units and among more conventional formations. Within armies, especially those 
seemingly caught in an unwinnable war, there is an emphasis on personal accomplishment just 
as much (and often more) than unit accomplishment. It is a long established trend. In her 
biography of Stilwell, Barbara Tuchman took particular umbrage  at the British Army’s ebullient 
depictions of failure.634 
No nation has ever produced a military history of such verbal nobility as the 
British. Retreat or advance, win or lose, blunder or bravery, murderous folly or 
unyielding resolution, all emerge alike clothed in dignity and touched with glory. 
[...] Everyone is splendid: soldiers are staunch, commanders cool, the fighting 
magnificent. Whatever the fiasco, aplomb is unbroken. [...] Disasters are 
recorded with care and pride and become transmuted into things of beauty. [...] 
Other nations attempt but never quite achieve the same self-esteem.635 
                                           
632 Ibid., 7. 
633 Ibid., 8. 
634 Paul Fussell called this “raising the idiom” of war. Fussell, 175. 
635 Tuchman, 557. 
230 
 
Tuchman, in making her case against the British, overstates  other nations’ honesty when it 
comes to depicting battles. It is true, for example, that some Americans admire the frankness of 
The Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, but many more Americans suffer a fondness for the lofting, 
lying literature of ‘the Old South’. 636 With the proliferation of special forces, the United States 
now finds itself competing with the British—even surpassing them. The special forces soldiers, 
no matter the outcome, have “without faltering”  become “ideal...masters of the night” as they 
maintain an “inexhaustible...ceaseless vigil” with “indomitable courage.” The words, which pour 
off the pages of the popular literature on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and every unit’s 
website, are applied without discernment to America’s tactical successes, tactical failures, and 
strategic emptiness. The use of the status-establishing words applied to special forces extends 
now all the way to the White House, where President Trump recently assured us that the three 
convicted war criminals he pardoned—Navy Seal Matthew Ghallahger, Green Beret Mathew 
                                           
636 Of Robert E. Lee, whom in the battle of Chancellorsville was in the process of losing his best general 
and almost one-quarter of his force, it was later said: “[When] I looked at him in the complete fruition of the 
success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that it must have been from some 
such scene that men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of gods.” Clement A. Evans, Confederate Military 
History: A Library of Confederate States History, 12 vols., vol. 3 (Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Company 1899), 
390. High language for the low cause of maintaining the enslavement of African Americans. The text was written by 
Lee’s aide-de-camp, which I first became of aware of when reading  
Derek  Smith, The Gallant Dead: Union & Confederate Generals Killed in the Civil War (Mechanicsburg, 
PA: Stackpole Books, 2005), 127. The memoirs of Grant were in part a rebuttal of the South’s rewriting of 
history. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New York: C. L. Webster & co., 1885). 
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Golsteyn, and paratrooper Clint Lorance—were “the bravest men.” “Heroes,” really, if you don’t 
think about it.637  
 Would Wingate be proud to see the replication and frequent use of his methods in the 
twenty-first century? Would he accept any blame for their strategic failures? In both cases, 
probably not. He never forgave the strategic errors of his contemporaries. He would be unlikely 
to forgive ours. He would accept all honor, and celebrate (as we do) the soldiers who complete 
such arduous training and missions. But he would, as so often happens in human nature, defer 
the blame to someone else. The special forces units emanating from the United States have 
never met Wingate’s written standard of massive scale, command and control, and local 
involvement all oriented towards a clearly articulated global strategy; the more Wingate thought 
about decisive victory, the more he thought in terms of corps and army sized formations.638 
Wingate’s own operations, however, never met his own standard for strategy. For soldiers, 
strategic goals are secondary to the internal competition within a coalition for organized 
violence. This basic problem ensures not only that no plan survives contact with the enemy (a 
common truism among soldiers), but that no plan survives the intragroup competition around 
the council table. Due to that competition, poor war plans are often adopted, as seen in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Vietnam, the longest and most strategically futile wars in American history.639 
                                           
637 Andrew M. Bell and Thomas Gift to War on the Rocks, December 5, 2019, 2019, 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/war-crime-pardons-and-what-they-mean-for-the-military/. 
638 Anglim, Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior from the 1920's to the Twenty-First Century, 203-08. 
639 Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Long War : A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War 
Ii,"  (2007); Ricks; ; Thomas E. Ricks et al., The Generals : American Military Command from World War 
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These wars and occupations occur, in part, because American military officers misread the 
lessons of the Second World War, and then sell political leaders on cheap, low casualty, 
politically popular strikes on precisely defined targets which ultimately cannot be leveraged for 
strategic gains.640 The state of Israel, the site of Wingate’s first moment of fame, has suffered a 
similar experience. Citizens are asked to trust elite soldiers. They are rarely asked to gird 
themselves against the fear of terrorism, or to consider the limitations of instrumental violence 
in an asymmetrical conflict.641  The confusion is even more profound in America, where the 
absence of conscription enables almost total alienation between citizens and ‘warriors’ (the term 
soldiers is out of fashion);642 the existence of a rootless military class has led to awful 
consequences in states throughout the world, including coups against democracy and the 
collapse of constitutional government.643  
                                                                                                                                        
2012); James H Lebovic, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (JHU 
Press, 2010). 
640 Jenna Jordan, "Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation 
Strikes," International Security 38, no. 4 (2014); Bryan C. Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists: How 
Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," ibid.36 (2012). Price’s promising title gives way 
to “mixed results”, and finds evidence only for tactical stalling.  
641 Ami Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 149. 
642Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules : America's Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2010); A. J. Bacevich, "The New American Militarism : How Americans Are Seduced by War,"  
(2005). 
643 Zoltan D. Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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 Today’s special forces, which, unlike in Wingate’s time, now require years of physical 
and mental training prior to deployment, remain rich in opportunities for personal honor, as 
soldiers are deployed throughout the world on behalf of the United States.644 When the 
operations go well or “come off” (and the public’s support can be assured) we learn of the 
actions immediately, as with Wingate’s survival in the first Chindit campaign in 1943, or the 
assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011.645 The rest we learn about later, as almost every 
week a new memoir is published arguing for the heroism of a Green Beret or a Navy Seal or a 
Delta Force operative.646 Occasionally, bad news leaks out, such as when Navy Seal Matt 
Gallagher stabbed to death a teen-aged boy who had his hands tied behind his back, or when a 
team of Rangers mistakenly shot and killed fellow soldier (and ex-NFL player) Pat Tillman.647 
For the most part, however, the failures are often hidden away in classified documents, such as 
                                           
644 Nick Turse, "Special Operations Forces Continue to Expand across the World—without Congressional 
Oversight,"  The Nation (2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/special-operations-forces-
continue-expand-across-world-without-congressional-oversight/. 
645 Macon Phillips, "Osama Bin Laden Dead: President Obama Addresses the Nation to Announce That 
the United States Has Killed Osama Bin Laden, the Leader of Al Qaeda," in White House Archive, 
President Barack Obama (Washington D.C. : United States Government, 2011); Burchett. 
646 A quick sample of just three such books reveals the tensions within the ‘SOF’ or ‘SOCOM’ community. 
Christopher Drew Nicholas Kulish, Sean D. Naylor, "Among Navy Seals, a Split on Cashing in on the 
Brand," The New York Times, 3 April 2016 2016. Mark Owen and Kevin Maurer, No Easy Day: The 
Autobiography of a Navy Seal : The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden (New 
York, N.Y: Dutton, 2012); Jack Murphy, Murphy's Law: My Journey from Army Ranger and Green Beret to 
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when Merrill’s Marauders were spent on a useless objective; or when Wingate’s brigade, during 
the first Chindit campaign, was effectively destroyed; or when Wingate attempted suicide after 
his campaign in Abyssinia. The personal honor and tactical victories are therefore highly public, 
while the costs can be highly classified.648 The costs, of course, move beyond the explicit loss of 
human life and dignity, and into the shifty value of government currency. The detailed use of 
public funds for constant special forces deployments, year after year, also remains a carefully 
guarded secret lest a line-item budget betray the as-of-yet undisclosed operations occurring 
throughout the world, even as I write this. Furthermore, the abandonment of traditional 
concepts of what it means to “hold” a strategic area means that, compared with conventional 
war, modern war is seemingly cost efficient. It is certainly rich in opportunities for personal 
honor, if not strategic success.  
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